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Abstract
Williams, Walter Franklin. Ph.D. The University of Memphis. December, 2016.
Monetary Policy and Railroad Overcapitalization: Their Role in the Depression Years,
1893−1897. Major Professor: James E. Fickle, Ph.D.
This dissertation takes an in-depth analysis of five causes of the Nineties Depression
which are varied, but occurring simultaneously during a four-year period from 1893 to
1897. The study of this economic period is important because these causes played a key
role in producing the financial upheaval that brought on the Depression of 1893−1897.
Much of the regulatory environment of the various banking reform acts and the railroad
acts of the early twentieth century resulted from this catastrophic depression which have
given added importance to its time frame. This investigation begins with a descriptive
analysis of how silver coinage authorized by the Bland-Allison Act of 1878, and its
successor bill, the Sherman Silver Purchase Act of 1890, created parity problems between
gold and silver in the U.S. currency system. These monetary parity problems ultimately
led to causes that brought about the depression of the 1890s.
The five years from 1893 to 1897 are unique in American economic history, in that
up to this time, no other financial panic or prolonged economic depression caused such
sweeping monetary ruin for such a broad population of Americans. Cotton farmers of the
South suffered from depressed prices with cotton reaching as low as five cents a pound,
corn and wheat farmers of the Midwest suffered from periods of drought during this
economic downturn, and there were bank failures that imposed untold financial ruin upon
the merchant and industrial classes as well. What began as a panic with the failure of the
Philadelphia and Reading railroad on February 26, 1893, led to the most severe and
deepest five-year depression of the late nineteenth century. This dissertation and research
has expanded upon and contributed to a much-needed financial focus on America’s late
nineteenth-century monetary and economic transformation. The industrialization of
iv

America with an inadequate monetary supply during the 1890s was part of the economic
process that led to this economic depression. The research has also offered a greater
analysis of the global economic interrelationships involved and the existing global
influences which compelled countries on the gold standard to maintain adequate reserves.
Global influences would not allow the standard parity of a 15 to 1 ratio of silver to
gold established by a January 1837 currency bill to remain in place. As more European
countries adjusted their monetary standard to a primary gold standard, the United States
was under constant pressure toward maintaining the convertibility of its bank notes into
gold upon demand while continuously maintaining an adequate U.S. Treasury gold
reserve. The five major economic problems that created the “perfect economic storm”
for the Depression Nineties are addressed within a global context as well.
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Introduction

This dissertation’s research addresses and provides persuasive arguments
suggesting that the Panic of 1893 and the ensuing Depression of 1893−97 resulted from
five interrelated economic causes that created the “perfect storm.” The research reveals
that these five causes brought on an economic depression that surpassed the Panic of
1873, and is only exceeded by the Great Depression of the 1930s.
The first two causes, which resulted in the financial downturn, can be grouped
together, because they were brought about by national monetary policy. The first cause
was the National Banking Act of 1863 and its continuance without modification for the
next fifty years. The second was the McKinley Tariff of 1890, which reduced federal
revenue for five years and depleted the gold tariff duties taken in by the U.S. Treasury.
The other three causes of the late nineteenth-century depression can be grouped
together because they happened outside the realm of the federal government, even though
railroads were supported financially by large federal land grants. The third leading cause
of the Panic of 1893, was the overcapitalization of railroads. Railroad promoters sold and
issued watered-down stock from railroad companies that were vastly overcapitalized
based on the revenue they had earned. One-fourth of the entire U.S. railroad system (192
railroads) was under the control of receivers during the year ending June 30, 1894.1
The fourth cause was falling farm commodity prices, which was a factor in the
political and cultural Populist movement. The Populist demands and concerns became
central to the Election of 1896, with William Jennings Bryan as the Democratic Party
1

Edward G. Campbell, The Reorganization of the American Railroad System, 1893−1900 (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1938), 26.

1

nominee against Republican Presidential candidate, William McKinley. A major
contribution of this research is its examination of how the monetary interaction of the
Populist movement, its beginnings, with its attempts to unify the South with the West,
made the push to make its voice heard in the halls of Congress. The Populists demanded
fiat paper money, increased silver currency, and an easing of credit restrictions. (Two
chapters of the dissertation are devoted to the Populist movement and its demand for a
greater monetary supply and circulation with which to finance seasonal crops.)
The fifth and final major cause of the Depression of 1893−97 was the Baring
Brothers Argentine Crisis of 1891, which resulted in Baring Brothers dumping American
railroad stocks to make good on the defaulted Argentine bonds which it had underwritten
for its own British investors. The “Baring Panic” during the autumn of 1890, changed the
attitude of European investors in foreign securities, because the demand for Argentine
securities slackened as a result of the Baring crisis and created a certain pale over all
foreign securities during 1890−91.2 At that time many American railroad securities were
actively traded on the London stock exchange, and by the Panic of 1893 occurrence, a
total of thirty-eight American rail stocks existed on this exchange.3 This created a large
vulnerability of American securities that would be sold during this panic. A chapter of the
dissertation will explain the Baring Brothers crisis and its global reach into the United
States as a delayed effect of an overcapitalized railroad structure.

2

Alexander D. Noyes, Forty Years of American: A Short Financial History of the Government and the
People Since the Civil War, 1865−1907 (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1909), 157. See Charles W.
Calomiris and Gary Gorton, “The Origins of Banking Panics: Models, Facts and Bank Regulation,” in
Financial Markets and Financial Crises (NBER), ed. R. Glenn Hubbard (Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1991), 161−162. See also Henry S. Ferns, Britain and Argentina in the Nineteenth Century
(London: Clarendon Press, 1960), Chap. XIV “The Baring Crisis.”

3

Dorothy R. Adler, British Investment in American Railways, 1834−1898 (Charlottesville: University
Press of Virginia, 1970), 156.

2

The Depression of 1893−97 occurred when America’s industrialization processes
were beginning to take hold, and, while at the same time, the country was becoming
increasingly urbanized. Given their impact, historians agree that the studies of economic
depressions are important, and economists look to earlier depressions as a means to
understand current economic trends. For example more recently, macroeconomics
specialist and longtime chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, Ben S. Bernanke wrote
about the Great Depression stating “that there is also so much to learn from the
Depression about the working of the economy.”4 Bernanke argued that such topics as
“high unemployment, failing banks, volatile financial markets, currency crises, and even
deflation,” which were also issues of the twenty-first century during the Great Recession,
occurred during the Great Depression. Bernanke also indicated that the issues leading up
to the depression of the 1890s are as relevant today as they were then.5 So by looking at
the financial crisis of 1893−97, we may find some help in understanding current trends.
As stated, this study has provided an in-depth look at U.S. monetary policy
toward the close of the late nineteenth century, when the United States was on a unified
gold-standard monetary system. This system existed despite the efforts by Congress for a
bimetallic policy of silver coinage and silver certificates, which could readily be
converted into gold specie. Hence, the research has originated with an examination of
how the coinage of silver with the Bland-Allison Act of 1878, and its successor bill, the
Sherman Silver Purchase Act, created parity problems between gold and silver in the U.S.
currency system which ultimately contributed to the depression of the 1890s. As a result,

4

Ben S. Bernanke, Essays on the Great Depression (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), vii.

5

Ibid.
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historical analysis is given of the sectional divisiveness that accompanied the current
bimetallic policy beginning with the Sherman Silver Purchase Act of 1890. This policy of
bimetallic currency and its disparity problems has remained an important part of history
because it produced the financial upheaval that brought on the Depression of 1893−97.
While the U.S. monetary policy of today is based solely on fiat paper money backed by
the full faith and credit of the federal government, this was not the case during the late
nineteenth century, when the United States was on a gold standard. When the United
States went off the gold standard in 1933, privately held gold coinage and gold
certificates were called into the Federal Reserve System. Even so, much of the regulatory
environment of the various banking reform acts and the railroad acts of the early
twentieth century resulted from this earlier catastrophic depression.
Historiography
There are basically four historical accounts of the Depression of 1893−97, each
published decades apart. The first is William Jett Lauck’s book written in 1907.
Unsurprisingly, it is outdated and contains errors. Lauck makes the argument “that it is
not necessary to go beyond the border of this country in search of an explanation of the
calamity” of 1893.6 Clearly, he did not take into account the Baring Brothers Argentine
Crisis of 1891.
Lauck discussed the grand total of British capital commitments in Argentina, but
he did not account for Argentina’s default on its “Public Works” bonds in 1891. This
default contributed to an overall steep redemption in U.S. railroad securities by Baring
Brothers, and other overseas investors who became increasingly concerned with their
6

William Jett Lauck, The Causes of the Panic of 1893 (New York: Houghton Mifflin and Company, 1907),
118.

4

foreign investments. Lauck’s work confirmed the concept of inflationist agitation of the
“sound money” theorists, while accepting that there was a general fear that the United
States would go off the gold standard.
However, the most erroneous conclusion that W. J. Lauck made was that “the
money supply was ample.”7 Lauck described the economic decline and the depression
that began in 1893, as a mere lack of confidence by the financial community. On the
contrary, this dissertation has argued that it was far more serious. There were five
interrelated causes of the depression that created the “perfect economic storm.” Lauck did
not offer a suggestion for the depressed farm commodity prices in cotton, corn, and wheat
for the five-year depression, despite the fact that the price and scarcity of gold increased
in value during this same period. Lauck’s final conclusion was that “this cause to which
the crisis of 1893 is directly and wholly attributable consisted of a widespread fear, both
at home and abroad, that the United States would not be able to maintain a gold standard
of payments.”8 Lauck failed to note a culmination of several world events preceding this
five-year depression, which included many industrialized European countries going on
the gold standard, along with war reparations paid in gold over an extended period by
France to Germany as a result of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870−71.
After William Lauck’s work in 1907, Frank Paul Weberg wrote a seventy-onepage dissertation in 1929, titled “The Background of the Panic of 1893.” Weberg’s
analysis is supported primarily by Wesley C. Mitchell, particularly in regard to business
cycles and their relationship to the Panic of 1893, which came as a result of foreign

7

Lauck, The Causes of the Panic of 1893, 118.

8

Ibid., 119.
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influences and a worldwide depression.9 Weberg emphasized and corrected Lauck’s
misinterpretation of the Panic of 1893 as being “local in occurrence and cause” and that it
“did not arise from any difficulties abroad.”10 Weberg’s main dissertation argument was
the refutation of Lauck’s work on the Panic of 1893 as a localized economic downturn.
Weberg’s own depiction is written as a global economic calamity. Weberg, unlike Lauck,
made use of Stanwood’s American Tariff Controversies in the Nineteenth Century, and
utilized figures from that work describing the loss of federal revenue from the passage of
the McKinley Tariff of 1890. Major shortcomings of Weberg’s dissertation included the
omission of railroad overcapitalization and lack of any attention to the European
disinvestment in railroad securities after the Baring Brothers crisis. These were two
railroad-related factors that, in addition to monetary policy, brought about the Depression
of 1893−97.
The next research was published in 1970, over forty years after Weberg. This
work, The Depression of the Nineties: An Economic History, by Charles Hoffmann
described the end results of the depression nineties with declining wholesale prices and
declining wages. However, the focus of this book was not on the causes of the panic.
Most of Hoffmann’s economic tables covered the ten-year period from 1890 to 1900.11
This economic data did not demonstrate as dramatic a decline as there would have been if
they had been charted over a longer time span, which unlike Edwin Frickey’s work,

9

Frank P. Weberg, “The Background of the Panic of 1893” (PhD diss., The Catholic University of
America, Washington, D.C., 1929), 3. (Weberg argued that W. C. Mitchell charted the business cycles in
seventeen countries from 1891to 1925, and made evident the general depression in 1891−95.)

10

Weberg, “The Background of the Panic of 1893,” 7.

11

Charles Hoffmann, The Depression of the Nineties: An Economic History (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood
Press, 1970) See: “Prefatory Note” to chapter seven, “Prices During the Depression,” xlviii−li.
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included economic data from 1866 to 1914.12 Hoffmann emphasized, to a lesser degree,
that foreign investment within the United States declined as Europe entered a contraction
phase of the 1890−91 business cycle.
Hoffmann gave British disinvestment only two pages, however, to amend for this
slight, a four-page appendix is added which stressed the severity of the British
disinvestment in American securities.13 Alternatively, my dissertation has emphasized
that railroad overcapitalization with a concomitant monetary shortage ultimately became
major causes of the 1890s depression. Another theme developed throughout this
dissertation was that fiscal policy problems led to a decreased monetary supply that also
diminished significantly from 1892 to 1896. Nevertheless, Hoffmann concluded that “It
was the drop in the use of money forms rather than in the quantity available which forced
a series of relatively moderate price declines.”14
In addition, Hoffmann quoted F. W. Taussig’s book, Tariff History of the United
States, while giving only a limited explanation that the McKinley Tariff of 1890 led to
mounting federal deficits due to lost revenue from the raw sugar tariff reduction. This
dissertation, on the contrary, discussed tariff issues throughout, and fiscal problems
concerning revenue reduction during the depression of 1893−97.
A major oversight of Hoffmann’s 1970 work is concerned with the data taken
from the U.S. National Monetary Commission’s statistics. These statistics only covered
1890 to 1900, which is insufficient to access the needed long-term trends, despite using

12

Edwin Frickey, Economic Fluctuations in the United States: A Systematic Analysis of Long-run Trends
and Business Cycles, 1866−1914 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1942), 66, 180, 338.

13

Hoffmann, The Depression of the Nineties, 193−197. (Appendix to Chapter 5, “British Capital Issues.”)

14

Ibid., 276.
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eleven tables. Hoffmann’s figures 2, 3, and 4, gave a better representation for a longer
economic cycle of 1870 to 1912, but this extended amount of data only exhibited a
greater decline in manufacturing output, material purchases, finished commodity goods,
and consumer goods output during the years of 1873−78 and the years of 1893−97.
Most of Hoffmann’s economic tables that covered 1890−1900 are derived from
the U.S. National Monetary Commission, Statistics for the United States, 1867−1909.
The impetus of this report came from Senator Nelson Aldrich of Rhode Island, who was
chairman of the National Monetary Commission (NMC), which had been established by
the Aldrich-Vreeland Act of 1907. Aldrich met with A. Piatt Andrew (also of the NMC),
to form a commission of leading New York bankers following the Banker’s Panic of
1907. They met at Jekyll Island and devised a U.S. Federal Reserve Central Banking
System leading to the Federal Reserve Act of 1913. As a result Piatt Andrew compiled
this data, and Hoffmann relied on the economic data of the NMC more than any other
source. This dissertation, however, has furnished greater accuracy with the usage of the
Cambridge University Press’s updated Millennial Edition of Historical Statistics of the
United States, volumes 4, 5, and 6, published in 2006. Updated information was provided
by eighty-eight governmental agencies, colleges, and universities, along with private
economic foundations that have contributed scholarly research for decades and supported
this updated Millennial Edition.
As far as the importance of the cultural and political context, Hoffmann
mentioned the term “Populism” just once in reference to Weberg. This dissertation,
however, provided greater coverage of the Populist movement and devoted more
attention to the Populist demands, which were important because the Southern and

8

Midwestern farmers were literally starving from an inadequate access to money and
credit. In addition, this dissertation has placed emphasis on the reverse pyramid structure
of the U.S. banking system, and how the concentration of money was centered in New
York City and Boston banks. More detail is also provided concerning the difficulty it
took to get banker’s reserves back to the interior of the country during the depression.
Furthermore, an updated interpretation is presented by economic historians who placed
this 1893−97 depression within a global context.
The last and most recent work was that of Douglas W. Steeples and David O.
Whitten’s, Democracy in Desperation: The Depression of 1893, published in 1998. Some
content came from Steeples’ 1961 dissertation from the University of North Carolina,
Chapel Hill, titled “Five Troubled Years: A History of the Depression of 1893−1897.”
The combined work of Steeples and Whitten emphasized labor and social history. Their
book has offered a well-developed political economic history of 1893−97. My
dissertation also emphasized the political unrest and is supported by considerable
coverage of unemployment levels and labor strikes, particularly the Pullman Strike of
May 11, 1894, as well as the monetary shortage and Populist demands.
Steeples and Whitten have demonstrated the social ramifications that people
experienced as a result of the 1890s depression. These authors stated that the depression
pushed people to react and join forces with, for example, Coxey’s Army, the Pullman
Railway strike, and the United Mine Workers’ Strike in 1894. They denoted several
social repercussions from the depression which were the “nativism” reaction and the
American Federation of Labor (AFL) union’s push for limited immigration in order to
reduce unskilled and cheap labor from entering the United States, and “the formation of

9

the Immigration Restriction League in Boston shortly after the panic of 1893.”15 Steeples
and Whitten have stressed the social repercussions, more than the economic issues or
banking problems that existed during the time. Further they emphasized that “Americans
of the 1890s knew of a simpler material, mental, and moral world than their counterparts
of the 1990s. They neither consumed nor amused themselves to death and would have
found the claims of 1990s postmodernists and deconstructionists absurd.”16
Steeples and Whitten gave a descriptive analysis of the metamorphosis of
American economic and social structures transformed from a rural agrarian way of life to
a modernistic urbanized economy. Their final analysis explained that once the “genie of
industrialization” came out of the bottle after the 1890s depression, a reform movement
began, which long outlasted those depression years. Both authors visualized the
Depression Nineties becoming a catalyst for a transformative America.
This dissertation has presented a fresh look at the Depression of 1893−97 from a
more globalized perspective. This research provided greater attention to the Argentine
bond crisis and the near financial collapse of Baring Brothers. My dissertation also used
the work of John H. Williams and Alec G. Ford in regard to Argentina and the Baring
Brothers Crisis of 1890. These two important thinkers are neglected in the works
described above in the historiographical review. And many noted writers such as
Desmond Platt, Henry S. Ferns, Charles K. Hobson, and Jeremy Adelman also argued
that the Baring financial crisis occurred as a result of underwriting Argentine Public
Works bonds bringing on perhaps one of the worst economic catastrophes in American

15

Douglas W. Steeples and David O. Whitten, Democracy in Desperation: The Depression of 1893
(Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1998), 98.

16

Ibid., 129. The only reference to the National Banking Act was an end note at chapter eight, 142.
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history. This dissertation has offered a constructive contribution from economic data
gathered from a large number of economic historians along with historical tables
compiled from investigation and research concerning this late nineteenth-century
financial collapse. My research has expanded upon the rationale and reasoning as to
exactly what brought on the Depression of 1893−97. The interpretative results have
explained five interrelated causes that led to an economic decline which precipitated one
of the worst depressions in history.
Chapter 1 — U.S. Bimetallic Monetary Policy in a Gold-Standard World
The first chapter described the origins of U.S. bimetallic monetary policy as an
effort to introduce a U.S. silver coinage system to replace the pre-existing Mexican and
Spanish silver coinage circulation that continued through the early nineteenth century.
The United States had its own bimetallic parity standard on a 15 to 1 ratio of silver to
gold in parity. This parity of the silver dollar to the gold dollar was established by a
January 1837 currency bill. Global influences would not allow this parity to remain in
place, and silver began to initially sell at a slight premium to gold from 1849 to 1853.
Silver was exported overseas because of its higher worth relative to the gold dollar during
this four-year period. However, the value of silver began to fall from 1853 to 1879, as
more European countries adjusted their monetary policy primarily to a gold standard.
The end result was that as the demand for international gold increased, this
increased demand created a gold currency shortage and caused commodity prices to drop.
Various forms of commercial credit had to be assembled to bypass or lessen the payment
in kind with gold. The constant monetary pressure of maintaining the gold standard and
the practice of converting bank notes into gold upon demand caused national banks and

11

the U.S. Treasury to deplete their gold supplies. At that time, a major source of
international credit included “bills of exchange,” which could be converted into bank
notes, which in turn, were used to purchase commodities such as cotton. Bills of
exchange were commercial instruments, which avoided the actual transference of gold
specie.
Werner Schlote’s British Overseas Trade from 1700 to the 1930’s provided a
compelling argument with statistical economic evidence that British trade had a powerful
and direct influence on America’s depression of 1893−97.17 The British had a major
economic slump from 1891 to 1894, which interfaced with the American economic
downturn. This chapter is strengthened by John M. Firestone’s analysis of lost customs
revenue and Richard Timberlake’s argument that the U.S. Treasury never had enough
gold reserves in place. In fact the Treasury had only a 29 percent gold-backing for the
convertibility of all outstanding Treasury notes and greenbacks. F. W. Taussig, Milton
Friedman, and Anna J. Schwartz provided further insight about the insufficiency of U.S.
Treasury gold reserves. In addition, Oliver M. Sprague placed much of the blame for the
1893−97 depression on the New York National banks, which failed to maintain the
mandatory 25 percent reserve requirement of hard currency.
Chapter 2 — The Populist Movement for an Increased Money Supply
The political platform of the Populist Party included the demand for an increased
money supply in order to pay off debts and obtain loans during planting season. The
crop-lien system became a major means of financing. It involved holding a farmer’s crop
as collateral against the debt incurred to a furnishing merchant for seed and provisions
17

Werner Schlote, British Overseas Trade from 1700 to 1930’s; translated by W. H. Chaloner and
W. O. Henderson (Oxford, U.K.: Basil Blackwell, 1952), Tables 9−10, pp. 45−49.
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throughout the planting, growing, and harvesting of a crop such as cotton. Edward Royce
made a well-defined distinction between two classes of farmers at that time who used the
crop-lien system.18 There was the sharecropper and the tenant farmer. According to
Royce, a sharecropper was a wage laborer who is compensated with a share of the crop at
the end of the season, while a tenant farmer rented land, and maintained control of the
crop until it was sold to pay off the debt. Both types of labor arrangements involved some
type of crop-lien against the farmer’s growing crop in order to collateralize the loans
rendered to the farmer by either a merchant who furnished supplies or possibly a small
bank. Some farmers may have actually owned some of their land as yeoman farmers, and
also rented out additional acreage as tenants.
The debt-ridden South consisted of several classes of farmers; sharecroppers,
tenants, and even small-acreage yeoman farmers. Many were landless white and black
farmers who only had their labor to offer, and who were compelled to agree to harsh
financial terms. Lawrence Goodwyn, Alex Arnett, John D. Hicks, and other historians of
Populism have referred to this high-interest rate debt of 25 percent or greater as “debt
peonage” since many Southern farmers could never completely pay off their loans. A
large amount of the crop financing in the 1890s came from the merchants who owned
what amounted to “company stores,” and advanced seed, farm supplies, equipment, food,
and other necessities to the tenant in exchange for the proceeds of the sale of their crop as
payment of as much indebtedness as possible.
The Populists thought that if the monetary supply could be increased, commodity
prices would increase as well. Friedman and Schwartz have argued rather than the money
18
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supply increasing, money velocity in fact decreased from 1879 to 1897, at the average
rate of 3 percent per year. This in turn, as emphasized in Monetary History of the United
States, 1867−1960, caused wholesale prices to fall further. The Populists’ plan called for
maintaining a money supply based on a per capita rate, which could account for an
increased amount of U.S. commerce and a growing population. Friedman and Schwartz
stressed the fact that from 1892−96, the money supply, after a previous rise of 2 percent
per year up to 1892, declined at the rate of 5 percent during these four years.19
Falling prices and increased costs caused farmers to unite behind a cooperative
crusade for more silver coinage and more currency, generally, in circulation. However,
farm commodity prices fell as a result of the Depression Nineties, while the value of gold
went up due to this currency shortage. Farmers united and proposed a Subtreasury Plan,
which would allow them to place crops in cooperative grain elevators and cotton
warehouses and where they could receive negotiable treasury notes for 80 percent of their
crop’s value while in storage. However, as a result of administrative, construction, and
managerial costs and the lack of Congressional support, the Subtreasury Plan never came
to fruition. Competitive sectionalism evolved over the support of maximum silver
coinage, between the South united with the Western mining states (Colorado, Nevada,
and Idaho), against the “goldbugs” of the East who wanted to maintain a strict gold
currency policy. The Bland-Allison Act of 1878, and its sectional Congressional
enactment as a means to appease the silver mining states confirmed this divisiveness
which existed over the supply of silver coinage in circulation.
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Chapter 3 — Politics of the Late Nineteenth-Century Free Silver Movement
This chapter introduced the Populists’ ideology and emphasized the
antimonopolist theme in their political platform. The Populist Party wanted government
regulation regarding money and banking, railroads, communication, and the vast land
grants that were being given to the railroads. Bruce Palmer has provided an excellent
example of Texas railroads, particularly the Texas and Pacific, who had been given over
thirty-two million acres of land directly from the State of Texas by 1882. The chapter
also detailed the farmers’ struggles with unregulated high mortgage interest rates (as
much as 12 percent interest) that were charged by loan companies, because of the scarcity
of money.20 The coalescence of a contracting economy and a limited monetary supply,
along with high farm mortgage rates and low crop prices placed American farmers in an
extremely vulnerable situation.
Sadly, the West and the South were never able to politically unite despite the
efforts of Populist speakers like Mary Elizabeth Lease and their presidential candidate
James Baird Weaver. The doctrines of “Social Darwinism” and “laissez faire” of the late
nineteenth century were strong enough to keep any socially progressive movement,
which would change the economic status quo at bay. The economic world in this time
and place was characterized by pure competition, “survival of the fittest,” and
“Newtonian mechanics” where financial institutions were strongly regulated and
monetary policies were based on “sound money,” and consequently less stringent policies
might have moved the financial world in an unnatural direction.21 However, that is
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exactly where the Eastern banking establishment’s best interests based on the National
Banking Act of 1863, and the depression were taking them toward economic
disequilibrium.
The Populist movement opposed the National Banking Act of 1863. State banks
were limited in the South, because of the 10 percent tax on all bank notes issued after
July 1, 1866. However, the capital-intensive regions of New England and the Middle
Atlantic states gained a greater financial foothold, both during and immediately after the
Civil War. Many Populist writers, such as Sarah E. V. Emery of Lansing, Michigan,
came out with pamphlets and spoke vehemently against the “National Banking system.”
Other Populists who spoke against the National Banking system were Populist U.S.
Senator William Alfred Peffer from Kansas, fellow Kansas Republican Senator Preston
B. Plumb, Mary Elizabeth Lease of the Populist speaking circuit, and W. Scott Morgan,
the Arkansas Wheel and Alliance leader. The Populists of the South and Western mining
states attempted to unify by launching a third U.S. political party at the St. Louis
convention on February 22, 1892.
During this time, the “Silver Parity Question” was a major American political
issue. U.S. Congressman Roger Q. Mills of Texas, Chairman of the House Ways and
Means Committee from 1887 to 1889, proposed that the silver and gold content of each
dollar be reduced so as to be on a largely universal global parity standard of 15.50 to 1 of
silver to gold. This parity would have been equivalent to what the Latin Union held, as
well as the French five-franc coinage, the Netherlands “Lion dollar,” and the five-peseta
piece in Spain. A noted economist of the time and president of M. I. T., Francis A.
Walker, also defended a bimetallic monetary policy. Walker advocated that the United
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States follow Europe’s lead in establishing a parity rate and not “go it alone” in
supporting the value of silver. The chapter has concluded with an explanation given by
Edward Kellogg and Alexander Campbell as to why the National Banking Act of 1863
was outdated by the late 1890s, did not fit with an expanding industrial-urban economy,
and should have had more greenbacks in circulation.
Chapter 4 — Bank Reserve Problems Initiate the Depression Nineties
New York City banks became the primary center of Eastern reserve capital. The
National Banking Act of 1863 required reserve city national banks to hold a 25 percent
specie reserve and, in addition, to maintain as collateral, government securities equal in
value to at least one-third of their capital to back up their own issued bank notes.22 New
York banks also held bankers’ balances in the interior or country banks. Reserve national
banks generally sent bankers’ balances, which could be called on demand, to the interior
banks during the spring planting season.
As the gold reserves of the U.S. Treasury dropped to $45 million dollars in
January 1895, the amount held in New York banks became increasingly significant.
These banks literally held more gold and gold certificates than the U.S. Treasury at that
time. In order to mitigate the transfer of gold among themselves, the New York banks set
up a clearinghouse system with clearinghouse loan certificate usage. The clearinghouse
loan certificates served as negotiable currency among member banks of the clearinghouse
association and served as a means of expanding the monetary volume, while, at the same
time attempting to maintain bankers’ balances and the 25 percent specie reserve
requirement of the National Banking Act. The severity of the 1890s Depression was
22
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associated with the large issuance of clearinghouse loan certificates. Their circulation
increased more during this depression and at a greater level than during the Panics of
1857 and 1873.
The U.S. Treasury also became a part of the monetary crisis. The Sherman Silver
Purchase Act of 1890, which required the purchase of 4,500,000 ounces of silver per
month, allowed the government to issue both U.S. silver certificates in small
denominations and U.S. Treasury Notes of 1890 in larger denominations as payment for
the incoming purchase of silver bullion. These Treasury notes of 1890 were convertible
into coin on demand either in gold or silver. Ultimately these Treasury Notes of 1890, as
a result of the Sherman Silver Purchase Act of 1890, depleted the amount of gold in the
U.S. Treasury. Consequently, the gold supply within the U.S. Treasury was insufficient to
redeem all the outstanding notes, because nearly all bearers of these Treasury Notes
redeemed them for gold. Thus, the Silver Purchase Act of 1890 had to be repealed in
order for the United States to remain on the gold standard with the rest of Europe and
England during the late nineteenth century. President Grover Cleveland called a special
session of Congress, and repealed the law in late October 1893.
This chapter concluded with a discussion of the sectionalism issue as it related to
monetary policy. The Southern and Western states had less currency along with higher
interest rates, and the Eastern and Middle Atlantic states had a greater amount of
currency in circulation and lower bank interest rates. Complicating matters, a five-year
stock market decline began on May 1893, only two months into Grover Cleveland’s
second presidential term throwing financial and currency requirements into disarray.
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Chapter 5 — Repeal of the Sherman Silver Purchase Act and the Protective Tariff
This chapter is focused on two legislative acts, which fueled a greater sectional
schism within the United States. These two legislative acts are the repeal of the Sherman
Silver Purchase Act of 1890 and the enactment of the McKinley Protective Tariff of
1890. Congress passed these laws in the latter part of that year, but they would each have
far-reaching effects for the Depression of 1893−97.
The debates within both Congressional houses on the repeal of the Silver
Purchase Act of 1890 produced headlines in the New York Tribune as the newspaper
covered various proposals on page one of its September to November editions. This
chapter has described and explained several of the headlines and their impact.
In addition, the legislative enactment of protective tariffs was to have extensive
economic effects during the late nineteenth century. As a result of this law, tariff
revenues paid in gold at the customs house were the major source of federal revenue in
the late 1890s, and public land sales diminished as the vast western homesteading frontier
reached its end between 1880 and 1890.23
The Protective Tariff of 1890 proposed by Representative William McKinley, as
Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee (March 4, 1889 – March 4, 1891),
lowered federal revenues by allowing raw sugar on the duty-free list. The revenue
reduction of the McKinley bill was vastly changed by the time it reached and passed the
Senate, much to Congressman McKinley’s dismay. Yet, the Tariff Act of 1890 was
enacted during President Benjamin Harrison’s administration when the U.S. Treasury had
a large surplus, and Congress and the President wanted to reduce the surplus, which in
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turn reduced tariff duties. However, this same tariff increased the duty on metallic
tinplate to protect an emerging minor domestic industry, causing an extreme hardship for
average households by raising the price of kitchen utensils, coffeepots, and even dinner
tin plates. The result of the McKinley Tariff of 1890 was that it vastly reduced the
amount of paid-in gold from tariff duties, resulting from a lowered tariff on imported raw
materials, but created a much higher tariff on manufactured goods to protect U.S.
manufacturing. Each year the federal surplus diminished from $10 million in 1892, to a
$2.5 million surplus in 1893, and then to deficit amounts of $70 million in 1894, which
became the worst year of the five depression years.24
U.S. Treasury Secretary John G. Carlisle attempted to correct the Treasury gold
reduction by selling U.S. bonds at 3 percent interest to New York banks in February
1894, asking for their patriotic support. It became a temporary fix to the Treasury gold
reserve and lasted only about six months, but the depression would linger on. Secretary
Carlisle approached J. P. Morgan and August Belmont in February 1895, and used their
commissioned services to sell U.S. bonds overseas at 4 percent in return, but with the
stipulation that one-half of the gold received must come from Europe to the U.S.
Treasury. By 1896, the Treasury gold reserves stabilized, yet the Wilson-Gorman Tariff
of 1894, enacted to raise federal revenue on raw materials, and replaced the McKinley
Tariff, had little effect. It was “too little too late.” The Wilson-Gorman Tariff generally
raised the duty on crude leaf tobacco used for cigar manufacturing and restored some of
the duty on sugar imports.
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Chapter 6 — Unemployment, Low Wages, and Deflation during Late NineteenthCentury America
This chapter discussed the rapid change for America’s industrialized North in just
five years (1890−95). Statistical analysis is made from Robert Mango’s work along with
Carroll D. Wright’s reports as U.S. Commissioner of Labor in the Eleventh
Annual Report of 1895−1896. The South remained primarily agricultural during this
time. Historical research offered some conjecture as to whether the Eastern capital
markets were acting in a quasi-imperialistic fashion in the economic treatment of the
South and West. Statistics in a previous chapter revealed that the South suffered
economically as a result of the National Banking Act of 1863, because of fewer national
banks and the levy on the remaining state banks of a 10 percent tax on issued state bank
notes. This tax caused many state banks, while still retaining their state charters, to stop
issuing state bank notes, thus reducing the money stock in the South.25 This distress in the
banking system made the allocation of credit more difficult for the Southern farmer
through its reducing effect on the stock of money.26 The Deep South was also relegated
primarily to one agricultural cash crop of cotton for four decades from 1865 to 1905,
following the enactment of the National Banking Act. Southern agriculture endured,
although with a largely heavily indebted labor force.
The “Middle-Border” West suffered economically as well. For example, wheat
prices fell to sixty-two cents in 1892, and remained at or below fifty cents per bushel for
the next three years. The lower commodity prices of the South and West caused
25
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economic constraints along with unemployment and wage cuts. This chapter related
statistics showing the high unemployment numbers by using a comparison of Stanley
Lebergott’s unemployment numbers with those of Paul Douglas and Christina Romer. In
turn, labor unrest resulted from the high unemployment and wage cuts.
The chapter also described the American Railway Union and Pullman Workers’
strike on May 11, 1894, and its results. In addition, the chapter illustrated the plight of the
jobless workers using the march of Coxey’s Army, which started in the West, along with
Kelly’s Army, which headed eastward via train hopping for transportation with hopes of
arriving in Washington, D.C., on the Capitol steps on May 1, 1894.
Chapter 7 — Overcapitalization and Disinvestment in Railroad Securities
This chapter explored the extent of investment that Baring Brothers had with the
Argentine government during the late nineteenth century. Most economic histories have
referred to this event with only a byline, when in fact it, along with other causes, led to a
global depression that affected the United States five years. The escalating effects of
Argentine bond defaults during a depressed global economy greatly challenged the Bank
of England in its attempts to prop up the Barings Brothers investment house. Just how
and why the Argentine government and its banks were caught up in this financial maze is
the theme of the chapter. The chapter also described the ensuing panic and financial
upheaval. Baring Brothers had to make good on the Argentine bonds that it had
underwritten for its own British investors. This it did, in part, by disinvestment of its solid
American railroad securities. The sell-off was one of many causes that brought on the
Panic of 1893 in America and the Depression of 1893−97.
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The overcapitalization of railroads and the problems of disinvestment by
European investors are a secondary focus of this chapter. The overextension and vast
expenses associated with railroad building caused many railroad systems to go into
bankruptcy and reorganization are identified as well as providing a leading cause toward
the beginning of the Panic of 1893 and the following depression.
Chapter 8 — Railroad Reorganization and its Westward Link during the Late
Nineteenth-Century Depression
An analysis is presented of the consolidation phase of the railroad industry during
the late nineteenth century, which resulted from the financial downturn. The line of
reasoning began with William Cronon’s “central place theory” to explain why Chicago
on Lake Michigan became the major metropolitan transportation hub of the Midwest.
Clearly, Chicago’s grain nexus to New York City via the Erie Canal was the most
economically viable transportation route of the middle and late nineteenth century for
east-to-west railroads.
This chapter also included a description of Eastern capitalization of railroads and
made the argument that Eastern capitalists in Boston transferred their China trade interest
to railroad transportation. The chapter has shown the importance of railroads for
economic development and why the early railroads followed the right-of-way of various
state-controlled canals including the Erie, Chesapeake and Ohio, and the Illinois and
Michigan. Even the Illinois Central, which runs north to south, followed many of the
internal Illinois River routes to the Mississippi River, with an 1854 completion date for
its 704-mile destination to Cairo, Illinois.
The chartering of the Illinois Central used vast land grants as a major means for
financing railroads, in addition to the backing from Eastern promoters. Large tracts of
23

land were sold off by railroad land agents, and much of the inducement for immigration
to the United States after the Civil War resulted in railroads promoting their land overseas
for potential farming in the trans-Mississippi Midwestern states, such as Kansas, Iowa,
Nebraska, Minnesota, and South Dakota. Other contributing factors were the
improvements of the McCormick reaper and its mass production in Chicago that made
wheat cultivation a viable livelihood.
The railroads promoted westward expansion to the ultimate frontiers, and when
the financial depression of the late 1890s began it led to another consolidation phase for
railroads greater than that during the Panic of 1873. Railroads were financed mainly by
bonds bought by overseas investors because U.S. railroad bonds paid a higher interest
rate than what could be obtained in England and Europe. Once these bond defaults began,
it indeed became “the survival of the fittest” and Wall Street houses such as J. P. Morgan
that specialized in railroad reorganizations became even larger.
Epilogue — The Escalating Effects of the Late Nineteenth-Century Depression,
1893−1897
The various monetary policies and the Tariff Reduction Act of 1890 created
escalating effects that resulted from the Depression Nineties. One result was that of
vertical integration of businesses that resulted from the merger activity of the late
nineteenth century. Both Alfred Chandler’s The Visible Hand and Naomi Lamoreaux’s
The Great Merger Movement emphasized that the “holding company” became the vehicle
for mergers, and the economic depression of the late 1890s drove these consolidations
forward. J. P. Morgan and railroad reorganization specialists such as Francis Stetson were
instrumental in forming a new phase of rail consolidation that went into the twentieth
century.
24

The epilogue has summarized the five leading causes of the Panic of 1893, and
the depression years of 1893−97. Two causes, which resulted in the financial downturn
during this period, were brought about by national monetary policy. The first cause was
the National Banking Act of 1863, which placed restrictions on state banks by imposing a
10 percent tax on state issued bank notes, thus restricting the money supply in the South
and West. In addition, the National Banking Act would not allow National Banks to
provide mortgage loans to farmers, who instead had to rely on commercial land mortgage
companies at excessively high interest rates. The inelastic money supply was a result of
the National Banking Act, and much needed changes that would provide for a larger
monetary supply did not take place until 1913.
The second cause was the McKinley Tariff of 1890, which reduced federal
revenue for five years due to its punitive rate-structure, and depleted the gold tariff duties
taken in by the U.S. Treasury. The United States would eventually be able to form more
favorable exports of its agricultural commodities, but only after opening up additional
global markets in the Pacific, with additional markets taking place in Puerto Rico, Cuba,
and the Philippines after the Spanish-American war, along with less restrictive trade
agreements with South America.
The third cause for the late nineteenth-century depression was outside the realm of
the federal government, even though railroads were supported financially by large land
grants. Large land grants induced the overcapitalization of railroads, and this became the
third leading cause of the Panic of 1893. Railroads which sold and issued watered-down
stock and were vastly overcapitalized based on the revenue they had earned. The fourth
cause for the Depression 1893−97, were the falling farm commodity prices, which
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became a factor in the Populist movement. For the first time in U.S. history, a third party
candidate received over one million popular votes and twenty-two electoral votes in the
Presidential Election of 1892. The Populist demands and concerns would evolve into the
Election of 1896, with William Jennings Bryan as both the Democratic Party nominee
and the People’s Party candidate against Republican Presidential candidate, William
McKinley. A major contribution of this research was its focus on monetary policy that
interacted with the Populist movement, its beginnings, and its attempts to unify the South
with the West.
The fifth cause of the depression was a global financial stringency created by the
Baring Crisis in Argentina from 1890 to 1891. Railroad financing declined and the selling
of railroad issues in the New York market by both Baring Brothers to raise needed funds,
and that of European investors as well, which caused additional gold specie to leave the
United States as the redemption of these stocks and bonds took place.
The Depression of the late nineteenth century caused economic distress for many
Americans with unemployment as high as 20 percent, and an average yearly salary for
those that could find work at only $300 per year. It was serious and has not been fully
appreciated for its long-lasting effects. The primary source material clearly has shown
that the Depression of 1893−97 had multiple causes that were national and global, and
this research casts it as a pivotal event in our country’s history. This in-depth depiction of
statistical data from leading late nineteenth-century economic historians along with
articles from the Commercial and Financial Chronicle on economic issues, and coverage
of legislative debates from the New York Times and New York Tribune, on the Repeal of
the Silver Purchase Act, has enhanced the analyses of some of the financial measures
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taken by various groups including the Populists during a time of laissez faire and very
little government regulation.
The scope and causes of the Depression of 1893−97 had significant and longlasting effects that proved that even global markets were instrumental in our national
economic interests. Many of these economic problems would become part of the
Progressive Movement of the twentieth century. These solutions would be found through
legislative enactments such as the Federal Reserve Act of 1913, which would provide for
a more regionalized U.S. Treasury system and an expansion of the monetary supply
through regional reserve banks. The dissertation chapters have presented major causes for
an unprecedented depression lasting five years, from a distinct period of American
history which enveloped a difficult economic transition between the very latter part of the
Gilded Age and just before the Progressive Era.
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Chapter 1
U.S. Bimetallic Policy in a Gold-standard World
The United States had a long history of difficulty in regulating its currency, and
the earliest enactment of such laws began with Congress passing the National Currency
Act of April 2, 1792, under the guidance of the Alexander Hamilton as the first Secretary
of the Treasury.1 This Act provided for the coinage of gold from $2 ½ dollars, known as
quarter eagles to a $10-dollar denomination known as eagles, as well as silver, with a
U.S. silver dollar containing the same silver content as the Spanish milled dollar each
with 371.25 grains of silver. U.S. coinage weight had been regulated by Congress under
Section 11 of the Act of 1792, and set the proportional value of gold to silver at 15 to 1.2
Gold bullion would become harder to obtain and this ratio would gradually increase to 16
to 1 during the War of 1812, and stabilize during the 1830s at around 15.5 to 1.
A major argument for this dissertation was not that the ratio of gold to silver
became overtly unstable or could not be adjusted by Congress, but rather that the “sound
money” influence from the Eastern banking establishment would prevent more silver
coinage from going into circulation. In addition, more European countries were going
onto a gold standard as their primary source of currency, which would make the value of
gold rise accordingly. The major thesis throughout the dissertation was that the quantity
of money whether coinage or bank notes that could be convertible into gold was
inadequate for a rising U.S. industrial economy in the late 1890s.
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Therefore, this chapter will explore some of the alternative usage of commercial
instruments other than hard currency, as well as the outside European influences that
prompted a United States monetary gold policy. The U.S. bimetallic policy of coinage
had been in use since the first U.S. Congress, and although the United States paid its
foreign debts and tariff duties in gold, the general circulation of money in lesser amounts
from one dollar to one dime were in silver. The intent of this chapter would be to
demonstrate the balancing act that the U.S. Treasury and Congress had to perform in
providing an adequate monetary stock of currency in circulation.
The United States bimetallic monetary policy began as an effort to replace
pre-existing Mexican and Spanish silver coinage with a U.S. silver coinage system. The
United States had its own bimetallic parity standard on the original 15 to 1 ratio of silver
to gold that was reaffirmed in a January 1837 currency bill. Global influences would not
allow this parity to remain in place. Initially silver was sold at a slight premium to gold
from 1849 to 1853 and was exported overseas because of its higher worth relative to the
gold dollar during this four-year period. But the value of silver began to fall from 1853 to
1879 as more European countries adjusted their monetary standard to a gold standard.
As the demand for international gold increased, it created a gold currency
shortage and caused commodity prices to drop. The constant monetary pressure of
maintaining the gold standard and the convertibility of bank notes into gold upon demand
caused both national banks and the U.S. Treasury to deplete their gold supplies. As a
result, various forms of commercial credit had to be assembled to bypass or reduce
payments in gold. One such instrument of international credit included “bills of
exchange,” which could be converted into bank notes, and in turn used to purchase
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commodities such as cotton. Bills of exchange were commercial instruments that could
avoid an actual transfer of gold specie, thus protecting the government gold supply.
Walter Schlote’s British Overseas Trade from 1700 to the 1930s provided the
compelling argument that British trade had a powerful and direct influence on America’s
depression of 1893−97. From 1891 to 1894, Britain had a major economic slump that
interfaced with America’s economic malaise. John M. Firestone’s analysis of lost
customs revenue during the Depression Nineties further supported this dissertation’s
supposition that U.S. tariff revenue was adversely reduced during the 1890s. Richard
Timberlake argued that the U.S. Treasury never had enough gold reserves with only a 29
percent gold-backing to convert all outstanding Treasury notes and greenbacks.
Other writers, F. W. Taussig, Milton Friedman, and Anna J. Schwartz, addressed
the insufficiency of U.S. Treasury gold reserves. Oliver M. Sprague has also placed much
of the blame for the 1893−97 depression on the New York National banks that failed to
maintain the mandatory 25 percent reserve requirement of hard currency.
The historical context of silver coinage and its parity with gold formed a basis for
the economic issues of the late 1890s. Late nineteenth-century politics invoked an
economic policy of “sound money,” which meant gold usage as the primary standard of
currency and to a lesser extent “honest money — gold, silver, and paper convertible into
coin on demand …”3 On January 14, 1875, the Specie Payment Resumption Act was
passed by both Houses of Congress and signed into law by President Grant. This act went
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into effect on January 1, 1879 and replaced the usage of fractional currency (paper
denominations in fifty-cent values, $1.25 or $1.50) with subsidiary silver coinage.4
The currency act also allowed for the redemption of “greenbacks” in coin after
this date, and it later became the policy of the U.S. Treasury to retire nearly $30 million
in greenback currency from circulation. In addition, the use of silver for replacement of
$33 million dollars in fractional currency was both necessary to keep the money stock at
a higher level and to prevent a severe contraction in the total currency volume.5 A later
chapter in this work will focus on the Populist movement and the political issues of free
silver and silver dollar coinage.
The bimetallic policy of the United States had an early beginning with silver
coinage and silver production exceeding that of gold throughout the eighteenth and late
nineteenth centuries.6 A major reason for a U.S. bimetallic policy from 1873 to 1890 was
the need of a U.S. silver coinage system to replace the Mexican and Spanish silver coins
that became a major part of America’s early nineteenth-century legal tender system. In
addition to foreign silver coinage being replaced, there was a paper fractional currency
and a postal currency, both circulating as late as 1871, with an official outstanding total
of $33,000,000.7 Silver coins issued in the amounts of half dollar, quarter dollar, and
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dime were issued to replace the Spanish real, which was the equivalent of 12 ½ cents. In
both the West Indies and on the U.S. mainland, the real was known as a “bit,” with Neil
Carothers relating that the custom of calling a quarter-dollar “two bits” has two centuries
of usage behind it.8 The Spanish silver dollar with 371.25 grains of pure silver became
the basis for Alexander Hamilton’s Coinage Act of April 2, 1792, enacted by Congress,
with the same silver content for all future coinage of U.S. silver dollars.
Once these foreign coins were redeemed by American silver coins and taken out
of the financial system, melted down, and reissued as American coins, the pressing need
for American silver coinage grew less, but half-dollars and silver dollars competed with
the introduction of the gold dollar. The gold dollar, weighing only 24 ¾ grains of fine
gold, was smaller than a dime, but nevertheless, on parity with the silver dollar. The first
gold dollars were initially minted in 1849, along with the coinage of an additional
4,000,000 gold dollars in 1851.9 Silver maintained a relatively stable value as it related to
gold from 1850 to 1879; although, it fluctuated above and below the 15.5 to 1 parity
amount that prevailed in Europe. However, the U.S. commitment to a bimetallic policy
was hard to regulate due to outside currency influences from other countries. From 1853
to 1874, when silver fell below the parity of 15.5 to 1, American silver was increasingly
exported to Europe as well as India. India is of interest, because in 1835, it adopted the
single monetary standard of silver, and during this time a premium on silver existed with
a silver dollar worth $1.03 relative to the U.S. gold dollar.10
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The weight of the gold dollar (24 ¾ grains) had been coined with a standard silver
dollar of 371 ¼ grains, thus establishing an even 15 to 1 ratio of silver to gold in parity.
On January 18, 1837, Congress passed a complex currency bill that called for a .900
percentage of fineness for both gold and silver.11 However, a new currency bill enacted
sixteen years later in February 21, 1853 reduced the silver dollar from 371 ¼ grains of
pure silver to that 345.60 grains. This changed the standard weight with alloy from 412 ½
to 384 grains and the “gold rush” dollar was decreased from 24 ¾ grains of gold to 23.2
grains.12 A major reason for the 1853 bill reducing silver was that silver content in the
U.S. dollar had been much higher than in European countries. It had become profitable
for dealers to melt American silver dollars and sell the bullion overseas for more money
than face value. The silver content in other subsidiary silver coins, such as the half dollar
was reduced as well to 192 grains — the exact half of the silver dollar — as were the
quarter, dime, and half dime.13 This act also restricted the use of the silver dollar as legal
tender for payment of debts exceeding five dollars, with any higher sum for commercial
transactions to be paid in gold. Laurence Laughlin stated that, while the formal
demonetization of silver occurred in 1873, silver dollars although traded, had not been
minted for several years prior, meaning that the real demonetization of silver within the
U.S. actually took place in 1853.14
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European Influences That Prompted a United States Monetary Gold Policy
Several European events gradually influenced the U.S. monetary policy, which by
1873 would make gold the primary source for payment of U.S. debts. The first European
influence was the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 and its aftermath. Laughlin described
German policy in the 1870s as the impetus for both France and the United States
accepting the substitution of gold over a silver monetary system.15 The new unified
German Empire acquired the gold necessary to build up a large commercial state in a
world that was quickly adopting a single monetary gold standard. This opportunity was
due to the “enormous war-indemnity from France, of which $54,600,000 was paid to
Germany in French gold coin.”16 France’s war reparations, therefore, created a shortage
of gold money stock when, in addition to the French gold coinage, “Germany received
from France bills of exchange in payment of the indemnity which gave Germany the title
to gold in places, such as London, on which the bills were drawn.”17 Adolph Soetbeer, a
German economist of this 1870s era, reported that before France paid the war indemnity
and Germany acquired French bills of exchange, the total German domestic coins in
circulation was about 91,000,000 marks or just 4 percent with a 65.7 percent silver
coinage in circulation.18 However, by 1885, a reversal took place in Germany’s currency
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with 1,928,890,830 gold marks, and only 444,491,484 marks in circulating silver
coinage.19
Barry Eichengreen also supported the argument that the Franco-Prussian War of
1870 and the 1871 indemnity agreement, under which France had forcibly paid
reparations to Germany, did in fact facilitate Germany’s adoption of the gold standard.20
Laughlin stated that Germany entered the gold standard by the passage of a coinage act
that established the gold mark as the primary currency source on December 4, 1871, with
silver as the subsidiary coinage, at an established ratio of 15.5 to 1, silver to gold.21
Laughlin further reported that Germany took even more decisive steps toward a single
gold standard by passing a law on July 9, 1873, which allowed Germany to gradually
withdraw its old silver coinage, and sell it as bullion on the open market until May 30,
1879, when such sales would be suspended.22 Germany’s selling of silver bullion on the
open market from 1873 to the end of May 1879 amounted to 113,676,800 ounces of
silver, with proceeds of the sales amounting to $141,784,948 or an average price of $1.25
per ounce.23
The evidence made clear that silver prices did decline from 1873−79. Jerome
Farmer included a table from the Bankers Magazine in 1886, which gave the equivalent
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average quotes for the price of silver during these six years.24 Farmer’s figures
established a consistency of one ounce of fine silver from 1863 to 1872, at the average
equivalent price of $1.32 per ounce. However, once Germany began its policy of open
market selling in 1873, the price of silver immediately began to fall beginning at $1.29
per ounce during that year, to $1.15 in 1876, and $1.12 in 1879.25 Consequently,
President Grover Cleveland appointed Edward Atkinson to the U.S. State Department,
and Atkinson visited the financial centers of Europe “to ascertain the feasibility of
establishing, by international arrangement, a fixity of ratio between the two precious
metals in free coinage of both.”26 A previous attempt to reach an international agreement
for a permanent ratio between silver and gold had been made on August 10–29, 1878, by
an International Monetary Conference held in Paris. This conference did not accept the
proposal of the American delegates, as had been established earlier under the Bland
Silver Purchase Act of February 28, 1878, with the 16 to 1 ratio of silver to gold.27
Had silver been allowed to exist in a unified bimetallic monetary system, then
arguably the monetary stock of the United States would not have been reduced to a level
that influenced the Depression of the 1890s. Friedman and Schwartz maintained that “the
return of the United States to the gold standard in 1879, at a time when the most
important nations with which it traded were also on a gold standard, in principle inverted
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the role of the stock of money.”28 Friedman emphasized that despite Congressional
appropriations for negotiations with foreign governments toward establishing a bimetallic
monetary policy with the hope of establishing a common set of mint ratios, such
international cooperation never came close. Friedman argued that the United States’ stock
of money under an international gold standard was “controlled primarily by external
influences,” particularly in regard to America’s minor involvement in a gold-standard
world where the U.S. maintained a monetary gold stock at just over 5 percent in 1879 and
never exceeding 18 percent throughout the 1890s.29
Germany’s demand on the world’s gold assets amounted to $414 million as late as
1880, when the German government purchased an additional $120 million of gold in
London.30 With this increased demand for gold, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway followed
Germany’s lead by changing their silver circulation to gold as well, thus simultaneously
throwing another $9 million of silver upon the open market.31 J. T. Phinney supported the
idea that several countries, particularly Germany’s adoption of the gold standard and the
return of the U.S. to it, with the resumption of specie in 1879, did in fact cause the price
of gold to increase, and secondarily caused commodity prices to decline.32 Phinney
argued that the rail and steel industry expansion within an industrializing United States,
alongside Germany’s own internal growth, brought a constant higher demand for gold.
28
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Phinney further supported the idea of a short money supply and its existence
during the late 1890s. Much like the wholesale price index (WPI) of today, Phinney using
similar indices supported his claims about the gold shortage equating with falling
commodity prices and how they led to the Depression of the 1890s.33 Phinney’s fallingcommodity price index used a combination of information taken from English economist,
William Stanley Jevons, and Augustus Sauerbeck, the author of Movement of Prices,
1840−1901. Many of Sauerbeck’s data tables on downward price movement are taken
from U.S. Senate reports and Department of Labor prices during this period. One of
Phinney’s charts was a comparison of Snyder’s general index for the period 1875 to
1913. Phinney provided additional charts that document the decline in the wholesale
price index, beginning in 1894 and a bottoming out in 1896, which demonstrated the
sharpest decline in commodity prices of the entire period.34
England’s Influence on America’s Return to a Gold Standard
The central banks of Europe had a profound influence in maintaining the gold
standard. Arthur Bloomfield maintained that by the end of the nineteenth century “nearly
all the leading countries had linked their currencies to gold in one form or another;”
however, “gold coin formed a relatively large part of the currency circulation only in
England, France, Germany, the United States, and (after 1897) Russia, and in several of
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the smaller countries such as Australia, South Africa, and Egypt.”35 The Bank of England
served as that country’s central bank and held the official gold reserves within the British
Empire, as did the Bank of France in Paris for that country.
However, the United States had no central bank and the Treasury held substantial
amounts of gold reserves. At one time, it was believed that $100 million in gold was an
adequate amount for any convertibility of bank notes upon demand into gold specie, even
though the United States held a limited sub-treasury amount of gold reserves in New
York commercial banks. Keeping the $100 million gold minimum became difficult for
U.S. Secretaries of the Treasury during the 1890s, and “by February 1, 1893, the gold in
the Treasury had dropped within $8,000,000 of the established minimum reserve.”36
Moreover, on February 2, 1895, during the mid-crisis of the Depression Nineties, the
amount of gold coin held by the United States in the sub-treasury in New York amounted
to less than $9,000,000, which was critically short.37
Just how the gold flowed between the United States and the central banks of
Europe was complex and related to each country’s imports and exports. Alongside the
international gold standard, there was a system of payments between countries such that
any tariff payments were made in gold specie and balances were maintained in gold. The
Bank of England used the bank rate to keep gold inside its country and to increase its
gold reserve. For example, if Britain’s imports exceeded its exports, then the central bank
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raised the bank rate of interest to attract gold into the country to offset gold payments that
were going out to pay tariff fees abroad. Richard Sayers’s work provided an insightful
analysis of the Bank of England’s policy: “When the Bank wanted to enforce high rates
in the City in order to deal with some temporary movement in the balance of international
payments, but did not want to penalize home trade,” the central bank frequently followed
the market rate set by joint-stock banks at that time.38 According to Sayers, the London
joint-stock banks established a lasting practice of regulating their Deposit Rate
automatically with Bank Rate. This practice linked interest rates for money loaned out to
that deposited into the banks and competed with the Bank of England’s deposits as well.
The Baring Crisis of November 1890 created a worldwide gold shortage through a
global system of banking networks. The Bank of England came to the aid of Baring
Brothers with more intricate maneuvers than it might first appear. Despite the
embarrassment of the Bank of England having to borrow gold from Russia and France,
the Russian government, not only transferred gold bullion to the London central bank, but
in fact, when the Baring Crisis first appeared “the Russian government transferred the
balances, which it had formerly kept with Barings, to the Bank.”39 The sale of Treasury
Bonds held by the Bank of England brought in £1,500,000 of Russian gold.40 The Bank
38
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of France assisted in much the same manner. With Lord Rothschild acting as an
intermediary, the Bank of France lent the Bank of England £3,000,000 in gold, and
according to Sayers, this loan was repaid within three months on February, 1891.
The Baring Crisis of 1890 in effect limited the amount of gold available
worldwide, and, in turn, created a tighter money supply since gold was the monetary
system of the existing global economy of the late nineteenth century. After the foreign
borrowing of gold on Barings’ behalf, Viscount Goschen, the Chancellor of the
Exchequer, initiated a policy of increased gold reserves for the Bank of England. Sayers
reported that between January 1894 and March 1896, the Bank of England increased gold
reserves from £24,500,000 to £49,000,000. Gold circulation increased as well throughout
the entire United Kingdom, with the total gold supply increasing from £90,000,000 in
1892 — according to the Chancellor of the Exchequer’s estimate — to £92,500,000 in
1895.41 The gold stock within the United States from 1890 to 1891 decreased, including
the bullion in the U.S. Treasury, by an amount of $30,000,000.42
As the monetary stock of gold decreased and the price per ounce of gold
increased, the price of commodities fell in proportion to the increased demand for gold.
Robert A. Lehfeldt argued for the “quantity theory” when stating that prices rose and fell
in proportion to the stock of money. Lehfeldt has taken Augustus Sauerbeck’s forty-fiveitem commodity price index and correlated it with the production of gold from 1840 to
1910. Lehfeldt’s resounding comparison for the same years confirmed that during the late

41

Walter T. Layton, An Introduction to the Study of Prices with Special Reference to the History of the
Nineteenth Century (London, Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1912), 133. (This data taken from Appendix D of
Layton’s work that included Table 1. “Estimates of Gold Circulation in the United Kingdom,” figures
obtained from the Thirty-fourth Annual Report of the Deputy Master and Comptroller of the Royal mint.)

42

Ibid., 134. (Layton’s Table III).

41

1890s, the world supply of gold decreased while demand was up. This idea of gold as a
commodity that controlled price levels went back to David Hume’s “Of the Balance of
Trade,” which Michael Bordo has explained as a price-specie-flow mechanism. Nations
used gold as a commodity arbitrage, which served to keep national price levels in line and
maintain a balance-of-payments.43
As a result of a decreased gold supply, commodity prices were driven down due
to a lack of money.44 Lehfeldt emphasized that this monetary shortage would have been
far worse had it not been for the gold findings of the Witwatersrand fields of South Africa
in 1887, while gold production fell off in the rest of the world.45 Lehfeldt supported the
argument that as trade increased throughout the world, it brought about a demand for
gold; and the question was not whether the supply was increasing, but whether it was
increasing at a fast enough rate. Lehfeldt made a compelling argument that the
suppression of silver and its demonetization caused much of the money supply to be
reduced while the world’s gold money supply grew at only 2 ½ percent; coinciding with a
world economy that grew at 3 percent annually during the late 1880s and 1890s.46
Richard T. Selden also argued the money-velocity theory and described the
circulating velocity of money as the velocity (V) of money by a “ratio of a money flow
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during a time period to the average money stock during that period.”47 Selden determined
that “the demand for money rose” during a period of declining velocity, and that income
velocity dropped extensively from 1879 to 1899.48 Milton Friedman’s essay in the same
work has also supported the premise that there are other “important factors affecting the
supply of money that do not affect the demand for money,” under which technical
conditions can affect the supply of specie.49 Some of these factors comprised the forms of
credit that existed between central banks during the late nineteenth century.
One example of commercial transactions used extensively during this time was
“bills of exchange.” Bills of exchange were forms of credit in which no physical gold had
to be transferred between an acceptor or creditor. Ralph G. Hawtrey defined a bill of
exchange as an instrument of assigned debt where the rights to that debt are exchanged
from one creditor to another. A bill of exchange “is an order to the debtor to pay to the
new creditor,” and “it is written or drawn by the old creditor,” as well as accepted by the
debtor.50 Hawtrey emphasized that, although bills of exchange could be drawn on traders
in any part of the country, London began as the predominant destination as the result of
joint-stock banking and the Bank of England. Since the export and import trade of the
United Kingdom came through and into the hands of British merchants, trade and its
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financing became centralized in the financial district of London.51 These bills of
exchange became so predominant with British merchants that the term “bill on London”
was synonymous with the bill of exchange as a form of commercial credit, with the Bank
of England backing up any demand for gold upon its concentrated reserves.52 Often one
bank would re-discount its credit, while one of its competitors might have more funds
than they could readily use.53 Such occurrences which increased the public demand for
cash, were met by calling-in the short loans from the “bill brokers,” who would find
whether another bank could lend the equivalent of what was called.54
Harold D. Woodman characterized the American South’s usage of this financial
arrangement when describing “bills of exchange” as loans from planters to factors,
running from 30 to 90 days, as short-term commercial loans with merchandise in storage
or transit, and delivery based on the good name, reputation, and tangible assets of the
factor when selling cotton in England.55 Woodman’s “Bankers and Factors” vividly
described how cotton buyers, as representatives of firms in North America or Europe,
“were given the right by the firm they represented to draw on them for funds in order to
buy cotton.”56 Woodman explained how these bills of exchange were traded between
larger general merchants with branches or partners in several cities, such as “Brown
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Brothers and Company and allied firms, Baring Brothers and Company, and Hope and
Company” which offered exchange and loan services as private and merchant bankers,
throughout the southern cities of Charleston, New Orleans, Mobile, Montgomery, and
Nashville.57 Woodman emphasized that the resident cotton buyers in Liverpool, London,
New York, Boston, or Philadelphia would even draw a bill of exchange on their own
firm, sell it to a bank; and with the bank note issued, use the proceeds to buy cotton.
Thus, these bills of exchange were commercial instruments that avoided the actual
transference of gold specie.
George J. Goschen, Chancellor of the Exchequer, provided an international
example of a typical foreign exchange process that took place in the late nineteenth
century. Goshen described “bills of exchange” in terms of international trade. He
illustrated that if merchant A in England has exported English commodities and has
consigned them to a correspondent B in France; with another merchant C in France
having exported French commodities to merchant D in England, then the buying up of
debt as bills of exchange are assigned over in payment to their own foreign creditors.
Thus the trouble, risk, and expense of sending coin is averted.58 Goschen’s analysis
demonstrated how supply and demand determined foreign exchange. If this same
example had fewer merchants with bills upon France than, say, England, then the bills on
France would be at a premium. However, if more persons had money claims from France
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than those required to send funds to France, then those bills would be at a discount.59 As
long as debts equated between countries, then there is a balance of trade, and the
transference of gold is at a minimum. However, when imports vastly exceeded exports,
countries had to pay off their debts in the form of hard currency.
Werner Scholte contributed leading statistical economic data for Great Britain’s
overseas trade during the nineteenth century, based on import and export values derived
by the 5 percent ad valorem duty that was added by the customhouse.60 This allowed
Schlote to use a multiplier of twenty in order to compute the fixed prices of goods.
Schlote also used shipping-tonnage statistics as a means of importing data for the
statistical tables of exports and imports.
The statistical data of Scholte’s tables have shown how British overseas trade had
a direct influence on America’s Depression of 1893−97. In addition, Schlote specified
data portraying Great Britain’s four-year slump from 1891−94, had a – £12.4 million
decline in imports and a –£54.4 million simultaneous decline in exports. This period was
one of the most protracted business slumps for Great Britain from 1816 to 1913.61
Scholte stated that 1893 was the most dismal year of this four-year 1891−94 period,
which he credited to the lackluster performance of livestock imports and finished
manufactured goods.62 Scholte’s figures also hold true for the largest decline in the year
1893, with regard to United Kingdom exports of home products.
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The United States took in less revenue as well. John M. Firestone related that
“during the four business cycles from 1879 to 1894, customs revenues constituted better
than 50 percent of total revenues” brought into the U.S. Treasury.63 Firestone’s data
emphasized that other sources of revenue for the United States Treasury included
seigniorage fees for the minting of gold and silver coinage. Also a large amount of
revenue came from public land sales and the sale of licenses and permits. However, these
additional revenue fees did not compensate for the revenue loss from decreased tariff
duties. Firestone’s data, given in percent amounts, confirmed a 9 percentage point
decrease in customs revenues received by the United States from 1894 to 1897,
decreasing from 49.7 percent to 40.2 percent of total revenues received.64
Gold Standard Necessity for Convertibility of Gold into U.S. Bank Notes
The Bank of England hedged on gold and maintained a larger reserve along with a
much slower global economy after the Baring Crisis spilled over into America. Arthur
Bloomfield maintained that since a world gold standard existed, it led to an increased
monetary supply of gold at a sufficient rate “to support the growing volume of money
needed to finance the growth in world production, as well as to provide the volume of
reserves needed for exchange stability and convertibility.”65 Such elasticity in the
monetary system did not exist in America’s depression of 1893−1897. According to
Bloomfield, the primary objective of monetary policy in the gold standard countries was
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to maintain the convertibility of their national currency directly or indirectly into gold at a
fixed exchange rate.66 The United States, in order to maintain both the convertibility of its
U.S. Treasury notes and greenbacks into gold, had previously set $100 million in bullion
reserves as the minimum requirement set by a July 12, 1882 Act.67 Richard Timberlake
emphasized that the U.S. Treasury had some central bank features; and throughout the
late 1880s it maintained a 40 percent gold reserve against all outstanding U.S. notes and
$346 million of outstanding greenbacks, which were frozen in quantity by the
Resumption Act of January 14, 1875.68 Timberlake indicated from F. W. Taussig’s earlier
work that the $100 million in gold minimum held by the U.S. Treasury was only a
reserve of about 29 percent against all outstanding notes and greenbacks.69
After 1890, the total silver currency in circulation, composed of silver coins,
silver certificates, and the treasury notes of 1890, began a large divergence from the
actual amount of gold coin held by the U.S. Treasury as a reserve. Frank Taussig argued
that Baring’s failure led to a heavy export of gold from the United States and that
between February and July, 1890, $70 million in gold had been exported as the result of a
downturn in the balance of international payments.70 Taussig stressed that by the close of
the fiscal year, in June 1891, gold reserves had been reduced to $118 million. According
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to Taussig, the U.S. Treasury gained some reprieve by a bumper wheat harvest in 1891,
the largest ever raised up until that time, while the European harvest was small. This turn
of events elevated the Treasury gold reserves up to $130 million. The surplus was shortlived, however, as New York banks exchanged their legal tender for specie and the
Treasury reserve dropped to $110 million by July 1892.71
The political ramifications of the monetization of silver under the Sherman Silver
Purchase Act of 1890 will be discussed in the next chapter, but according to Richard
Timberlake, this measure “did not expand currency stock appreciably because of the
simultaneous outflow of gold and corresponding decline in gold certificates.”72 Both
Friedman and Schwartz have argued this as well. These authors stated that there was a
drastic increase in public distrust about the maintenance of the gold standard, with the
passage of the Sherman Silver Purchase Act passed on July 14, 1890, “by a Republican
Congress as a purported concession to the West for the support of the protectionist
McKinley Tariff Act of 1890, sought by the industrial East.”73 Friedman and Schwartz
further argued that the convertibility of silver certificates into gold abetted the driving
down of gold reserves.
The Sherman Act stipulated that the Treasury had to purchase 4.5 million ounces of
silver per month or roughly twice the amount purchased under the Bland-Allison Act of
1878, which was 2 million ounces of silver per month. The major difference between the
two acts was the convertibility resulting from the issuance of a new currency. The new
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currency paid for the silver purchases, the Treasury notes of 1890, which were full legal
tender and redeemable in either gold or silver at the discretion of the Secretary of
Treasury.74 Friedman and Schwartz described a declining monetary supply for the
depression years of the 1890s, from a peak in June 1892, coming off the bumper wheat
harvest of fall 1891, with a continuous decline of currency held by the public and
commercial banks from June 1894 through June 1897.75
The purchase of silver came at a time when the international economy was
declining as a result of the Baring Crisis. Barton Hepburn made the argument that silver
purchases under the laws of 1878 and 1890, amounted to 459,946,701 fine ounces,
costing the Treasury $464,210,262, or an average price per ounce of $1.01, when parity
for gold to silver was $1.29.76 Barton emphasized that much of the silver coinage was
warehoused in the U.S. Treasury and that the actual silver certificate paper currency,
which catered to a public preference for paper money, was issued against a large amount
of the coin held in Treasury storage.77 Friedman stressed that silver coinage did increase
the stock of money but not at a fast enough rate, with silver rising from one-eighth of the
currency in circulation to one-fourth of the total currency during the height of the silverpurchase program.78 Other historians, such as Oliver Mitchell Wentworth Sprague,
minimized the importance of silver for the monetary crisis of the Depression 1890s.79
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O. M. W. Sprague placed most of the blame upon the Eastern banks and a major
business contraction, which took place after the failure of the Philadelphia and Reading
Railroad on February 26, 1893. Sprague analyzed that loans from New York national
banks were $365 million in May 1892, and by March 1893, reduced to $323 million, with
a further reduction to $307 million by May of the same year.80 Later on July 25, 1893, the
Erie Railroad failed and the stock market endured the worst decline of the year, with the
governors of the New York Stock Exchange discussing its closure.81
Sprague gave three stages of the crisis as they occurred during the Depression
years, and noted that, although the banks in the West and Southwest had a large number
of suspensions, there was no evidence that people were distrustful of silver money.82
Sprague further argued that the abrupt reduction in their surplus reserves in New York
banks falling from $24.6 million to $8.7 million was “certainly not in any definite way
connected with the silver situation.”83 Banks from the interior of the West and South
could not obtain their funds fast enough from the New York clearinghouse banks,
according to Sprague, and nineteen national banks were placed in the hands of receivers
from May to June, 1893. Sprague considered this economic disjunction as the second
crisis stage following the stock market collapse in May 1893.

80

Oliver Mitchell Wentworth Sprague, History of Crisis under the National Banking System (New York:
Reprint by August M. Kelley Publishers, 1968), 198. Also cited as U.S. Senate Report, Sixty-first
Congress, 2nd Session, National Monetary Commission: Document No. 538 (Washington, D.C., GPO,
1910), 162−163.
81

Alexander Dana Noyes, Forty Years of American Finance (New York, G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1909), 194.
(The stock market closure was not without precedent; it closed for ten days on September 20, 1873, with
the Panic of 1873, following Jay Cooke’s failure on Northern Pacific Railroad bonds.)
82

Sprague, History of Crisis under the National Banking System, 168.

83

Ibid.

51

Friedman summarized the historical period as two sets of forces that were
responsible for two different drains. The first was the distrust of the Treasury’s ability to
maintain silver at parity with gold caused by the external drain. And the second was the
distrust of the solvency of banks in particular the western institutions caused by the
internal drain.84 Alexander D. Noyes emphasized the liquidity crisis of banks in the South
and the West regions. Although perfectly solvent, they could not endure the runs that
escalated during this major contraction. Noyes described that out of 360 national banks
and state banks combined, they had a liability of $96 million that suspended payments
during 1893, and that, from this number, 343 suspensions occurred west or south of
Pennsylvania.85 This interior failure of banks in the South and West was Sprague’s third
stage of the crisis, despite the withdrawal of funds once again resuming from New York
during the third week of July, 1893. But by then, it was too little, too late, with the
reported net loss for the week ending July 22, 1893, in the amount of $2.8 million from
reserve bank funds.86 The following week, according to Sprague’s account, bank failures
came in from Chicago, Indianapolis, Milwaukee, and Louisville with net shipments going
out in the amount of $7.8 million from the New York banks.
The U.S. Treasury’s gold reserve fell to a low of $45 million in January, 1895. As
a reaction to the lower reserve amounts, the U.S. Treasury had previously come out with
successive bond issues of $50 million, sold to New York banks during January and
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November, 1894, which were not successful in restoring the Treasury’s gold reserves.87
Treasury Secretary James Carlisle, working with Assistant Secretary William E. Curtis,
realized the gravity of the gold depletion within the U.S. Treasury and the gold standard
was in a perilous state. Carlisle made a decision at midnight while the Capitol was in the
grips of a February blizzard to invoke section 3700, of the Revised Statutes which came
under the Resumption of Specie Act of 1875, which authorized the treasury secretary “to
purchase coin with any of the bonds or notes of the United States authorized by law, at
such rates and upon such terms as he may deem most advantageous to the public
interest.”88 The actual contract writing was left up to Francis Lynde Stetson, J. P.
Morgan’s attorney and Assistant Treasury Secretary Curtis. This last-ditch effort through
the syndication of bankers, headed by J. P. Morgan and August Belmont, who agreed to
sell the government $65 million with 3.5 million ounces of gold at the price of $17.80 per
ounce, did cause the gold outflow to subside somewhat.89 This funding occurred on
February 8, 1895 with the backing of thirty-year 4 percent bonds at a premium of 104 ½ ,
along with the stipulation that at least one-half of the gold obtained came from Europe.
Both Morgan and Belmont, profited during this depression period, but the end
result was, that were it not for Morgan or Belmont acting as syndicators of the gold bond
issue, it would undoubtedly have been taken on by another financial house such as Baring
Brothers in London, or Rothschild in Europe. Although the bond sales in Europe and
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Canada bought time for the U.S. gold standard, it added more political problems for
President Cleveland. Silver monetization was not the major problem during the
Depression of the late 1890s, but rather a balance of payments deficit that allowed gold to
leave the country. The McKinley Tariff was protectionist rather than economic, causing
higher import duties imposed by the tariff, thus reducing the demand for imports of the
protected commodities and also the much needed foreign currency to pay for them.90 The
Sherman Silver Purchase Act of 1890 and the McKinley Tariff were passed in the same
year during Benjamin Harrison’s administration with William Windom as Secretary of
the Treasury, a position he held until his death in New York City on January 29, 1891.
The economic crisis became global with the Baring Crisis and escalated from that point
forward. U.S. tariffs played a major role in maintaining the Treasury’s gold reserve
through a classical balance of payments. Hume’s dynamics described by David Pope,
stated that this “loss of gold reduces the amount of money in the country, since either
gold is money or the banking system keeps the supply of money adjusted to the quantity
of gold reserves.”91 Mill’s quantity theory of money holds that with less money, people
will spend less, and less spending with no output change will lower prices.
Economic problems that resulted from the overall business contraction became part
of the anomaly that resulted in a constant fall of commodity prices such as cotton, wheat,
and corn, along with a simultaneous drop in money supply and credit. Despite John G.
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Carlisle’s attempts as President Cleveland’s Secretary of the Treasury to alleviate the late
1890s Depression, no final remedy appeared in sight. The Populist movement, discussed
in the next chapter, has offered a focused explanation about how this contraction affected
the average American. Regionalization of the money supply provoked a discordant
Populist idealism initiated in the Midwest, which allied itself with an agrarian South,
along with a pro-silver movement of the Western mining states against the Eastern
banking sector.
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Chapter 2
The Populist Movement for an Increased Money Supply
The Populist Party political platform included the demand for an increased money
supply in order to pay off debts and obtain loans during planting season. The crop-lien
system became a major means of financing by holding a farmer’s crop as collateral
against a debt provided by a furnishing merchant for seed and provisions throughout the
planting, growing, and harvesting of a crop. Edward Royce made a well-defined
distinction between two classes of farmers who use the crop-lien system for financing
their provisions.1 According to Royce, a sharecropper was a wage laborer who was
compensated with a share of the crop at the end of the season, while tenancy was a form
of renting land, and the tenant maintained control of the crop until it was sold to pay back
any loaned provisions. Both types of labor arrangements involved some type of crop-lien
against the farmer’s growing crop as collateral for a furnishing merchant or small bank.
Some farmers may have owned some of their land as yeoman farmers, but rented out
other acreage as tenants.
The debt-ridden South consisted of several classes of farmers. Many were
landless white and black farmers who only had their labor to offer, and were compelled to
harsh financial terms in agreements. Lawrence Goodwyn, Alex Arnett, John D. Hicks,
and other Populist historians have referred to this high-interest rate debt of 25 percent or
greater as “debt peonage” since many Southern farmers could never pay off their loans. A
large amount of the crop financing in the 1890s came from the furnishing merchant who

1

Edward Royce, The Origins of Southern Sharecropping (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993),
184.

56

advanced farm supplies, food, and other necessities to the crop tenant in exchange for the
sale of their crop to pay off as much of their indebtedness as possible.
The Populists thought that if the monetary supply could be increased, commodity
prices would increase as well. Friedman and Schwartz contended that rather than the
money supply increasing, money velocity in fact decreased from 1879 to 1897, at the
average rate of 3 percent per year. This in turn, as argued in Monetary History of the
United States, 1867−1960, caused wholesale prices to fall. The Populists’ plan called for
maintaining a money supply based on a per capita rate, which allowed for the increased
amount of U.S. commerce and population. Friedman and Schwartz stressed the fact that
from 1892−96, the money supply after a previous rise of 2 percent per year up to 1892,
declined at the rate of 5 percent during these four years.2
The farmers united behind a cooperative crusade for greater coinage of silver and
more currency in circulation. Farm commodity prices fell as a result of the Depression
Nineties, while the value of gold went up due to this currency shortage. A unification
movement, the subtreasury plan, was installed to place crops in cooperative grain
elevators and cotton warehouses where farmers could receive negotiable treasury notes
for 80 percent of their crop valuation in storage. However, as a result of administrative
costs, construction and managerial costs, the subtreasury plan never came to fruition due
to the lack of Congressional support.
Sectionalism evolved over the support of maximum silver coinage by the South
and the Western mining states of Colorado, Nevada, and Idaho, versus the “goldbugs” of
the East who wanted to maintain a stronger gold currency. The “Crime of 1873,” perhaps
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began the initial animosity between the “silverites” of the West and the “goldbugs” of the
East when the mintage of the standard silver dollar was suspended for a period of five
years under the Coinage Act of 1873. The passage of this coinage act furnished fodder for
Congressional debates for several years over money, and even more so during the
Depression of 1873−78. One of the Populist writers intensified the crime legend later in
1887, when Sarah E. V. Emery condemned the demonization of the silver dollar as one of
the “seven conspiracies that shook the world.”3 The Populists also attached their free
silver movement to the legend of this so-called crime, and placed the blame for the
shortage of currency on Eastern bondholders who wanted to make certain that payments
on public bonds were made in gold and not depreciated silver. An effort to appease the
Midwestern farmers and the silver mining states was made by the rapid passage of the
Bland-Allison Act of 1878, led by Democratic representative Richard P. Bland of
Missouri. The Act required the U.S. Treasury to purchase between $2 million to $4
million of silver bullion each month from western mines and coin the metal into 412½
grain-amount silver dollars.
One of the major goals of the Populist movement was to create a larger monetary
supply in the agrarian economy. Bruce Palmer argued that the Southern Populists wanted
financial reform “to prevent money from affecting market values of other commodities.”4
Financial reform was one of the three planks that the Populist Movement drafted in its
Omaha Platform during its presidential nominating convention in 1892. Palmer’s work
contained the valid argument that to “keep the purchasing power of the dollar reasonably
3
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uniform in relation to commodity prices,” and to keep market variation within reason,
“the volume of money had to increase at the same rate as the population and commerce
increased.”5 The argument used throughout this dissertation was that the volume of
money did not keep up with the increased commerce of the late 1890s, and because of
this financial failure farm commodity prices did in fact decrease — not from
overproduction resulting from supply and demand, but from a short money supply.
The high points of this chapter will be the increased demand by the Populists for a
bimetallic currency to increase the money supply and the push for a larger supply of
greenback paper currency by the Populists to increase monetary flow.
The concept of sound money in the late 1890s and throughout the late nineteenth
century was that currency should have an intrinsic value, and that was the goal of the
Eastern banking establishment. All other money was fiat money in that its only support
was the full faith and credit of the United States government. Irving Fisher’s classic
work, The Purchasing Power of Money, stressed that money in the nineteenth century
was of two types: primary and fiduciary. Fisher analyzed that money is called “primary”
if it is a commodity such as gold coin, which has just as much value in some usage other
than its monetary form.6 Fiduciary money, by example, was bank notes that could be
exchanged at banks, or for the payment of mercantile goods; however, state and private
bank notes during the late nineteenth century were often discounted when converted into
gold coin based on the creditworthiness of the bank that issued the notes.7
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The decades succeeding the Civil War, especially the 1890s, brought forth many
financial questions as to how money was created, and on which basis it circulated defined
in many critical ways the relationship of farmers, urban workers, and commercial
participants in America’s emerging industrial state.8 Lawrence Goodwyn and other
Populist historians have argued that not only what type of money, but also the amount in
circulation was an important issue and that this quantitative amount affected the “terms of
price and income levels, interest rates, and the relations of creditor and debtor classes.”9
The Populist movement under the label of “Agrarian Radicalism” wanted cheaper money
with which to pay off farm-mortgage debt and obtain loans during planting season. The
Populist movement with agrarian roots was deeply seated in the South and West. Alex M.
Arnett emphasized that the capital of the South was widely destroyed during the Civil
War, and since land became unsalable and unacceptable as a security then credit became
more of an extensive part of the South’s economic basis in the form of the crop-lien
system for several decades.10 In the South, this resulted in the breaking up of large estates
into smaller holdings of forty to sixty acres, and former plantation owners renting these to
both landless whites and black farmers for a share of the cotton crop.11
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A commercial class arose in the form of small-town merchants who extended
credit to the cotton sharecroppers using over-extended store accounts. While some of the
more able planters entered the mercantile business, but stayed within the confines of their
modest supply stores or commissaries located on their larger acreage, many others moved
into towns and became merchant landlords establishing various furnishing stores.12
Lacking ready available hard currency, such capital, though miniscule, was based on
cotton prices for tenant farmers. In addition, their credit generally was extended on a
year-to-year basis with loans rarely ever paid off. Goodwyn emphasized the gravity of the
sharecropper’s hopeless cause with an economic system where furnishing merchants paid
as much as 18 percent for credit extended from Northern banks — then passed these
credit-based costs on to moneyless farmers using a crop-lien as security.13 Goodwyn
argued that a two-price system — one price for cash and the second higher price for
credit — could subject sharecroppers to anywhere from 25 to 50 percent interest on an
already inflated base.
This type of debt, referred to as debt peonage, is described by Goodwyn when
many a farmer signed a note mortgaging next year’s crop when failing to “pay out” to the
furnishing merchant. Both Alex Arnett and Lawrence Goodwyn stressed that within the
postbellum South, the relationship between the cotton sharecropper and the crop-lien
system was one large collateralized system. Arnett made clear that within the state of
Georgia furnishing merchants, financed with Northern capital due to the low number of
state banks in the South, advanced loans of a hundred dollars, but only after deducting
12
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twenty dollars at the outset as a loan-negotiating commission.14 Along with this fee for a
loan secured by a mortgage upon their farm, the interest charged to farmers with land ran
between 7 or 8 percent, and Arnett highlighted that the entire economic system of
Georgia during this time was conducted in the manner of a huge pawnshop.15 Matthew B.
Hammond explained that the “use of the credit system is not confined to a small number
of the farmers of the cotton belt,” but that 90 percent of the cotton growers in Alabama
made their purchases this way, and they paid on average 25 percent more on credit than
cash customers.16
Roger Ransom and Richard Sutch analyzed the effect of rural furnishing merchants,
as they became the heirs to the cotton factors during the postbellum decades. These
merchants filled the void caused by the elimination of a number of state-chartered banks
that had to pay the 10 percent tax on the note issues upon non-national banks.17 C. Vann
Woodward emphasized that the 1863 National Banking Act, passed by Congress, along
with the 10 percent levy on state bank notes, limited one bank to every 16,600 inhabitants
in 1895. Excluding Texas, this limited only one bank to every 58,130 inhabitants in the
cotton states.18 Matthew Hammond stressed the financial severity in the ten cotton states
as having only 417 national banks in September 1895, with 214 of those located in
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Texas.19 Steven Hahn has supported the compelling argument that if Southern banking
had been revived after the Civil War, then a “semblance of the factorage system might
have been salvaged,” or perhaps a credit solution might have been found.20 Hahn stressed
that the wartime Republican Congress under U.S. Treasury Secretary Salmon P. Chase
and Ohio Senator John Sherman enacted the National Banking Act of 1863, with the
established goal of a national currency and a national banking structure that proved
disadvantageous to rural areas and a capital-starved South. Hahn agreed that the National
Banking Act allowed state-chartered banks, but the imposed 10 percent tax on statechartered bank notes kept what few national banks and state banks that did emerge in the
postbellum period confined largely to urban centers. These statistics on the low number
of banks in the South related how the necessity of the furnishing merchant came about in
the postbellum decades.
Ransom and Sutch conveyed that “there were 7,977 general stores listed by Dun’s
Mercantile Agency in the rural Cotton South in 1880, located at 2,937 separate postal
addresses.”21 Many of these same stores undoubtedly carried on into the 1890s, with the
country furnishing merchant interposing himself and alleviating the need for an
intermediary role of the antebellum cotton factor.22 Monopoly of credit was also a factor
that Ransom and Sutch have stressed as contributing to the agrarian plight of the 1890s.
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Populist historians have described the absolute necessity of credit for sharecroppers and
tenant farmers. The furnishing merchant making the advancements insisted that farmers
conduct all of their business at that specific store holding the crop-lien, thus ensuring a
monopoly of trade.23 Barton C. Shaw, writing about Georgia’s Populist Party, described
“the storekeeper’s lien, which year after year coiled slowly about the yeoman,” as the
“anaconda mortgage,” and the merchant simply known as the “the Man.”24
Bruce Palmer examined the economic dilemma of the Southern Populists who
knew that by increasing the quantity of money, prices would increase slowly and remain
steady. But the amount of money circulating also had to expand. The term “circulation”
referred to money velocity. The money in circulation had to flow quicker to stimulate the
agrarian economy. However, the problem was that hard currency was notably scarce.
With the crop-lien system in place and the strong reliance on a furnishing merchant credit
system, there was not enough currency to stimulate the economy. The Populist
Movement was attuned to increasing the money velocity by an increased money supply,
hence their strongly felt need of more silver currency into monetary circulation.
Palmer has applied Irving Fisher’s “equation of exchange,” MV = PQ, to the
economic conditions facing the Southern Populist movement in Texas from 1891 to 1896
which explained the necessity of an adequate monetary circulation.25 Milton Friedman’s
interpretation of economic data for the years 1879−97 has provided chart analysis that
23

Goodwyn, Democratic Promise, 27. Ransom and Sutch, One Kind of Freedom, 127.

24

Barton C. Shaw, The Wool-Hat Boys: Georgia’s Populist Party (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1984), 15; see also Goodwyn, Democratic Promise, 28.
25

Palmer, “Man Over Money,” 84. See Palmer’s endnote 18 at p. 288 for formula explanation. Palmer
explains using “P=MV/Q that if the velocity of money (V) doubles while the quantity of money (M) and
the number of transactions (Q) stay the same, the price level (P) doubles. For example: If Q = 10; M = 10;
V=10.” However, if V doubles to 20, then P also doubles.

64

portrayed “the sizable and highly regular decline in velocity — it fell at an average rate of
nearly 3 percent per year.”26 Friedman researched the years 1879−1914, for cyclic
expansions and contractions, illustrating a decline in the velocity of money for the year
1894, along with a falling wholesale price index during a four-year period from 1894−97
inclusive.27 Friedman portrayed the period 1891−97, as one of the most economically
troubled times in our history, with an initial money stock spurt in 1891−92, reversing
itself and declining 5 percent during 1892−96.
The Yearbook of the U.S. Department of Agriculture presented evidence from
official accounts of lower commodity prices in key grain-producing states during the
1890s depression years. Corn prices in the nation’s grain market of Chicago went from a
high of sixty-five cents in September 1891, a relatively good year, and well before the
depression hit, to a low of thirty-four cents. Corn prices remained in the mid-thirty cent
range per bushel throughout 1893.28 The prices were even lower within the grain states,
such as Iowa and Illinois, than in the populated eastern regions where it had to be shipped
by rail. Wheat prices also fell, going from sixty cents per bushel in Minneapolis and St.
Paul, Minnesota in 1891, to a low of thirty-four cents per bushel in December 1893.29
Donald L. Kemmerer and C. Clyde Jones, economic historians writing about crop
production, also supported this falling-commodity prices viewpoint and demonstrated
with Historical Statistics in Table 2.1, the 1890s production levels of wheat, corn, and
cotton. Even with the decreased overseas shipments, prices still spiraled downward.
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Table 2.1 Crop Statistics, 1866 – 1914.30

Wheat

Corn

Year

Million
bushels

Price per
bushel

1866

170

$2.06

1870

254

1880

Price per
bushel

Thousand
bales

Price per
pound

731

$0.66

1,948

$0.16

1.04

1,125

0.52

4,025

0.12

502

0.95

1,707

0.39

6,357

0.10

1890

449

0.84

1,650

0.50

8,562

0.09

1894

542

0.49

2,671

0.21

10,026

0.05

1900

599

0.62

2,662

0.35

10,124

0.09

1910

625

0.88

2,853

0.47

11,609

0.14

1914

897

0.99

2,524

0.64

16,112

0.07

(1896 figures
for corn)

Million
bushels

Cotton

Source: Donald Kemmerer and Clyde Jones, American Economic History, 434.

Jeffrey G. Williamson emphasized that the “lagged relationship” between supply
and price in the world grain market from 1860 to 1880 had less effect on price than was
the case with cotton in the pre-Civil War period.31 Comparing the production figures and
their respective prices against the exports of the same commodities provided evidence
that oversupply did not cause depressed commodity prices for farmers during the 1890s.
Table 2.2 compared two of the three crops that Kemmerer used and has submitted a

30
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sequential year-by-year of export amounts and their dollar value from 1888 to 1897,
comparing the five depression years of 1893−97, in contrast to five better economic years
1888−92.32
Table 2.2. Exports of Unmanufactured Cotton and Wheat
Year

Cotton (million lbs.) Cotton (value of

exports in $millions)

223

Wheat (million
60-lb. bushels)

Wheat (value of
exports in $millions)

1888

2,264

66

56

1889

2,385

238

46

42

1890

2,472

251

54

45

1891

2,907

291

55

51

1892

2,935

258

157

161

1893

2,212

189

117

94

1894

2,683

211

88

59

1895

3,517

205

76

44

1896

2,335

190

61

40

1897

3,104

231

80

60

Source: Douglas A. Irwin, “Exports of Selected Commodities, 1790−1989,” 547.

Table 2.2 analyses lend support to the argument that production of agricultural
commodities stayed relatively constant, yet world commodity prices continued to fall,
especially noted in the years 1895−96. Bruce Palmer emphasized that both Friedman and
Schwartz, in Monetary History of the United States, “maintained that the adoption of free
silver in 1879 would have prevented the price deflation of 1879 to 1897,” and “would not
have led to inflation,” the greatest fear of the Eastern banking establishment.33
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During the three decades of the 1870s, 1880s, and the 1890s, Goodwyn asserted
that “there appeared to be a direct and desperate relation between the South’s rising
cotton harvest and the region’s rising poverty.” With the annual output increasing on
even yet smaller tracts of crop-lien land, “thousands, then millions descended into the
world of landless tenantry” as the soil and those who worked it became exhausted from
this desperate financial cycle.34 The vicious cycle caused by the monopoly of necessary
credit existed whether a farmer dealt with one merchant or more, and still demanded an
expansion of cotton production as a cash crop that sent the indebted farmer back to the
merchant for provisions.35 Hahn described a postwar South that suffered from “falling
prices for agricultural produce on the international market, discriminatory freight rates,
the erection of high protective tariffs, the demonetization of silver, and land policies,” all
of which financially squeezed U.S. farmers as industrial and speculative financial capital
merged into a national economy.36
Edward L. Ayers characterized that furnishing merchants were local people as
well, and while there might be some distressing scenes of a sheriff’s sale at the
courthouse steps, the normal process would be for a merchant to approach a lien-crop
farmer on the verge of financial collapse, and offer an assignment of deed, thus clearing
all accounts in full.37 Landless cotton farmers moved further westward, with both C.
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Vann Woodward and Lawrence Goodwyn crediting Ulrich B. Phillips’ famous passage:
“Let . . . the soil be worn out, let the people move to Texas . . . , let almost anything
happen provided all possible cotton is produced each year.”38
Farmers Unite Toward a Cooperative Crusade
Goodwyn described how three simple initials, “G. T. T.” (Gone To Texas)
embedded across a nailed shut sharecropper’s door, was all the information needed to
convey the message that another cotton farmer of the Old South had moved westward for
a new beginning. It is in Texas that the beginnings of the Farmers’ Southern alliance took
place. The Farmers’ Alliance movement had two separate beginnings, one in Texas and
the other in Kansas and New York, according to Populist historians Bruce Palmer and
John D. Hicks. Hicks maintained that the National Farmers’ Alliance or Northern
Alliance as it was more commonly known, grew out of the Granger Movement of the
1870s, and the “date of the founding of the Northern Alliance is fixed at March 21,
1877,” to devise a “political mouthpiece” for the farmers voice.39 The Kansas element of
the Northern Alliance grew out of the Settlers’ Protective Association, which Hicks
described as a number of Kansas squatters organized around 1874, in defense of their
land titles against railroad claimants.
Black farmers were also organized and formed “from a venture in cooperative
marketing attempted by some farmers in Johnson County, Illinois, as early as 1883.”40
Hicks and Goodwyn both recounted that a Southern white man, R. M. Humphrey, a
38
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native of Texas “who had been a Baptist missionary among the negroes,” received credit
for organizing the Colored Alliance at “Houston, Texas, in December, 1886. By January,
1891, a million and a quarter members were claimed, with a dozen complete state
organizations,” and a national organization firmly established by 1888.41 The Populist
movement began from local state chapters allowing an outlet to voice their opinions.
These local chapters added political clout that would further a “grass-roots” cooperative
cause to establish a broader-base currency which would alleviate the farmers’ debt.
Joel Sipress wrote a case study about the cooperative efforts of the hill country
Populist movement in Grant Parish, Louisiana, where a community of black farmers
organized a Colored Farmers’ Union in 1888 under the patronage of the local white
union.42 Sipress accentuated the “race betrayal” label that the Democratic Party’s “white
supremacy” politics placed upon the white hill country Populists and its prevention of a
formal unification among Black and White Populists, thus hindering the third-party
movement for Southern Populist leaders at the state level. Hill country whites
demonstrated their opposition against Democratic officeholders by either voting
Republican or backing “independent” candidates for local posts, with some of the
Populists candidates running under such labels and being successful in the upland
Parishes of Grant and Catahoula.43

41

Hicks, The Populist Revolt, 115. Goodwyn, Democratic Promise, 218. (Goodwyn’s Chapter X, “The
Populist Approach to Black America,” also discussed Humphrey’s career in more detail.)

42

Joel Sipress, “The Race Cry Doesn’t Scare Us” . . . Or Does It?: Populism and Race in Grant Parish,
Louisiana,” in Populism in the South Revisited: New Interpretations and New Departures, ed. James M.
Beeby (Jackson, Miss.: University Press of Mississippi, 2012), 16.

43

William Ivy Hair, Bourbonism and Agrarian Protest: Louisiana Politics, 1877−1900 (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1969), 199.

70

All Farmers’ Alliance members shared a number of common goals and a number
of these dealt with financial issues both directly and indirectly. The Southern Alliance,
according to Hicks, was more interested in financial problems than anything else, while
the Northern Alliance was most concerned with the railroad carriage rates and the
disappearance of the public lands. Hicks stated that though the issue of a quantity theory
of monetary supply may not be the entire explanation for the farmers’ depressed crop
prices, a continuous appreciating dollar cannot be denied.44 For a farmer in debt, a lack of
adequate circulating currency and the inability to secure crop loans for planting at
reasonable interest rates was a major economic hardship. Peffer, Ashby, and Emery,
along with other currency reformers of the Populist era, have arguably explained that at
the completion of the Civil War the United States had nearly two billion dollars in
circulation; however, by 1890 the population had doubled and business volume tripled,
yet the dollars in circulation had actually declined.
A shortage of currency and falling commodity prices were not the only issues that
farmers had to live with during the late nineteenth century; there is also what is known as
the purchasing power per acre of farm income produced. Two noted agricultural
economists, George F. Warren and Frank A. Pearson, utilized Carl Snyder’s index
number to examine how the “Farm Value Per Acre Harvested” was more important and a
truer value representing greater economic hardship than falling farm commodity prices.45
Two important farm commodities that the Populist farmers raised were cotton in the

44

Hicks, The Populist Revolt, 88−89. See also Arnett, Populist Movement in Georgia, 69.

45

George F. Warren and Frank A. Pearson, The Agricultural Situation: Economic Effects of Fluctuating
Prices (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1924), 70 and 101. (Snyder’s index gave commodity prices a
weight of 20 percent; wages are weighted at 35 percent; cost of living weighted at 35 percent; and rents at
10 percent.)

71

South and wheat in the Midwest. Warren and Pearson have taken their data for farm
prices and acreage from the Department of Agriculture. These two economists related
that wheat during the trough years of 1893 and 1894 had an average U.S. price of 56.3
cents and 49.8 cents per bushel respectively, while the farm value per acre harvested was
$6.78 in 1893, and $6.97 in 1894.46 Cotton, the most crucial crop to the Southern
Farmers’ Alliance, went on average at 7 cents per pound in currency in 1893, and was
down to 4.6 cents per pound in 1894.47 The value per acre harvested in currency declined
from $10.50 in 1893 to a value of $8.96 in 1894.48 Ranchers did not survive the economic
downturn of the Depression Nineties any better, as evidenced in 1894−95, the value per
head of cattle was at the $14.50 price range, and not until 1898 did the price go above
$20 per head of cattle.49 While agricultural commodity prices dropped, the value of gold
went up during the 1890s. Warren and Pearson portrayed that the return of the United
States to the resumption of specie payments in 1879 greatly increased the demand for
gold. Their argument was that the monetary “injustice . . . brought to taxpayers and
debtors led to the Populist movement, and to the free-silver campaign.”50 Warren and
Pearson charted a graphical analysis of gold’s value and correlated an index value of 72
in 1782, to the value of 135 in 1896, representing gold’s highest value for 142 years.51
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American farmers during this 1890s decade viewed themselves as the producers
of America. In order to survive the high prices that mercantile stores charged for farm
supplies the farmers turned to cooperation as a remedy for rural credit problems.52 The
Grangers had initially adopted the Rochdale plan of consumers’ cooperation, a system of
cash-only cooperative stores; however, because of the appreciating value of the currency
and depressed crop prices, most farmers could not participate in cash-only stores.53 The
Farmers’ Alliance movement was strongly anti-monopolist in their views, and so to avert
the crop-lien system set up a series of trade stores. These began in six key Texas counties
where the Southern Alliance had its early start in Lampasas, Coryell, and Hamilton
counties which formed a state alliance in February 1878, and by 1880, were joined by
Parker, Wise, and Jack counties.54 Following the cooperatives of the Grange, the Texas
county Alliances organized by S. O. Daws and other lecturers established “trade
committees” that negotiated with local merchants to seek special rates for Alliance
members.55 Emerging from the “trade committees” and the trade-store system the
Alliance movement progressed and formed joint stock companies for trading purposes.56
Charles W. Macune forged a new consensus within the Texas Alliance with an
emphasis on business goals in order to “ward off accusations that the Farmers’ Alliance
was a dangerous or radical organization” and deployed a strategy for transforming the
52
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Alliance into a formidable business organization.57 The various regional farmers’
alliances became united throughout the South. Near Bayou D’Arbonne in Lincoln Parish
there began the Lincoln Parish Farmers’ Club, which expanded into the Louisiana
Farmers’ Union, and in January 1887, merged with the Texas county alliances to form the
National Farmers’ Alliance and Cooperative Union, simply known as the Farmers’
Alliance.58 John A. Tetts with a 160-acre farm and Samuel Skinner a homesteader near
Ruston, both ex-Grangers, were the founders of the Louisiana Farmer’s Union and were
typical of the small landowners of upland Louisiana.59 The next Farmers’ Alliance
convention was assembled in Shreveport in October of 1887, and the convocation was
national in scope with representatives from eight states along with the distinguished
North Carolina agrarian leader and editor of the weekly Progressive Farmer, Leonidas L.
Polk.60 The Arkansas “Agricultural Wheel” with 150,000 plus members residing in
Arkansas, Tennessee, and Missouri sent its delegation, and it would achieve merger with
the Farmers’ alliance at the Meridian, Mississippi, meeting the following year in 1888.61
Goodwyn described Charles W. Macune’s best efforts “to construct, within the
framework of American capitalism, some variety of cooperative commonwealth.”62 It
was at the Texas State Alliance convention in Waco, on January 18, 1887, that Macune
while still presiding as temporary chairman delivered an address which stressed the needs
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of intensified efforts toward organized cooperative markets.63 Macune told the delegates
“I hold that cooperation, properly understood and properly applied, will place a limit to
the encroachments of organized monopoly, …”64 Goodwyn described that after taking
competitive bids, the city of Dallas offered deferred rentals and real estate for the Texas
Alliance Exchange site. However, the exchange had an organization plan that called for
only $500,000 of paid-in capital stock. This stock would be subscribed by assessing
Alliance members only two dollars, and the exchange was undercapitalized from an
initial opening with only $20,000 available to operate as of March 1887.65 The “Farmers
Alliance Exchange of Texas” opened for business in Dallas in September 1887, and
advanced necessary provisions on credit to the neediest Alliance members with funds and
equipment to harvest their 1888 crop and in turn they sold their crops back through the
exchange.66 Despite its best efforts, the exchange competed in a hostile business locale
against local merchants using unscrupulous price cutting. McMath described the failure
of the “Alliance Exchange” with McCune’s resignation as manager in January 1889, and
a forced liquidation on December 1889, resulting from heavy indebtedness after a
survival of just two years. McMath emphasized that the exchange stood as a vanguard for
the Texas Alliance and with its collapse a decline in alliance membership took place.
The Subtreasury Plan
John Hicks’ work, The Populist Revolt, provided an in-depth analysis on the
subtreasury plan first proposed at the December 1889 Southern Alliance meeting in St.
63
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Louis. The Alliance had a “Committee of the Monetary System,” which embodied its
leading members: Charles W. Macune, a past president of the Southern Alliance and
editor of the National Economist; Colonel Leonidas L. Polk, the newly elected president
and editor of the Progressive Farmer; Leonidas F. Livingston, president of the Georgia
State Alliance, and one of the power Bourbon Democrats in Georgia; W. Scott Morgan,
the author of a History of the Wheel and Alliance, the Arkansas component; and Harrison
Sterling Price Ashby, a prominent Texas Alliance member.67 The subtreasury plan was
the Farmers’ Alliance’s first attempt to stabilize and increase the value of the farm
commodities they produced. The intent of the plan was to establish federal subtreasuries
in every United States county that had annual sales of at least $500,000 worth of farm
commodities that included wheat, corn, oats, barley, rye, rice, tobacco, cotton, wool, and
sugar.68 The sheer vastness of this project was nearly impossible, considering the physical
building requirements of the grain storage elevators and the warehousing necessary under
the restricted economy of the late 1890s.
The subtreasury plan had been enthusiastically presented by the Alliance monetary
committee which “called for the establishment of federal subtreasuries along with
warehouses and elevators in which farmers could store certain nonperishable
commodities.”69 Macune’s plan called for the receipt of negotiable treasury notes paid to
the warehousing farmer upon crop deposit in an amount equal to 80 percent of the crop’s
value. The farmer would pay interest at 1 percent monthly on the subtreasury certificates
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of deposit, plus minimal storage fees, but could withdraw that crop and sell it any time to
pay off the advanced loan.
In order to draw broad-base support Charles Macune published the proposal in the
National Economist. Macune further mentioned that such a commodity storage plan had
precedent in both France and Russia, and had been put into operation by a Russian
Imperial decree in 1888, where the Russian railroads were authorized to provide
storage.70 The major difference in the plans was that the Russian plan used bank credit,
while the American plan proposed paper currency in the form of subtreasury greenbacks
which Macune had proposed once implemented “would inject as much as several billion
dollars” into the nation’s economy at harvest time.71
Gretchen Ritter’s work emphasized Macune’s argument that “the monetary
system was inelastic and unresponsive to the demands of the annual harvest season.”72
The subtreasury plan contained two major provisions; one included a warehouse-storage
plan, and the second provision was that of currency issuance of greenbacks up to 80
percent of the certified value of the farmer’s crop.73 Ritter explained that the subtreasury
system would alleviate the effects of the crop cycle; spreading crop sales over several
months. Ritter added that this system would have maintained a greater stability of farm
prices rather than a concentration of sales in the fall harvest. The currency rendered by
the government would strengthen its financial position relative to that of the Eastern
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banks and the financial elites with an “antimonopolist monetary system that would
maintain equal economic opportunity between farmers and industrialists…”74
The most serious drawback of the plan was the heavy administrative cost, and the
U.S. Treasury department was not encouraging the subtreasury plan. In May 1891, when
delegates of the Populist Party convened in Cincinnati, a delegation was sent across the
Ohio River to interview U.S. Senator James G. Carlisle of Kentucky, Grover Cleveland’s
Treasury Secretary, just two years later in 1893. Carlisle in the interview criticized the
subtreasury plan as requiring too many people to add for government administration.75
Charles Postel analyzed that for late nineteenth-century America, the subtreasury plan
represented a major undertaking that “entailed the construction of federal offices,
warehouses, and grain elevators in over one thousand American counties where farmers
raised staple crops.”76 Postel, taking Harry Tracy’s estimate, found that the cost would
have been over $17 million to “erect every one of the elevators and warehouses upon the
most modern plan with the most substantial appliances.”77 It is Harry Tracy, one of the
earliest Texas Alliance organizers and a prominent Greenbacker, who made the argument
that “agriculture had not kept pace with manufacturing and commerce,” and that in 1891,
the “quantity of money available at harvest time was about half that available in the early
months of the following year, resulting in price fluctuations of about forty percent.”78
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However, despite the best efforts of the Farmers’ Alliance in supporting the
subtreasury plan, it received a very unenthusiastic reception in the halls of Congress. The
House Ways and Means Committee expressed doubts about any passage of the
subtreasury plan and in an adverse report explained that were the plan to pass as a law,
the U.S. Supreme Court would promptly negate it.79 The Committee report cited that the
Supreme Court held that it was unconstitutional to lend Treasury money to citizens for
the purpose of a private business.80 A point taken was that the subtreasury plan was only
viable for non-perishable crops such as cotton, wheat, corn, and other grains, but the plan
would do little for the livestock farmer or the fruit-grower.81 The Northern Alliance based
in Kansas had an agreement of sorts with the Southern Alliance led by Charles Macune in
Texas in regard to the subtreasury plan. The Southern Farmers’ Alliance would have to
concede the principle of government ownership of the railways, and the Northern
Alliance, equally reluctant, would support Macune’s subtreasury plan.82
The subtreasury plan was again approved when the Southern Alliance met in St.
Louis in February 1892, and the subtreasury became part of the Omaha platform during
the Omaha convention of the People’s Party held July 2-4, 1892, along with support for
legal tender fiat greenbacks and the abolition of the national banking system.83 Populist
U.S. Senator William A. Peffer of Kansas, in office from March 4, 1891, to March 3,
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1897, was very much for the subtreasury plan. Senator Peffer stated that the storage of
cotton in a warehouse or the storage of No. 2 red wheat in a grain elevator with a
warehouse receipt was no different than a distillery that used a bonded warehouse, where
the U.S. Government assisted while the liquor is bonded until the internal revenue tax is
paid.84 Peffer did not limit the possibility of the subtreasury warehouses being built by
the “General Government” or by state governments; but they could also be built by
railway companies, and in fact “should be built close to railroad tracks, and they ought to
be part of the railway system,” in that “transportation is a large part of agriculture.”85 The
ideal of the subtreasury plan never went away until the dissolution of the Populist Party
and its fusion into the Democratic Party during the Presidential campaign of 1896.
The Populist Free Silver Movement — An Antimonopolist Cause
The Populist subtreasury plan and the prospect of increasing the money supply to
support the Agrarian currency-shortage with the free coinage of silver became part of the
Ocala platform and the first Populist campaign in 1892.86 The leaders of the Populist
movement quickly realized that the public press was not sympathetic to their viewpoints
for an expanded currency or the control of the rail rate structure that they were seeking.
The Populists felt abandoned by both political parties with the Republican Party of the
1890s being for sound money and the monometallic gold standard backed by the Eastern
bankers of New York and Boston. The Democratic Party became more urbanized with an
urban Catholic immigrant faction in the industrial cities of the East, the patronage of
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several municipal political machines, along with “a thin but influential layer of
capitalists.”87 A Bourbon-Democratic faction existed in the post-Reconstruction South,
which was also more influenced by business interests than by agrarian interest.88 Hicks
has described that at the close of the Reconstruction period, the “Bourbon leaders
associated with the more important people in growing towns,” the merchants, bankers,
railway men, and manufacturers.89 During this time, more stringent lien laws were
enacted, which placed the “furnishing” town merchants in equal or greater priority with
the landowner regarding any crop tenancy agreements in dealing with tenant farmers.90
In order to counter an unfavorable public press, the Populists created their own
journals, many of which began in the earliest stages of the Farmers’ Alliance movement.
The various journals were The Advocate, the official Alliance journal in Kansas with a
circulation peak of 80,000; The American Nonconformist, published by Henry, Cuthbert,
and Leopold Vincent (all brothers) in Winfield, Kansas (later moved to Indianapolis); the
Appeal to Reason, published by J. A. Wayland in Girard, Kansas; Leonidas Polk’s
Progressive Farmer that went to 12,000 farmers in North Carolina and throughout the
Southeast; the Southern Mercury subscribed by over 30,000 readers throughout the
South; and The People’s Party Paper published by Tom Watson in Georgia.91
87

Goodwyn, Democratic Promises, 353.

88

Hair, Bourbonism and Agrarian Protest, 212. (Hair described that the “first People’s Party national
convention had an overwhelming majority of delegates from the Midwest and plain states,” where Kansas
alone sent 411, while the entire South could only muster 36 delegates.)
89

Hicks, The Populist Revolt, 51.

90

Harold D. Woodman, New South — New Law, The Legal Foundations of Credit and Labor Relations in
the Postbellum Agricultural South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1995), 1−124. See also
Hahn, The Roots of Southern Populism, 176.

91

Goodwyn, Democratic Promise, 175, 354, 498. (These six were among the most prolific Populist
journals.) See also Hicks, The Populist Revolt, 131.

81

These various journals offered a unified form of communication for the Agrarian
movement of the late 1890s. In addition, their consistency to the platform of monetary
reform became part of the overall National Reform Press Association. W. Scott Morgan,
the Populist leader of the Wheel and Alliance in Arkansas, provided two-page inserts
filled with a unified theme in a “ready print” format that became the interior of many of
the four-page Populist weeklies.92 Charles Postel described the journals as selfeducational and informative with the intention of breaking the stranglehold held by the
major newspapers and publishing houses. The Farmers’ Alliance countered with its own
National Reform Press Association having over one thousand newspapers in various rural
centers, and distributing the hundreds of thousands of copies via rural second-class
postage.93 By some means, late nineteenth-century industrialization had left the average
farmer out of the mainstream of American subsistence and forced a unifying movement
not heretofore witnessed in American history. The farmers, faced with the difficulties of
the competitive marketing system, felt the need to organize and organization took away
some of the fear of being isolated and ineffective in the 1890s industrial society.94
The economic survival of the farmers’ livelihood encouraged women within the
Populist movement in large numbers, especially in rhetorical communications within the
various Populist journals. Postel’s work also articulated a comprehensive chapter on
women’s efforts within the Farmers’ Alliance movement and states that the organization
“offered women extensive rights within the organization, rights that stood in stark
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contrast to those offered by other institutions in American life.”95 Postel reported that
women’s attendance at Alliance meetings was encouraged by imposing no dues on
women members, even though the burden of childcare and household chores limited their
ability to participate in reform work. Despite political equality at a local level, it did not
take effect on the national level, and the demand for women’s suffrage was left out of the
Omaha platform in 1892 at the southern delegates’ insistence.96 Political equality which
equated to women’s voting rights was strong in the Western Mountain states where
women under Populist support won the right to vote in Colorado in 1893, and in Idaho in
1896.97 Among the accomplished Populist women leaders were Sarah E. V. Emery of
Michigan, author of Seven Financial Conspiracies Which Have Enslaved the American
People; Annie Diggs of Kansas, who joined Charles Macune to direct the National
Reform Press Association; and two famous women lawyers of the Populist movement,
Mary Elizabeth Lease, the famous orator from Kansas, and Marion Todd of Illinois.98
Women in the Populist movement helped in the precarious economic balance that rural
households held in abeyance. Marion K. Barthelme’s book of letters written by women in
correspondence to the Southern Mercury portrayed the urgency of the farmer getting out
of debt in a letter written by a farmer’s wife after attending a meeting given by state
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lecturer Ben Terrell at Burns Station, DeWitt County, Texas.99 In the short anonymous
letter written to the Southern Mercury, the writer said “Debt is what is ruining the
farmers, preventing us from being independent men and women. Let us shun it as we
would the viper.”100 Mortgage debt was always a burden to the late nineteenth-century
farmer, and this was especially true as agricultural households moved westward.
Fred A. Shannon emphasized that while farm growth acreage could hardly keep
pace with a rising urban population, free or cheap land in the West, while failing to
provide a release for the Eastern urban laboring class, lured farmers to semi-arid localities
subject to climate adversity.101 Shannon stressed that without any federal farm-loan
agency during the late 1800s, the farmers had to depend on merchants, commission men,
or implement dealers for credit. A critical shortage of liquidity occurred around harvest
time — even with the establishment of state banks in the Western states of Wisconsin,
Nebraska, Kansas, Oklahoma, and the Dakotas — these banks seldom had any place with
which to rediscount their notes and obtain new capital.102 One of the major economic
problems of this period was the regional disparity in interest rates; for example, while
private loan companies might be charging as much as 6 to 10 percent interest on a loan,
“Eastern banks had idle funds awaiting offers of 3 or 5 percent.”103
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This nexus of illiquidity in the banking industry, between interior and Eastern
banks, increased the exacerbation of the Nineties Depression. Money could not flow fast
enough to where it was needed most, which in turn brought runs on banks for what little
funds were available and eventually closures. During the first half of 1890, New York
banks were beginning to feel a pinch in their liquidity, in that “the banks were regularly
from ten to fifteen million dollars below the reserve at the same time in the previous
year.”104 O. M. W. Sprague argued that the amount due to the banks reached
$145,000,000 in February 1889, and that by the same time in 1890, funds were down to
$132,000,000. Sprague discussed two causes that could have brought this on, the first
being that interior banks in the West and South which largely deposited to New York
banks may have been mortgaged out. Sprague emphasized that this was the situation in
1889 and 1890, when an active land and mortgage business in the West and the South
taxed the banking resources of those sections, leaving no surplus for deposit in New York
banks beyond the requisite amount required for reserves. Sprague related that along with
the Baring Crisis in London, which itself caused disinvestment and the withdrawal of
American banking funds, a deleterious double effect came into play. The other cause for
decreased funds that Sprague gave was that individual bank deposits decreased as well.
Gretchen Ritter indicated that gold as a monometallic standard made America
vulnerable to international economic forces. The monometallic gold standard
“contributed to the rigidity of the financial system, the frequency of panics, and the
concentration of financial control within certain sectors of the economy.”105 To the
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Populist financial reformers, “the power of gold was the power of Eastern finance,” and
“it was the power of the city over the country, the industrialist over the farmer,” and it
created a sectional division of the Eastern “goldbugs” of New York and Boston over the
South and West.106 Ritter argued that “the shortage of gold contracted the money supply”
and “raised prices and increased the cost of debt.”107
As previously noted at the beginning of this chapter an appeasement was made
toward the Western Silver-mining states earlier in the nineteenth century which was as an
attempt to alleviate the monetary contraction from the Panic of 1873. This event took
place fifteen years after the demonetization of silver coin occurred in 1873, or the
legendary “Crime of 1873,” with the compromise passage of the Bland-Allison Act of
1878.108 The Secretary of the U.S. Treasury was to purchase not less than $2,000,000 and
not more than $4,000,000 worth of silver bullion each month and have it coined into
silver dollars of full legal-tender value.109 The Bland-Allison act, sponsored by Richard
P. Bland, Democratic Congressman of Missouri, was an attempt to capture the free-silver
Democrats for the 1878 elections.110 William B. Allison, the Republican U.S. Senator
from Iowa, was co-sponsor for the bill. The Bland-Allison Act did not require the U.S.
Secretary of the Treasury to purchase more than the minimum amount and for the next
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twelve years only the minimum was purchased, until that amount was increased by the
Sherman Silver Purchase Act of 1890. The $2,000,000 amount was the exact amount
purchased each year, and the Treasury Secretary was not permitted to pay more than the
market price for the silver brought to the mint for coinage. An amendment to the bill was
added that provided for the issuance of silver certificates on deposits of silver dollars into
the Treasury. The Bland-Allison Act also made silver certificates receivable for all public
dues, though not for the redemption of gold certificates, along with $593,000,000 in
government bonds that had been issued from 1873 to date of bill passage, with the reality
that the bonds paid for in gold would be redeemed in gold at the owners’ request.111
A finalized Senate vote on the Bland-Allison bill was 48 to 21, with its passage on
February 15, 1878. The U.S. House of Representatives passed the Bland-Allison bill as
amended by the Senate 203 to 72; President Rutherford B. Hayes vetoed the bill on
February 28, 1878. In spite of this, the veto was promptly overridden on the same day by
both Democrats and Republicans joining in with a final passage in the U.S. Senate 46 to
19, and the U.S. House of Representatives passage 196 to 73.112 The vote in both houses
was sectional rather than partisan, with 48 of the Republican dissenters in the U.S. House
of Representatives from the Northeast voting against the measure.113 The act provided for
the weight of the silver dollars to contain 412 ½ grains troy of standard silver (371.25
grains of bullion), as provided in the act of January 18, 1837, and with its higher silver
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content placed it on a 15.99 to 1 parity with the gold dollar.114 The coinage of silver was
somewhat successful, and in the Treasurer’s report for 1879, Treasury Secretary Sherman
reported that no effort had been spared to put the silver into circulation, but only
13,000,000 of the silver dollars were then in use out of a coinage of 45,000,000.115
Hepburn related that the silver dollars were held back deliberately in the vaults of the
Treasury to preserve the parity with gold.
The Populist Political Movement in Congress for an Increased Money Supply
The first delegation of the People’s Party that convened the Fifty-second
Congress in December 1891 consisted only of eleven of that party’s congressmen.
However, this number was significant when one has considered that the Populist Party
was still in the process of being shaped at the state and national levels. The first People’s
Party with the various reform groups had just met in Cincinnati in May 1891 to create a
national People’s Party which devised the St. Louis national meeting held on February
22, 1892. On July 4, a second Omaha Conference selected James B. Weaver of Iowa and
James G. Field of Virginia to head the party’s presidential ticket. The Omaha convention
drafted a platform that consisted of three planks. The first was money, the second was
transportation (railroads) and communication, and the third was land. The issue of an
increased money supply resounds throughout the historical research and the Populist
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platform declared “that wealth belongs to those who create it.”116 This convention
platform at Omaha was merely an abbreviated version of the seven “St. Louis Demands”
made in December 1889 between the Southern Alliance and the Knights of Labor.117
Under the heading of “money” the St. Louis demand stated: “We demand a national
currency, safe, sound, and flexible, issued by the general government only, a full legal
tender for all debts, public, and private, without the use of banking corporations . . .”118
Clanton emphasized the critical importance of an increased monetary supply; specifying
the five financial measures sought by the Populists. These included the free and unlimited
coinage of silver at the ratio of sixteen ounces of silver to one ounce of gold, an increase
in the “circulating medium” to “not less than fifty dollars per capita,” a graduated income
tax, and a statement that “all state and national revenues shall be limited to the necessary
expenses of government economically and honestly administered.”119
Sectional divisiveness became more pronounced as the liquidity of money came
to the forefront toward easing the monetary supply for the agrarian class. The Southern
Populists joined forces with the Midwest Populists and the silver-mining interest states of
Colorado, Nevada, and Idaho. Goodwyn explained that “through the 1880’s, the politics
of the mountain states had become increasingly centered around the issue of free coinage
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of silver, particularly the mining regions of Colorado, Nevada, and Idaho.”120 In
Colorado, a radical Aspen editor named Davis H. Waite was nominated for governor by
the Populists, endorsed by the Democrats, and elected in November of 1893.121 Goodwyn
further emphasized that the free silver element of the Populist movement was very vivid
in the late 1890s. Nevada’s third political party, the “Silver Party,” soon had a virtual
monopoly on presidential electors.122 Idaho, a newly admitted state in July 1890, with
free-silver Populist backing, cast its three electoral votes toward the twenty-two electoral
votes that went to the Populist Presidential candidate James Baird Weaver.
The historical significance of this sectional division and the free-silver Populist
movement has an often-stated allegorical theme in L. Frank Baum’s classic The
Wonderful Wizard of Oz written in 1900. Henry M. Littlefield in “The Wizard of Oz:
Parable on Populism” has viewed the wicked Witch of the East as representative of
eastern industrialists and bankers who controlled the people; the Yellow Brick Road, as
the gold standard; and Dorothy Gale, originally from Kansas, a silverite state, wore silver
slippers in the book versus the ruby red ones in the classic movie.123 Littlefield’s article
has related other allegories in Baum’s book written from a western perspective, and
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Baum’s experience as editor of a South Dakotan newspaper rendered the viewpoint of the
Emerald City with its brilliant green coloration as representing Washington, D.C.
There are many other parables and class figures that can be interpreted within
Baum’s The Wonderful Wizard of Oz for content.124 Ritter explained that the Munchkins
were the “People of the East, previously dominated by the bad witch,” the “Wicked
Witch of the East,” represented by Eastern capitalism, and “she ruled over the good
people of the East, Munchkins, who are dressed in blue (the color of the Union).”125 One
other notable allegory in the book was that the Wizard’s name “Oz” is the abbreviation
for ounce, perhaps an ounce of gold.126 However, the importance of these allegorical
characters demonstrated that bimetallic monetary policy was ingrained into the American
Populist psyche and the socioeconomic context of late nineteenth-century America.
In addition to Ritter and Littlefield, Hugh Rockoff reemphasized the Wizard of
Oz as a monetary allegory.127 Rockoff related that few students of money and banking or
economic history will ever forget the battle between free silver advocates and the goldstandard defenders once explained through the parable presented in the Wizard of Oz.
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Rockoff explained that the entire Panic of 1893 and the subsequent depression is focused
on long-term deflationary price trends with declining farm wholesale prices documented
by the U.S. Bureau of the Census as falling to their lowest levels in thirty-seven years.
Rockoff envisioned the Wizard of Oz allegory as a failure on the U.S. Treasury’s part to
act when the Populist demand for an increase in the monetary base was justified.128
The Populist ideology for an increased monetary supply is expanded in the next
chapter with an emphasis on the political movement that supported this cause. The
farmers’ struggle against monopolistic money and banking forces has been highlighted.
Chapter 3, “Politics of the Late Nineteenth-Century Free Silver Movement,” has the goal
of depicting the political figures involved in the bimetallic Populist movement, their
fusion process as former Greenback Party members, then the Union Labor Party, and
lastly the Populist Party (People’s Party). Analysis will be made of the significance of the
Populists leaving both the Democratic and Republican parties behind, and their evolution
back to the political mainstream within William Jennings Bryan’s U.S. Presidential
Democratic-People’s party nomination in 1896.
The latter part of chapter 3 has offered an analysis of the National Banking Act of
1863 and how this monetary legislative act affected farmers and mortgage-holders in the
South and West. The argument is made of the monopolistic two-tier system of bank
notes: one system for national bank notes issued by higher-capitalized banks in
metropolitan cities, and state bank notes that were required to pay a 10 percent tax for the
issuance of their bank notes predominantly located in the South and Middle Western
states. All of these events aggravated a preexisting decreased monetary supply and
worsened an ongoing depression and depressed global commodity prices.
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Chapter 3
Politics of the Late Nineteenth−Century Free Silver Movement
This chapter has emphasized the antimonopolist theme of Populists’ ideology.
The Populist Party platform wanted government regulation regarding money and
banking, railroads, communication (i.e., telegraph), and the vast land grants given to
railroads. Bruce Palmer provided an excellent example of how Texas railroads,
particularly the Texas and Pacific, had been given more than thirty-two million acres of
land directly from the State of Texas by 1882. The farmers’ struggle with unregulated
high mortgage interest rates of 12 percent due to the scarcity of money is presented as a
major focus of the chapter.1 This is important because American farmers were placed in a
vulnerable situation because of a combination of a contracted economy, a limited
monetary supply, high farm mortgages, and low crop prices.
The West and the South were unable to unite politically despite the efforts of
Populist speakers like Mary Elizabeth Lease and their presidential candidate James Baird
Weaver. The economic doctrines of “Social Darwinism” and “laissez faire” of the late
nineteenth century were overreaching enough to keep at bay any socially progressive
movement that would change the economic status quo. The economic world at that time
and place was one of pure competition, “survival of the fittest,” and “Newtonian
mechanics” where if financial institutions were strongly regulated or monetary policies
were not based on “sound money,” then less stringent policies might move the financial
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world in an unnatural direction.2 However, the eastern banking establishment’s best
interests and the depression were taking monetary policy in an unnatural direction.
The Populist movement opposed the National Banking Act of 1863. State banks
were limited in the South because of the 10 percent tax on all bank notes issued after
July 1, 1866. The capital-intensive regions of New England and the Middle Atlantic
states gained a greater financial foothold both during and immediately after the Civil
War. Many of the Populist writers, such as Sarah E. V. Emery of Lansing, Michigan,
came out with pamphlets and spoke vehemently against the “National Banking system.”
Other Populists of the time who were also against it were U.S. Senator William Alfred
Peffer from Kansas, fellow Kansas Republican Senator Preston B. Plumb, Mary
Elizabeth Lease of the Populist speaking circuit, and W. Scott Morgan, the Arkansas
Wheel and Alliance leader. The Populists of the South and West attempted unification
with the launching of a third U.S. political party at the St. Louis convention held
February 22, 1892.
The “Silver Parity Question” was also a major political issue for Americans in the
1890s. U.S. Congressman Roger Q. Mills of Texas, chairman of the House Ways and
Means Committee from 1887 to 1889, proposed that the silver and gold content of each
respective dollar be reduced to be on a universal parity standard of 15.50 to 1 of silver to
gold. The parity Mills ascribed to was equivalent to what the Latin Union held, as well as
the French five-franc coinage, the Netherlands “Lion dollar,” and the five-peseta piece in
Spain. A noted economist of the time and president of M. I. T., Francis A. Walker, also
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defended a bimetallic monetary policy. Walker advocated that the United States follow
Europe’s lead in establishing a parity rate and not “go it alone” in supporting the value of
silver. The chapter ending is given a persuasive argument that the Populist Party in its
quest for a greater monetary supply was able to influence the Democratic Party in the
Election of 1896, and in fact created a “fusion movement” in the support of free silver.
The People’s Party Paper that Tom Watson published from 1891 through 1896
used a motto attributed to Thomas Jefferson, “Equal Rights to All, Special Privileges to
None,”3 in its banner. The Jacksonians borrowed it in their election of 1836. This was not
just Watson’s banner for his Populist newspaper; it was also the slogan for the People’s
Party. The ideology of the Populists went back to the republican virtue under Thomas
Jefferson when America would become a nation of farmers. This ideology of a nation of
farmers and producers went even further to include certain elements of the Locofoco
wing of Jacksonian Democracy. Its element of antimonopoly was deeply embedded
within the Populist cause, which attacked the special kind of privileges given to railroads
and banks, and exclusive government charters to groups or individuals.4 Chester Destler
has argued that the “working-class Locofocoism of the Jacksonian era was transplanted
by the westward movement to the rich soil of the Middle West in the forties and fifties.”5

3

Palmer, Man Over Money, 23. See also C. Vann Woodward, Tom Watson: Agrarian Rebel (New York:
The Macmillan Company, 1938), 381−382. Tom Watson, one of the leading Populists of Georgia, and state
legislator, then U.S. Congressman, and later Governor of Georgia was an avid admirer of Thomas
Jefferson. Watson in addition to the People’s Party Paper, published after the Populist Movement,
Watson’s Jefferson Magazine, vol. 1 in Jan. 1907, and Watson’s Jeffersonian Weekly began in Oct. 1906.
4

Ibid., 114.

5

Chester Destler, American Radicalism, 1865−1901: Essays and Documents (New London: Connecticut
College, 1946; reprint, New York: Octagon Books, Inc., 1963), 3.

95

Destler has added that the dominant antimonopoly bias of Populism was clearly
expressed in their party platform and was devoted in its entirety to the three great fields
of monopoly that the Populists argued against for decades: money and banking, railroads
and communication, and land.6
John Hicks has placed the Populist platform demands in the appendices of The
Populist Revolt, several of which strike against monopolistic practices. The “St. Louis
Demands” of December 1889, where the National Farmers’ Alliance and Industrial
Union joined with the Knights of Labor under Terrance Powderly, are squarely aimed at
providing a greater money supply into the economy. The Farmers’ Alliance’s first
demand was “the abolition of national banks and the substitution of legal tender treasury
notes in lieu of national bank notes issued in sufficient volume to do the business of the
country on a cash system; regulating the amount needed, on a per capita basis . . .”7 The
third of the “St. Louis Demands” was for the “free and unlimited coinage of silver,” and
the fifth demand under the doctrine of “equal rights to all, and special privileges to none”
was a demand for taxation, whether national or state, “not to be used to build up one
interest or class at the expense of another.”8 The “Ocala Demands” of December 1890
also demanded implementation of the subtreasury plan and direct government loans to the
people, not to exceed 2 percent per annum for non-perishable farm products, land, and
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farm loans.9 Both the “St. Louis Demands” and the “Ocala Demands” had a provision
aimed at the railroads and land monopoly as well. The land antimonopoly plank stressed:

The land, including all the natural sources of wealth, is the heritage of
the people, and should not be monopolized for speculative purposes, and
alien ownership of land should be prohibited. All land now held by
railroads and other corporations in excess of their actual needs, and all
lands now owned by aliens, should be reclaimed by the government and
held for actual settlers only. (Palmer, 1980, 71)
Palmer argued that the Southern Populists had to protect their homestead rights
and often were in conflict with large ranches and land companies, as well as state
policies, where large blocks of land including over thirty-two million acres in Texas had
been given to the railroads by 1882.10 Many railroads received one section of land or 640
acres for each mile of track laid, which was the case of land grants with the Texas and
Pacific railroad. William Ivy Hair emphasized an even greater railroad land grant (though
not carried out) which was the “Backbone Railroad” that Congress authorized in 1871, to
travel diagonally across the state from New Orleans to Shreveport, and over to Marshall,
Texas.11 The railroad officially known as the New Orleans, Baton Rouge, and Vicksburg
Railway Company “was to receive ten sections of land for each mile of track it laid.” Had
the line been completed, this would have amounted to a domain of more than two million
acres.12 The Backbone Railroad project, although it issued large amounts of stocks and
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bonds, according to Hair, was another inspired carpetbagger project and never laid one
foot of track. Its land grant was forfeited in 1876.
These massive railroad land grants often came in conflict with small farmers over
the Homestead Act of 1862, which allowed any American citizen or alien, twenty-one
years or older, who had filed their intention papers along with a ten-dollar fee to file a
claim up to 160 acres of unclaimed public land.13 Both residence and cultivation were
required, with the ban against ex-Confederates being dropped in 1866. Not until after
1879 were homesteaders allowed to claim more than the 80 acres in the reserved
government sections of railroad land grants.14 However, with the land grants came
mortgages, and it is with these that farmers ran into financial difficulty during the 1890s.
Populist Senator William Alfred Peffer from Kansas, who served from March 4,
1891, to March 3, 1897, had proposed that mortgage interest rates should be closer to the
net national product per capital rate, which at the time was between 2 percent and
3 percent.15 Friedman and Schwartz, have emphasized the severity of the late 1890s
depression and provided the Simon Kuznets’ cyclical data for net national product that
stressed “a sharp retardation from something like 1892 to 1896.”16 Mortgage interest
rates were among the most stressful adversities that farmers faced in the late 1890s.
Senator Peffer described the two speeches delivered on the Senate floor by Democratic
Senator Daniel W. Voorhees of Indiana and Republican Senator John J. Ingalls of
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Kansas, whom Peffer replaced, where each held that business associations were engaged
in obtaining western farm mortgages in pools, and mortgages collectively paid 12 percent
interest due to the scarcity of money in the region.17 These same two Midwestern
Senators also reported that some of these mortgages had the requirement to be repaid in
gold, where the original loans were made in greenback currency.18
Peffer and other Populist writers and lecturers of this period such as Mary
Elizabeth Lease and Sarah E. V. Emery have focused on each of the three monopolies
mentioned in the St. Louis and Ocala demands. Though the Populist movement was
actively engaged in American politics in the late nineteenth century, there were
limitations placed on the economic change that the Populists sought as a result of two
existing major economic philosophies. These were the doctrine of laissez faire and the
doctrine of social Darwinism. Laissez faire was a basis for economic thought of the latenineteenth century’s rising industrial age and “to many businessmen the ‘let alone’ policy
was fair enough.”19 J. Sterling Morton, President Grover Cleveland’s Secretary of
Agriculture, thought that trusts existed as the products of normal laissez faire economics
and the good companies would regulate themselves and in turn would last, and
competition would tend to eliminate the undesirable trusts.20 The application of
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Darwinism to social and economic problems became predominant during the late
nineteenth century, which “forced the supporters of life-as-it-is to evolve a defense.”21
Perhaps one of the staunchest supporters of “social Darwinism” was William
Graham Sumner, who taught sociology at Yale and emphasized the economic system’s
fragility rather than its strength.22 Robert Wiebe has described Charles Darwin’s
evolutionary hypothesis reflected in the writings of Herbert Spencer, a leading Darwinist
of the time, that “gave powerful authority to the economists’ world of pure competition,”
and these same social theorists used Newtonian mechanics to explain that if “unions
exacted wages beyond the allocated fund, they would drive capital in unnatural
directions.”23
The social theorist William Graham Sumner was also a strong supporter for the
single monometallic gold standard. Sumner’s book, History of American Currency,
espoused that the issue of greenbacks was a great wartime error and that whatever
strength the nation had was weakened by issuing legal tender notes, and that paper money
with a forced circulation was not a temporary relief, but rather “a mischief easily done
but most difficult to cure.”24 However, the forces of social Darwinism did not go
unanswered and a rebuttal to Sumner and the individualists came from Lester Frank
Ward, professor of sociology at Brown, who argued that the survival-of-the-fittest theory
21
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is simply not applicable to human society.25 Ward used a more rational approach applied
in his Dynamic Sociology book, and stated “men are men, not beasts, and need not follow
the law of beasts,” and “nature is wasteful and irrational in its workings, blind, accidental,
unintelligent”… “note the number of seedlings needed to produce one tree.”26
The Populists were up against a long tradition of “sound money” theorists and the
struggle to impose a bimetallic policy to increase currency circulation. Also, an increased
velocity of money, as one of their three demands, was remote at best. Since the Populist
political movement was the antithesis of monopolistic money and banking forces; the
importance and historical significance of the currency contraction for farmers needs to be
highlighted. Historians also have to view the institutional changes in banking that came
about in postbellum America that still had a lasting effect into the late nineteenth century,
in particular the National Banking Act of 1863, and its effect on the South and Midwest.
Money and Banking — Contraction of the Currency
The contraction of currency for the southern and western farmers began before the
Populist movement. It actually began with the National Banking Act of 1863 and 1864,
with its principal purpose of providing a market for government bonds issued during the
Civil War and establishing a uniform national currency based on national bank notes,
thus replacing a large amount of state-chartered bank notes.27 Congress used some
coercive forces to make state banks obtain a national charter by the passage of an act that
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levied a 10 percent tax on all state bank notes issued after July 1, 1866. However, many
state banks in the South were not able to convert due to capital requirements and the war.
The end result was that state banks fell from 1,562 in 1860, to just 247 in 1868, with the
South suffering the most from this interwar Congressional Act.28 Walter Nugent has
argued some of the regional unfairness with the total sum of national bank note currency
being limited by law, and the U.S. Treasury issued charters during the war only to those
with capital enough to set up such banks on a first-come, first-served basis.29
The capital-intensive regions of New England and the Middle Atlantic States
gained the upper hand in establishing national banks to the detriment of the Middle West
and the South.30 George Barnett explained that the National Banking Act of 1864, a later
revision of the original act, required a national bank’s minimum capital stock to be at
least $50,000 in towns with populations under 6,000, and a capital stock of $100,000 in
cities with a population between 6,000 and 50,000.31 Cities that exceeded 50,000 in
population were required to have capital no less than $200,000.32 In addition, to the
28
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capital requirements being restrictive under the 1864 Act, the “other significant entry
barrier . . . was the prohibition of mortgage lending by national banks.”33 According to
John James, because New York state banks had been using real estate mortgages as the
basis for note issue, many Congressmen had become suspicious of real estate collateral,
and it was written into the National Banking Act of 1864 that national banks were
prohibited from mortgage lending.34 This ban remained in effect until 1913, with the
establishment of the Federal Reserve Act, and brought forth excessive interest rate loans
to the farmers in the form of mortgage companies with backing from eastern financial
pools, many of which charged 12 percent or more on farm mortgages.35 State banks were
still allowed to make mortgage loans where their capital reserves permitted it.
The new national banks established from 1863 onward were also an instrument
whereby the government could sell bonds that became a large portion of the bank’s
capital in exchange for gold that was needed in the Treasury.36 Ritter has emphasized that
in addition to creating a new uniform national currency, although limited in overall
volume, the national banks when buying government bonds with gold, deposited such
bonds with the Treasury department, and in turn were permitted to issue currency notes
worth up to 90 percent of the value of the bonds purchased.37 The bonds paid 5 percent
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interest in gold to the banks, and they loaned their national bank note currency out at as
well, which gave the national banks essentially a double payment on their investment.
Hughes and Cain also stressed the significance of this exchange that by purchasing the
U.S. bonds equal to at least one-third of the national bank’s required capital; the banks
would then deposit the bonds back to the Comptroller of the U.S. Treasury, a new
government office created by the National Banking Act. In exchange each bank would
receive national bank notes in fiat money, with that bank’s name embossed upon the
notes, based upon a 90 percent face value for the bonds.38
The National Banking Act set up a two-tier system of bank notes. There were
fifteen cities that had designated banks that would become the agents of country banks,
and these “banks were required to hold a reserve of 25 percent, one-half of which might
be deposited in the banks of New York, which until 1887 was the only city of central
reserve rank.”39 The National Banking Act would manage America’s finances for a total
of fifty years from 1863 to 1913, and would become well entrenched by the Depression
Nineties, years 1893−97. Despite the fact that the National Banking Act spurred the late
nineteenth-century industrial upsurge in the United States, there was a dramatic decline in
agriculture.40 Richard Sylla has reported that while forty years earlier, the value added by
agriculture to national output was nearly twice that of manufacturing; just a mere 40
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years later in 1899, the value of agriculture was only two-thirds that of manufacturing.41
Sylla made a compelling argument that the restrictive provisions of the National Banking
Act limited national bank note issues, increased capital requirements for bank charters,
and the types of loans allowed. These restrictions in fact led to an increase of
unincorporated private banks during the late nineteenth century which operated under no
charter at all.42 Sylla emphasized that this major restriction of mortgage lending had a
major impact on national bank entry in the predominantly agricultural sections of the
country where land was a household’s major asset, and though the authors of the National
Banking Act intended to abolish state banks, this provision against real estate lending had
a latent effect of bringing about their recovery in expanded agricultural areas.
George Barnett’s early work on State Banks and Trust Companies has given
added emphasis on what would become another cause toward the collapse of the banking
system during the Panic of 1893 and the Depression Nineties. Once the overextended
real estate boom in Kansas and the Midwest went bust as farm mortgages began to
default due to declining crop prices, along with a currency shortage, it appeared easier to
visualize the rapid downward economic effect that these state banks in the interior
regions might have had in drawing their reserves from the New York reserve banks.
These state banks were not regulated under the National Banking Act and were more
predominant in the southern and middle western states.
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The table below from Barnett’s work of 1911 has demonstrated this dramatic
increase in state banks due to the real estate boom that was brought on by railroad
building during the 1880s, and the great westward migration.43
Table 3.1. Number and Percentage of Increase of State Banks for 1879, 1889, and 1899

Group
New England
Eastern
Southern
Middle Western
Western
Pacific
Total

1879
Number
(base year)
19
189
204
295
42
64
813

1889
Number % increase

1899
Number % increase

22
253
464
675
528
155

16
34
127
129
1,157
142

23
334
1,071
1,594
956
275

5
32
131
136
81
77

2,097

158

4,253
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Source: George Barnett, State Banks and Trust Companies, 202.

Barnett emphasized that state banks outnumbered national banks, but the state
banks fell far behind in the amount of aggregate capital held with national banks having a
2 to 1 ratio over state banks in the amount of capital held.44 Richard Sylla, much like
Sprague, argued the controversial manner in which banking reserves were held and
confirmed a reverse-pyramid reserve system of the National Banking System. Gretchen
Ritter emphasized the danger of this structure as well by describing the National Banking
System as having a “pyramid reserve structure (PRS) in which New York formed the
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core and the South and West were the peripheries.”45 Ritter emphasized that “alternative
forms of regional financial circulation were discouraged by this arrangement.”46 The
National Banking Act imposed minimum capital and reserve requirements, prohibited
real estate loans by national banks, and prohibited branch banking.47 Eugene White
supported the argument that these barriers to entry and constraints on banking activity
impaired a broader banking service that would keep pace with demand as the United
States grew and expanded westward.
Many Populist writers of this time came out with pamphlets and books describing
the ills of the banking system and the critical shortage of currency. Among the most
prolific was Sarah E. V. Emery of Lansing, Michigan, who like many Populists, was a
transplanted easterner from the Finger Lake region of New York where she had been a
teacher in a district school at the age of 18, and moved to Midland, Michigan, in 1869.48
Like many other Populists, Emery was also a supporter of the Greenback party and was a
Michigan delegate to the national Greenback Labor Party Convention of 1884, which in
turn evolved into the Union Labor Party where Emery attended its first national
convention in 1887.49 Emery became immersed into the third-party political movements
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and from this background became equally involved in the People’s Party of the 1890s.
Emery was not only part of the lecture circuit for the Populists, but was part of the
Reform Press Association that informed the workers and farmers of the struggle for
structural reform within the economic system.50 Sarah Emery’s major work was a
monthly journal called The Corner Stone, which contained original articles as well as
other quoted material from Populist presses such as The American NonConformist, The
Searchlight, The Advocate, and The Alliance, among others, all of which was published
and edited from the Lansing home for the two years preceding Emery’s death in 1895.51
Emery’s most famous work was Seven Financial Conspiracies Which Have Enslaved the
American People written in 1894. One of Emery’s well-known statements has
emphasized that “by contracting the volume of money, it lowered the prices of other
property and added that much more to the burdens of the debtor class.”52
Another Populist leader and orator, Mary Elizabeth Lease, began the Midwestern
life teaching at Osage Mission, Kansas, in 1870, after leaving Ceres, New York.53
Richard Stiller has portrayed Lease’s life similarly to that of Sarah Emery with a classical
education from an eastern academy, which in Lease’s case was a parochial boarding
school at St. Elizabeth’s Academy in Allegany, New York. Mary Lease moved to Osage
Mission after leaving the New York-Pennsylvania area, and taught ancient history at a
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boarding school called St. Anne’s.54 Lease also had the firsthand experience of
homesteading in western Kansas in 1873, and along with spouse Charles settled in
Kingman County, Kansas, located approximately thirty miles west of Wichita.55 Charles
and Mary Lease would homestead 160 acres in Kingman County and build “the common
sod house of the ‘Middle Border,’ the land just west and north of the Missouri River.”56
During the Panic of 1873, just one year into their homestead, corn prices fell to ten cents
a bushel, and wheat to forty cents per bushel, and the Lease farm was taken over by the
loan company in 1874.57 Mary Lease became an articulate and persuasive platform
speaker for the People’s Party with demands often made in speeches for an increase in
monetary circulation by the government of $50 per capital from the current $10 amount.58
Populist Senator William Peffer supported Lease’s argument with a statement,
“the amount of money in actual circulation among the people is not half as much capital
now as it was in 1878, when it was $17.85.”59 Peffer, lending strength to the argument,
quoted fellow Kansas Senator Preston B. Plumb, a Republican, who also supported
greater currency with a presentation before the entire U.S. Senate on June 6, 1890, and
placed the monetary circulation amount in the United States as $550,000,000, or “‘a trifle
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over $8 per capita.’”60 Senator Plumb, in 1890, went on to say that the business of
America had doubled in the last twelve years, and the U.S. population had increased at
least 30 percent, but the money volume had decreased from $17.85 per capita to $8.
W. Scott Morgan, the leader of the Arkansas Wheel and Alliance, stressed “that
nothing short of a cyclone of facts and an avalanche of authorities will convince them of
their error” — referring to political economists that argued the law of supply and demand
alone controlled prices — denying monetary supply had little effect.61 To further support
this argument, Morgan took extracts from the silver commission reports, which Congress
appointed to inquire into the industrial depression within the United States with
statements that “in the whole history of the world, every great and general fall in prices
has been preceded by a decrease in the volume of money.”62
Scott Morgan further articulated that those of this time arguing overproduction of
crops when prices were depressed failed to see that labor was plentiful due to the general
fall in prices. Morgan stated that “cross-roads politicians and hair-brained editors”
viewed money as having nothing to do with controlling prices — without taking into
account the same law of “supply and demand” — that if money is plentiful, it is cheap,
and “if money is scarce it is dear and requires more of the products of labor to obtain
it.”63 Morgan supported Senator Peffer’s statement on the shortage of currency per capita,
60
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and tabulated a constant yearly decrease in circulating currency from 1866 through 1878
inclusive. Morgan has persuasively argued that two essential agents were lacking to
prevent “under-consumption” versus the improper term usage of overproduction. The
two missing agents of distribution for an adequate medium of exchange were an adequate
currency, and the means of transportation to adequately distribute goods in an equitable
manner.64 The argument to be made is that a declining volume of currency caused a
decline in consumption and prices fell accordingly. The distribution argument by the
Populist farmers was for more equitable railroad rates, and less disparity between the
westward rates from New York to Chicago, which were generally less than the eastbound
rates from Omaha to Chicago, or Chicago to New York. First-class rates from New York
to Chicago dropping to 39 cents in 1892, for the same dollar amount charged back in
1867.65 Some relief came in the average distance hauled from a distance increase of 22.7
miles in 1860 to 108.5 miles in 1892, along with freight rates dropping over a forty-year
period (1852−1892), resulting from cost-saving methods and improved traffic volume.66
A major research point to be made is that not only did the Populists want more
money in circulation, but so did some well known Congressmen and economists of this
period. The most influential legislator was Roger Q. Mills, Democratic Congressman
from Texas, and Chairman of the U.S. House Committee on Ways and Means, 50th
Congress, from 1887 to 1889, who after the 1890 election was succeeded by William
64
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McKinley. Mills had insight into the actual U.S. Treasury assets, having been the House
Committee Chairman, and wrote a knowledgeable article in the North American Review
in 1890, when monetary events were at the forefront of the political economic debate.
Mills maintained that “there is a class in all countries which is interested in keeping the
volume of money of all kinds below the demands of business, because that makes money
high and the price of labor and its products low.”67 Mills ascertained that gold and silver
were the most valuable forms of money and their increase in circulation cannot produce
inflation. Mills further emphasized that as long as paper money remained interchangeable
with gold and silver then it presented no inflationary danger, but once it lost that
interchangeability then the danger occurred.
Congressman Mills expressed that in an ongoing industrial society a decrease in
monetary circulation brought on lower prices “because there is little demand for the
products of labor, and the decreased demand is the result of the want of money with
which to purchase and pay.”68 According to Mills, once a decreased demand for the
products of labor existed, then production also must decrease to conform to the decreased
demand. Committee Chairman Mills was for the coinage of silver and asked, “Why
should we keep our mints closed against the coinage of silver?” In reference to England’s
gold standard, Mills stated that England also had a large stock of silver for subsidiary
coinage that was in daily use among the English people. Mills concluded that the only
thing missing was a uniform parity rate between gold and silver that the European
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countries could agree upon. Mills advocated this parity by a reduction in the amount of
the gold dollar from 23.33 grains of fine gold to a lesser 22.43 grains, and silver reduced
to 347.22 grains of fine silver, which would establish a 15.50 to 1 parity rate.69 Mills
supported a universal standard similar to the same fineness of silver used in the five-franc
piece of the Latin Union, the same fineness of the Netherlands dollar, the five-peseta
piece in Spain, the same silver currency content as the Central American states, as well as
Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela.70 Mills finalized his argument that
gold was adapted to large transactions and silver to smaller transactions.
One noted economist of this time, Francis A. Walker, president of Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, also defended a bimetallic monetary policy. Walker described
the Silver Party of the United States, comprised of bimetallists, who believed with
Alexander Hamilton that monetary circulation should be based upon both precious
metals, silver and gold.71 Walker advocated parity between the two metals that would
prevent inflation and yet promote stability and avoid the evils of a restricted money
supply. Walker strongly argued that the United States rather than supporting France,
Italy, Belgium, and Switzerland which constituted the Latin Union, should pull away
from a world monetary parity standard of 15 ½ : 1, and began coining at a 16 : 1 ratio.72
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Francis Walker, lending support to the bimetallist argument, has quoted Alfred Marshall,
a leading English economist, as having stated that if given a choice between bimetallism
and gold monometallism, the choice would be for bimetallism.73 Both John S. Nicholson
and Herbert S. Foxwell, protégés of Marshall, and leading British late nineteenth-century
economists in their own right, avidly upheld the validity of the bimetallic argument.74
The theme that Francis Walker presented in this 1893 article was that the United States
had the characteristic of national impatience and should not “go it alone” in supporting
the value of silver.
Along with an increase in the U.S. population, there was a rapid expansion of the
agricultural frontier as well, resulting from the westward movement.75 The new
agricultural frontiers of Minnesota and the Dakotas led the nation in the production of
wheat from the success of McCormick’s mechanical reaper; Kansas and Nebraska led in
the production of corn; and Texas was evenly divided between cotton in the eastern
regions and its western beef production ranges.76 However, the monetary supply did not
keep up with the money-velocity needs for adequate circulation in these remote regions.
The promotion of greenbacks was an early attempt to expand currency in the
South and the West, but eastern “sound money” advocates deemed this as an inflationist
attempt. National bank notes ultimately replaced a large portion of the greenbacks, as $35
million were redeemed out of circulation by gold coinage as a result of the Resumption
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Act when it took effect January 1, 1879. The initial conversion of greenbacks into coin
went according to plan. Secretary of the Treasury, John Sherman, in the December 1879
Treasury Report stated that only about $11 million of notes had been presented for
redemption in coin, and the Treasury gold stock had increased nearly $20 million.77 As a
result of the National Banking Act, on December 1879, there were $337 million in bank
notes, $305.8 million circulating in gold, $121.4 million in silver circulation, and $346.6
million in greenbacks for a total money supply just over one billion dollars or
$1,110,800,000.78 Of this amount $260 million was held in the Treasury, “leaving for
general use about $17 per capita.”79
Ignatius Donnelly, who served three Congressional terms in Washington as a
Minnesota Republican, during and after the Civil War, left the Republican Party in 1877,
and became the Greenback nominee for U.S. President in 1880.80 In addition to
supporting the Greenback Party and the Union Labor Party in 1888, according to Hicks,
Donnelly almost became the Union Labor Party nominee for Minnesota governor that
year. Donnelly began to throw his support to the Populist cause and encouraged Alliance
members “to vote for their own interests rather than for their party”. . . “whether the
concessions came from Democrats or from Republicans” made little difference.81
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One of Ignatius Donnelly’s works written specifically on the contraction of the
currency, titled The American People’s Money (1896), was a dialogue between a Mr.
Sanders, a Populist farmer, and a Mr. Hutchison, a banker, conversing over the “money
question” of that time. Donnelly had used a similar analysis to that in Coin’s Financial
School, and had taken all the gold, silver, state bank notes, national bank notes, and
demand notes with a final sum of $1,283,606,802 in total circulation at the end of 1865,
as given by Francis Elias Spinner, the Treasurer of the United States, from 1861 to
1875.82 The purpose of describing the amount in circulation was to demonstrate that the
per capita for each inhabitant of the United States at that time just after the Civil War was
$67.26, and this amount had dropped significantly all the way through to the 1890s.83
Modernist economic historians such as Richard E. Sylla are maintaining that
monetary innovation, which the Populist movement was striving toward with a bimetallic
policy of both gold and silver and the convertibility of the two metals, as well as a lack of
adequate monetary funding in U.S. bank notes, led in the long run to the deflationary
period of the late nineteenth century.84 Sylla explained that the accumulation of wealth by
an increased market exchange growing in relation to total production created an
“unprecedented increase in the long-run demand for money as both a means of exchange
and a store of wealth.”85 Sylla agreeing with the Populists held that the U.S. Treasury’s
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mythological attachment to the gold standard and its efforts to reduce the level of
greenbacks outstanding did result in a failure to provide for a steady expansion of
national bank notes. This in turn brought on the late nineteenth-century convertibility
problem in the short run and led to deflation in the long run.86 Sylla further emphasized
that the restrictive banking regulations of the National Banking System joined with an
inflexible monetary standard due to the rejection of both the greenback and silver forces
of the late nineteenth century produced the secular deflation that occurred.87 The
Resumption of 1875 reduced the outstanding amount of greenbacks from $382 million to
$347 million, and for every five-dollar increase in national bank notes, the U.S. Treasury
retired four dollars in greenbacks.88 The National Banking Act did not supply enough
national bank notes which were heavily concentrated in the eastern banks, and without a
secure and sufficient currency or an insecure paper currency based on specie, the gold
system was prone to panics.89
A related purpose of this dissertation has been to define the crucial importance
that should be placed on the “the money question” issue of the late nineteenth century.
The issue of sound money or gold specie with bank notes that could be convertible into
gold versus that of fiat money or greenbacks became a most important political issue
during this time. Many of the early Populists had been members of the Greenback Party
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that supported fiat money and some of the ideas of Edward Kellogg. Kellogg also had run
upon a forced suspension as a mid-nineteenth-century merchant resulting from the Panic
of 1837 while running a wholesale dry goods house on Pearl Street in New York City.90
The Populists, following the ideas Ignatius Donnelly and Kellogg, called for more money
in circulation, where this significant late nineteenth-century problem resulted from a U.S.
Treasury and a governmental policy that could not regulate the money supply.
The Greenbackers, borrowing from Kellogg’s economic theory, had declared that
money is the creature of law, and “all of its distinctive properties are derived from the
laws creating it.”91 The Populist agrarians knew that they were providing the productive
form of capital, but yet were not reaping the rewards of a changing industrial society.
Kellogg’s first labor theory of value made a distinction between productive and nonproductive capital, and the rapid accumulation of wealth was occurring in the hands of a
few, with high interest rates being charged on farm mortgages to the disadvantage of the
farmers as producers.92 Alexander Campbell, a promoter of coal mining and iron
manufacturing, as well as the first mayor of the town of LaSalle, Illinois, picked up
Kellogg’s banner for fiat currency in the 1860s and argued extensively against the
intrinsic value of gold.93 Campbell urged for Greenbacks as the exclusive currency and
David Montgomery’s later work, Beyond Equality, reiterated that Congress was duly
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authorized by the Constitution “to fix and regulate the value of money.”94 Yet, Congress
would rely on the National Banking Act of 1863 and 1864 to address the problems as
industry came of age in the late nineteenth century, a congressional act that remained in
effect until the Federal Reserve Act of 1913. The act lessened Greenback currency usage
with a substitution of National Bank notes, and the heavy reliance upon the gold standard.
In essence, the National Banking Act passage resulted in each National Bank
holding its own gold reserve, in addition to gold bonds issued by the U.S. Treasury for
their surplus gold deposited to the Comptroller. The National Banks in turn could
exchange the bonds at any time for their own issuance of bank notes. In effect, each
National Bank became its own mini-treasury since there was not a Federal Reserve
System until 1913. Ritter’s strong emphasis again demonstrated during the Panic of 1893
“an insufficient and inelastic currency was vulnerable to the stringency caused by annual
crop movements.”95 Ritter further stressed that the money stock declined due to the
volume of national bank notes receding by one-half between 1882 and 1891. Bankers in
the 1890s “wanted to exclude the government from banking and currency management”
and believed that they “were best equipped to provide efficient capital and credit
flows.”96
The Depression Nineties Farm Mortgage Crisis
The historical importance of this exclusion of national banks from mortgage
lending was the creation of an entirely new business entity. The National Banking Act in
94

Montgomery, Beyond Equality, 429.

95

Ritter, Goldbugs and Greenbacks, 156.

96

Ibid.

119

effect created the new profession of loan agents who were supplied capital from the
East.97 Raymond Miller has reported that “as a rule the mortgages were accepted without
investigation by the eastern lender, for payment was guaranteed by the agent,” and as
long as land values continued upward, as they had for the past thirty years, these seemed
to be conservative investments by eastern financiers.98 The railroads that had built out
westward on the uninhabited prairies of the western part of Kansas and Nebraska, as well
as South Dakota and Minnesota, “were eager for the coming of settlers whose crops
would pay freight rates which could be translated into dividends.”99 The railroads
devoted thousands of dollars to entice settlers into Kansas, Nebraska, and South Dakota
with the inducement of land offered at low prices and on easy terms.100 It appeared that
the railroads themselves were in competition for any new settlers, with the Atchison,
Topeka, and Santa Fe in Kansas, the Union Pacific and Burlington in Nebraska, the St.
Paul in Minnesota, along with two other railroads extending westward from Chicago into
Minnesota and South Dakota which are the Chicago and Northwestern, and the Chicago,
Milwaukee, and St. Paul railroads. These railroads and others sent land agents to many
European countries with descriptive pamphlets and maps of the railroad’s lands, and the
states themselves had commissioners of immigration to attract incoming settlers.101 Land
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was a valuable commodity in the late nineteenth century, and the rush to Oklahoma in
1889 was not lost on those who observed the demand for free land.102
Hallie Farmer indicated “all the railroads offered land at low prices and on easy
terms,” with the Union Pacific offering eleven years’ credit upon payment of one-tenth
down at time of the sale, and interest at seven percent on the remaining balance.103
Despite the terms given by the railroads, W. F. Mappin described farm mortgages in
dismal terms and young men did not go West for free land because they had plenty of
money to spend, but because they lacked money.104 The western plains settler was not the
only part of the investment triangle that became indebted as boomtowns sprouted up
almost overnight. Hattie Farmer maintained that every “new school district must have a
new schoolhouse and the old districts must have larger schools to accommodate the
increased population,” as well as sewers and paved streets, roads, and bridges.105
Railroads continued to be built westward from the major markets of Chicago and New
York during the late 1880s, and it was to meet the needs of westward expansion that
“eastern capital turned to the three most productive lines of investment — mortgages,
municipal bonds, and railroad securities.”106
The entire farmland boom cycle was based on extended credit, according to
Raymond Miller, and the good times lasted from 1880 to 1887, with a rare instance
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where land prices rose to as high as $200 per acre.107 Mortgage debt had increased by
three times per capita in 1887 from the amount it had been in 1880.108 Hattie Farmer
emphasized that the collapse occurred due to three factors, the first being an adverse
drought that occurred in 1887, and lasted for ten years to 1897. Only in two of the ten
years did the rainfall in the western halves of Kansas, Nebraska, and South Dakota reach
the normal average of 21.83 inches of rainfall.109 The droughts were more destructive due
to the prevalence of hot winds and the prairie fires caused by these extreme conditions.
One writer of these times, Fannie McCormick, the first president of the National
Women’s Alliance, lived on a farm in Great Bend, Kansas, northwest of Wichita, and
gave a first-hand description in chapter seven, “Prairie Fires,” of family members taking
turns as night-watchers in October during dry conditions to warn if wild prairie fires were
approaching their homesteads.110 McCormick described catastrophic conditions where
their entire granary barn containing their yearly store of corn, wheat and rye was engulfed
in flames and destroyed despite all exertions to plow a perimeter against the oncoming
inferno which fell all for naught.111 McCormick’s autobiographical account narrated the
hardship of many eastern families that came for the hopes and promises of a better life in
western Kansas only to find despair, dashed dreams living in a sod house, grasshoppers
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that stripped their cornfields bare, and chattel mortgages on everything from a threshingmachine to the garden rake.112
McCormick, in addition to the hostile weather conditions, described the desperate
financial conditions of the Kansas farmer. McCormick’s narrative stressed the rejected
“hopes of the industrious farmers blasted as they burn corn for fuel because its price will
not pay the cost of transportation and dividends on millions of dollars of fictitious railway
stock and bonds.”113 McCormick expressed that the farm producers of the western states
were “reduced to the condition of serfs to pay interest on public and private debts to the
money-sharks of Wall Street, New York, and of Threadneedle Street, in London,
England.”114 According to McCormick’s own account in 1892, exorbitant rates of interest
are charged on Kansas farm mortgages secured by ironclad provisions and enforced by
rigid statute. Despite crop failures in Russia, Germany, and the British Isles, the western
farmers received only forty to seventy cents per bushel for wheat rather than one dollar
and a half per bushel as the law of supply and demand would imply.115
Hattie Farmer described vividly how the farm-mortgage boom went bust. Farmer
explained how Pierre, the capital of South Dakota, dwindled from a population of 8,000
to 1,500 in the 1890 census. Farmer stressed in detail the total despair facing agrarians, as
prices steadily declined from 1880 to 1895.116 According to Farmer’s documentation,

112

McCormick, A Kansas Farm or the Promised Land, 82−85, 118.

113

Ibid., 106.

114

Ibid.

115

Ibid., 109.

116

Farmer, “The Economic Background of Frontier Populism,” 418.

123

“corn which sold for sixty-three cents a bushel in 1881 was selling for twenty-eight cents
nine years later.”117 The market price of grain seldom equaled the cost of production, and
the Department of Agriculture in 1893 made a study that showed the cost per acre
exceeded the price received for both wheat and corn.118 The ultimate result was that
11,122 Kansas farm mortgages were foreclosed between 1889 and 1893, and the land
passed into the hands of loan companies without going through foreclosure proceedings,
since contracts provided that the land was forfeited without that formality.119 The
Chicago Tribune reported that fifteen counties in Kansas had between 75 to 90 percent of
the land owned by loan companies in 1895.120
Raymond Miller related that between 1888 and 1892, one-half of the people left
western Kansas and trailed eastward out of the state, each with their family and their total
worldly possessions in a single covered wagon drawn by oxen, mules, or horses with
such legends painted upon them as “Going back to the wife’s folks,” or the more
common adage, “In God we trusted, in Kansas we busted.”121 Not only were the farmers
placed in financial ruin, but also many of the boomtowns of Kansas were placed in
overpowering debt, both public and private, and Miller added that the population of
Wichita dropped from 34,000 to 21,000, with many other cities in like proportion.
According to Miller, the sudden collapse sent farmland prices to one-half their former
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level, and the farmer who had paid half of the original mortgage would reflect bitterly
that the remaining half now equaled the total current value of the farm. Miller has
emphasized that many unpaid mortgages exceeded the real value of the Kansas farms and
debtors preferred to allow foreclosure rather than make payment even when able to do so.
Raymond Miller’s historical account of the late 1890s Kansas catastrophe reinforced that
better conditions would have existed had crop prices not fallen and sustained the Populist
demands for more money as a means to raise prices and reduce debt.
This monetary shortage is also documented in a table composed of various
economists in a retrospective symposium on the gold standard from 1821 to 1931.122 In
addition to Warner and Pearson’s description of the value of gold at an all-time high to
that of commodity prices, Wallace Huffman and James Lothian’s chronological table has
depicted a pre-contraction period from 1892 to 1894 with negative logarithmic values of
-5.1 for “Real Income,” -1.7 for “Money,” and -4.5 for “Gold.” The contraction for gold
is even greater during the two-year period of 1895 to 1896, with a value of -8.6, a number
that exceeded the -7.1 value for the Great Depression years of 1929−1932.123 Friedman
and Schwartz took note of this particular pre-contraction period of 1892 to 1894 in
“Money and Business Cycles,” where a percentage decline in the stock of money from
1892 to 1894 was 5.8 percent, which was the second largest economic depression only to
that of the Great Depression of 1929 to 1933, where the stock of money declined 35.2
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percent during those years.124 These contracting values lend themselves to the greater
argument that the depression years of 1893−1897 merit greater historical attention and
created direful circumstances for the settlers of the Middle Border and farming families.
Populists Attempt Unification: South and West
Despite all the hardships, Kansas elected but one Populist Senator, William
Alfred Peffer, who replaced Republican Senator John J. Ingalls in the election of 1890.
Also, one Populist Governor, Lorenzo Lewelling, an early member of the Farmers’
Alliance was elected the twelfth governor of Kansas in 1892. Kansas remained largely
Republican: “in the three elections between 1892 and 1896, the Republican vote varied
little, being 48 percent, 49 percent, and 47 percent of the total vote cast, and the Populist
vote in 1890 and 1894, was only 36 percent and 39 percent of the total vote cast with the
Democrats in those same two years securing 24 percent and 8 percent respectively.125
It was the hope of the Northern and Southern Farmers’ Alliances that by having
their own presidential candidate, they would have unity among the Alliance sections and
more political clout against the two established parties. The Southern Farmers’ Alliance
had already used economic pressure against the jute-bagging trust, an antimonopoly
campaign where the Southern Populists were able to break the usage of jute after
exorbitant price increases due to a trust. Cotton bagging was substituted as a means of
boycotting the jute and the Alliance leadership brought the monopolists to terms.126
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The Northern Alliance had its greatest success in Kansas in 1892, and in the
South, the Alliance made itself felt, but it still retained some unity with the Democrats,
while the West worked independently.127 The Populists had many divergent groups, and
it had convention representatives from the Southern Alliance, the Knights of Labor, the
Farmer’s Mutual Benefit Association, the Colored Farmers’ Alliance, and the Citizens’
Alliance.128 As a measure of Populist unification, Ignatius Donnelly of Minnesota and
James B. Weaver of Iowa drew up resolutions for launching a third party at the St. Louis
convention held on February 22, 1892.129 The presidential election due on November 8,
1892, was fast approaching and a Populist party candidacy began nationally on February
1892, which adopted the St. Louis demands of December 1889, including a combined
platform of the Southern Alliance and the Northern Alliance, and the Ocala demands of
December 1890.130
The Populist third-party movement suffered in its solidarity of the southern states
from the untimely death of its Southern Alliance President, Colonel Leonidas L. Polk,
who most likely would have been the Populist candidate for president, with the
nomination practically agreed upon.131 General James B. Weaver, a Union Army veteran,
and a prior Republican who switched to the Greenback Party, as well as a congressman
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from Iowa, became the U.S. presidential nominee for the People’s Party. Tom Watson
had been mentioned as a possible nominee for vice president, but instead General James
G. Field of Virginia, a prior Confederate general, received the candidacy to balance the
Union general on the Populist presidential ticket.132
Campaigning for the Populist ticket in Kansas, Nebraska, Colorado, and South
Dakota was not the same as campaigning in Georgia and Alabama. General Weaver, Mrs.
Weaver, and the inspirational speeches of Mary Elizabeth Lease failed to appease the
conservative gold standard Democrats. These “Bourbon Democrats” maintained a tight
control over the Democratic Party, but free silver split the Alabama Democratic Party
three ways by the fall of 1892.133 The conservative regular Democrats were committed to
white supremacy as their major issue along with control by the gold standard advocates,
and they held to the right and voted for Grover Cleveland in the 1892 presidential
election.134 Campaigning in Georgia went even worse for General Weaver and Mrs.
Lease, where “the Democratic press whipped up fury against him by charges of ‘cruelty
and oppression’ practiced on the people of Tennessee by Weaver during the War.”135 “A
gang of Democrats at Macon had pelted General Weaver, along with Mrs. Weaver, with
rotten eggs while he spoke, striking Mrs. Weaver on the head.”136 Congressman Tom
Watson tried to intercede on General Weaver’s behalf, but he was shouted down as a
132
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traitor to white supremacy, and a major attempt was made by the Georgia Democratic
Party to unseat him from the tenth congressional district in the election of 1892, which
was done by fraudulent means.137 Weaver called off the southern campaign and
concentrated on the Plains states and the silver mining states where the Populists had the
strongest free-silver support for bimetallism.138 The results in 1892 were a start for the
Populists on a national scale. Weaver won 1,027,329 votes, the first third-party candidate
in American history to receive over a million popular votes. Weaver and Field carried
Kansas, Idaho, Nevada, and Colorado, along with portions of North Dakota and Oregon,
for a total of 22 electoral votes.139 Leonidas Polk had been more optimistic before his
death on June 11, 1892, and thought the Populist ticket would carry eight southern states
and at least fourteen northern ones, but Weaver’s experience as the Greenback Labor
Party candidate for president in 1880, had to offer some experience as a campaigner
despite the Populists’ lack of extensive organization and party press.140 New Populist
senators were added in 1892, where they had been nonexistent before: William A. Peffer
of Kansas, James H. Kyle of South Dakota, William V. Allen of Nebraska, and Senator
William M. Stewart of Nevada, who transferred from the Republican side to the Populist
ranks as a silverite.141
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There were also factions of southern Populism in the Republican Party as well.
Most notable was the political vacuum created with the untimely death of Leonidas Polk
of North Carolina. Though North Carolina was heavily Democratic in state politics, the
Republicans took a substantial vote share in state elections.142 On August 12, 1891,
Marion Butler, who would go on to take Polk’s Populist role in North Carolina, also
replaced Elias Carr as the head of the State Alliance.143 During the election of 1892, the
Republican Party of North Carolina split, with John J. Mott leading the eastern
Republicans, which included Daniel L. Russell, who supported free silver and the
exclusion of blacks from the state Republican Party.144 Ritter emphasized that there were
two state Republican factions with Russell’s intrastate opposition led by John Baxter
Eaves who supported black rights and the gold standard. Daniel Russell went on to win
the state governorship as a free-silver Republican and a white supremacy candidate in
1892. Marion Butler, who supported Russell, was selected by the state caucus for U.S.
senator with 26 Populists in the state senate and 33 in the house legislature.145 Ritter
accentuated that the North Carolina Democratic delegation opposed the re-nomination of
Grover Cleveland and favored an Illinois bimetallist, Adlai Stevenson. Cleveland’s “gold
bug” campaign platform of June 22, 1892, and the failure of the Democratic national
convention to adopt the St. Louis platform started the stampede of southerners into the
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People’s Party, and the Populist defection would have been greater had Leonidas Polk
lived to accept the People’s Party presidential nomination.146 However, losing the 1892
presidential election, political goals for the Populists worked toward the Democratic
Party in the Election of 1896.
Populists Fusion Movements toward the Democratic Party
The silver plank of the Populist Party was but only one plank, and this faction did
indeed screen many of the other purposes of the Populists between 1892 and 1896;
however, it was the leaders of Populism who pushed the silver faction the most.147
Kansas Populists had taken votes away from ex-Republicans and Democrats in the 1890
election of William A. Peffer over John J. Ingalls as U.S. senator, but only after eighteen
separate ballots were cast in order to obtain a majority, with ninety-eight Populists for
Peffer, fifty-eight Republicans for Ingalls, and six Democrats for Charles Blair.148 Elected
by the state caucus and political maneuverings, Peffer was declared U.S. senator for
Kansas by a final vote of 101−58 over Ingalls.149
The Farmers’ Alliance also was somewhat successful in the upper South during
the election of 1890, and in North Carolina during the election of 1892. Many eastern
North Carolina Knights of Labor declared themselves Populists in 1892, and at their 1893
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convention held in Greenville, they adopted resolutions for the free coinage of silver.150
Vann Woodward has related that in “Tennessee, the Alliance named the governor, 14 of
the 33 state senators and 40 of the 90 members of the lower house, making the Assembly
‘distinctly agrarian in character.’”151 North Carolina and Alabama Democrats pledged
their support of the Alliance with Virginia, Louisiana, and Kentucky not holding any
state elections in 1890.152 The silver monetary reform platform of the Alliance, the most
popular of the third-party principles, was widely accepted by Southern Democrats with
the Democratic party strategy after 1894 for advocating free silver, and in turn obtained
additional votes from the ranks of the Populists.153 Alex Arnett theorized that by “stealing
the Populist thunder” for the unlimited coinage of silver and other reforms “the Southern
Democracy would probably recall a sufficient portion of its straying flock to save the
Solid South.”154
The Southern Democrats would first make an alliance with Populists in the cause
of free silver, and they promoted a Silver convention in Memphis, June 12−16, 1895,
which was promoted, at the time, as “strictly nonpartisan.” The convention also made
efforts to attract Populists and western-silver Republicans.155 Woodward emphasized the
extent of the convention where “more than 2,200 delegates from all the southern and
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western states attended.”156 The attendees were among the most ardent western silver
supporters, including former Congressman William J. Bryan of Nebraska, Senator
William M. Stewart of Nevada, and Senator David Turpie of Indiana.157 Bimetallic
Leagues were organized in nearly every southern state and by July 4, 1895, both
Louisiana and Arkansas Democrats had thoroughly organized into Bimetallic Leagues,
with the strategy of luring Populists back into the old Democratic Party.158
The adoption of free silver by the Southern Democrats was effective. The
Presidential Election of 1896 was unique, because Democrats nominated William
Jennings Bryan as their candidate, as did the People’s Party simultaneously. A
continuation of the Populist’s push for a standard bimetallism parity rate and the freesilver political movement in the late 1890s are at the forefront of chapter four’s research.
In addition, a decreased national bank note circulation worsened the currency shortage,
and banking problems resulting from a pyramid reserve structure are investigated.
Chapter four expands on U.S. Secretary of Treasury James G. Carlisle’s attempt
toward stabilization during the monetary debacle of the Depression Nineties. The next
chapter discusses the enduring stock market decline, the usage of clearinghouse
certificates to prop up bank reserves, and the political ramifications that occur as a
consequence of the repeal of the Sherman Silver Purchase Act in October 1893 during
Grover Cleveland’s second administration.
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Chapter 4
Bank Reserve Problems Initiate the Depression Nineties

New York City banks became the primary center of eastern reserve capital. A
mandatory requirement of the National Banking Act of 1863 was that reserve city
national banks had to hold a 25 percent specie reserve and government securities equal in
value to at least one-third of their capital to back up their own issued bank notes as
collateral. New York banks also held bankers’ balances of the interior or country banks.
The bankers’ balances, which could be called on demand, generally were sent to the
interior banks during the spring planting season.
The amount held in New York banks was even more significant as the gold
reserves of the U.S. Treasury dropped to $45 million in January 1895. These banks held
more gold and gold certificates than the U.S. Treasury on that date. In order to mitigate
the transfer of gold among themselves, the New York banks set up a clearinghouse
system with clearinghouse loan certificate usage. These certificates served as negotiable
currency among member banks of the clearinghouse association and as a way to expand
the monetary volume while maintaining bankers’ balances and the 25 percent specie
reserve requirement of the National Banking Act. The severity of the 1890s Depression is
associated with the large issuance of clearinghouse loan certificates. Their circulation
increased more during this depression and at a greater level than during the Panics of
1857 and 1873.
The U.S. Treasury also became a part of the monetary crisis. The Sherman Silver
Purchase Act of 1890, which required the purchase of 4,500,000 ounces of silver per
134

month, allowed the issuance of both U.S. silver certificates in small denominations and
U.S. Treasury notes of 1890 in larger denominations in payment for the incoming
purchase of silver bullion. These Treasury notes of 1890 were convertible into either gold
or silver coin on demand. As a result of the Sherman Silver Purchase Act of 1890, these
Treasury notes of 1890 ultimately depleted the amount of gold in the U.S. Treasury.
Consequently, the U.S. Treasury’s gold supply was insufficient to redeem all the
outstanding notes. Thus, the Silver Purchase Act of 1890 had to be repealed in order for
the United States to be on the gold standard with the rest of Europe and England during
the late nineteenth century.
President Grover Cleveland called a special session of Congress and repealed the
law in late October 1893. This chapter ends with a discussion of sectionalism in monetary
policy with the southern and western states having less currency and higher interest rates,
and the eastern and Middle Atlantic states having more currency circulation and lower
interest rates. A five-year stock market decline began on May 1893, only two months into
Grover Cleveland’s second presidential term.
The National Banking Act of 1863 and its revisions in 1864 set up New York City
as a separate central reserve city with outside banks that had been in the practice of
keeping a large part of their reserves in the form of deposits in New York even before the
National Banking Act recognized and legalized the practice.1 While the reserve
requirements for New York City national banks were 25 percent, the reserves required for
country banks by the 1864 revision of the act were set at 6 percent in cash and 9 percent
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in balances, which included deposit accounts.2 The National Banking Act was designed
to stimulate a national bank note currency system and to reduce the number of
greenbacks outstanding, but it “introduced no drastic innovation in respect to reserves.”3
The railroad boom in the 1880s and the development of the Erie Canal had turned New
York City into a major trading center. This immense commerce “was believed
responsible for the centralization there of so much of the financial power and operations
of the country.”4 Most of the interior banks found it convenient to maintain surplus funds
on deposit in New York banks, since there was a constant flow of goods and funds
between New York and the peripheral regions.5 John A. James emphasized that these
interior bankers’ balances were being sent to New York banks for the same reason that
the flow of funds from domestic trade resulted in state bank notes being redeemed by
New York correspondent banks. In addition, New York banks practiced a standard
inducement of paying 2 percent interest on idle bankers’ balances deposited by interior
banks.6
O. M. W. Sprague stressed that Chicago and St. Louis also became central
reserve cities during 1890, but that the national banks in these two cities controlled only
5 percent of the total resources of all national banks throughout the entire country. The
bankers’ deposits amounted to only $34 million for these two cities compared with $145
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million held by the New York banks.7 In May 1890, the New York national banks owed
other national banks $124 million while those in Chicago and St. Louis owed only $35
million.8 National banks had specific requirements. The original requirement under the
National Bank Act was that each was required to hold a specie reserve against their
notes issued in addition to the bond collateral that covered the notes.9 Margaret Myers’s
work made a compelling argument that the “pyramiding of reserves in New York had
put a heavy responsibility in the hands of the city banks.”10 Clearinghouse membership
of large New York City national banks created a further concentration within the city,
and “the result was that a few large banks held virtual control of the whole credit
structure whenever a hint of disaster started a withdrawal of reserves from New York.”11
The general practice of transferring bank funds from predominately agricultural
uses to New York for commercial and industrial uses occurred in cyclical fashion.
Money moved from America’s periphery to its “open capital markets where lumpy
investments in railroads and large-scale industry were increasingly financed,” and
financial markets would indeed be strained in the event of an economic downturn or a
Wall Street panic when needed funds had to be sent back to the interior banks.12
Bankers’ balances from the outlying banks held by New York City National Banks were
7
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concentrated in 1890 within the seven top national banks, and remained at that number
until 1900.13 Such names as Hanover, Republic, and Chase were among the top seven
and these banks continued on into the twentieth century. The total bankers’ balances
held by these top seven banks amounted to $92 million, and in addition to these bankers’
balances that were deposited funds by interior banks, New York national banks were
required to keep 25 percent in gold and “lawful money” of the United States.14 Along
with gold and silver coin, national bank reserves consisted of gold treasury certificates,
gold clearinghouse certificates, silver treasury certificates, greenbacks, and United States
certificates of deposit.15 Most of America’s money in the late 1890s was in the hands of
New York banks, and considering that the U.S. Treasury’s own gold reserve fell to a low
of $45 million in January 1895, the $92 million amount held as bankers’ balances
became even more significant.
Phillip Cagan emphasized the critical times when the demand for currency
exceeded the supply, and banking panics have stemmed from expectations that banks
might suspend payments.16 Cagan gave the four great panics since the Civil War as
occurring in 1873, 1893, 1907, and 1933, with all four involving the suspension of
payments by the banking system; although in “the first three, banks remained open to
handle checks that circulated through local clearinghouses.”17 A very important financial
term used by Cagan, as well as Friedman and Schwartz, is the concept of “high-powered
13
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money.” Milton Friedman used it as the primary factor accounting for changes in the
stock of money and defined it as the “total amount of hand-to-hand currency held by the
public plus vault cash.”18 Cagan has defined high-powered money as bank reserves plus
the currency held by the public.19 As will be emphasized in this chapter, there were
extreme shortages of high-powered money, beginning with a stock market crash in May
1893, bank suspensions, railroad receiverships, and numerous other financial defaults
that all made the Depression Nineties one of America’s greatest catastrophes.
The Clearinghouse System and Clearinghouse Loan Certificate Usage
The usage of the clearinghouse system played a noteworthy role during the
Depression Nineties by channeling bank drafts and checks from the interior banks to the
metropolitan banks of New York, Philadelphia, Chicago, Cleveland, St. Louis, or New
Orleans. These are among the fifteen cities that became a central reserve city that
handled transactions such as the clearing of checks for country banks. National banks
also did a large amount of check clearing and drafts among themselves. For instance, if a
merchant in a remote Ohio town bought a bill of goods in New York for $200, and paid
for them with a check on that local town bank, then the check would clear through both
national bank clearinghouses in Cleveland and New York. James Cannon related that the
jobber from whom the goods were bought would deposit the check in a New York bank,
with the final paid check coming back to the Ohio town bank where it was written.20
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This clearinghouse system involved the stream of commerce and when banks failed or
suspended for a short time during the Panic of 1893, it had long-ranging economic
ramifications and liquidity became a major problem. As a means to alleviate the
economic stringency, it was decided by associated national banks in New York City,
Philadelphia, Boston and other major cities to issue clearinghouse loan certificates as a
last resort to settle clearinghouse balances.21 James G. Cannon defined clearinghouse
loan certificates as temporary loans made by the banks organized as clearinghouse
associations for the purpose of settling clearinghouse balances amongst themselves.22
Clearinghouse loan certificates were negotiable only among member banks of
the association and were a means of expanding the money volume where banks could
continue their usual loans and withdrawals among customers and minimize a panic when
currency restrictions occurred.23 Cagan recalled that during the Panic of 1893, the
unauthorized note issues circulated to alleviate the “shortage” of currency and
clearinghouse certificates were printed in small denominations and paid to the public.24
The issue of loan certificates in 1893 greatly exceeded that of previous depressions or
economic downturns. During the Panic of 1873 and 1884, loan certificates were issued
only by the New York Clearinghouse Association, with a total amount issued in 1873 of
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$26.6 million, and in 1884 it was $25 million.25 The looming clouds of a major stock
market crash appeared prior to the approach of President Grover Cleveland’s second
administration, which began March 4, 1893. James Cannon, vice president of New York
City’s Fourth National Bank during this period, reported the alarming shrinkage in
national bank deposits from May 4, 1893 to July 12, 1893, as exceeding $190 million,
while a decline in state and savings banks was just as severe.26 Cannon stressed that the
situation intensified in the reserve and central reserve cities by the urgent demands from
the interior banks for their reserves. Cannon also reported that from June 21, 1893 to
September 6, 1893, during the beginning panic, there was $41.5 million in clearinghouse
loan certificates issued, bearing 6 percent interest to expand the currency.
Not only did national banks associate into clearinghouses in New York, Boston,
Chicago, and Philadelphia but also within the South as well. In 1893, the clearinghouse
association at Chattanooga, Tennessee, resorted to loan certificates which was the only
time in the history of that organization to do so.27 These clearinghouse loan certificates
never made up more than 1.5 to 2.6 percent of the local available money stock and acted
as “I owe you” vouchers when given to the public.28 This closed-loop clearinghouse
system helped the shortage of circulating currency in that it minimized the use of actual
cash, and removed the risk and cost of sending a large amount of cash about the streets
of New York via messengers or runners.29 Barton Hepburn, Comptroller of the Currency

25

Knox, A History of Banking in the United States, 203. (Cannon agrees, 1873 at p. 90, 1884 at p. 97.)

26

Cannon, Clearing-Houses, 103.

27

Ibid., 120.

28

Cagan, Determinants and Effects of Changes in the Stock of Money, 140.

29

Hepburn, A History of Currency in the United States, 163.

141

from 1892 to 1893, who then returned to banking as President of Chase National Bank
during Cleveland’s second term, related that each national bank settled its business on a
daily basis with all the other banks as if there were but one bank in the city. Once the
Depression Nineties began in 1893, the number of clearinghouse transactions and loan
certificates backed by pledged assets of various member banks declined as well as the
volume of money. Hepburn’s “Miscellaneous Financial” table provided some indication
of the severity of the inter-bank money shortage during the depression years:30
Table 4.1. Clearinghouse Transactions Representing Bank Clearings
Year
1892
1893
1894
1895
1896

Clearinghouse Transactions
New York
U.S. outside N.Y.
$36,280,000 $60,884,000
$34,421,000 $58,881,000
$24,230,000 $45,028,000
$28,264,000 $50,975,000
$29,351,000 $51,936.000

Source: A. Barton Hepburn, A History of Currency in the United States, 370.

Sprague’s work described the severity of the monetary situation prior to 1893 in
the desperate years that began with the Baring Crisis. Sprague gave three causes of the
Depression of the 1890s as below-cost prices for agricultural staples, the heavy load of
farm mortgage indebtedness, and the railroad receiverships due to the overly optimistic
estimates of future earnings and the “reckless financing of the wildest sort.”31 In
addition, Sprague placed much of the blame on gold exports due largely to an imbalance
of trade. Despite 1890 being a good year for grain exports and Europe’s lackluster wheat
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harvest, the United States in 1891 suffered $53,000,000 in gold exports during the first
six months of that year, and it was not the simple result of the Bland Silver Purchase
Act, as Sprague emphasized “some zealous advocates of the gold standard were inclined
to argue.”32 Sprague accentuated that the small amount of increased currency circulation
of $37 million as Treasury notes were quickly absorbed by banks outside the national
bank system for a $30 million total, or it went into daily usage as a result of increased
business activity due to the increased population.33 In either case, the U.S. Treasury note
circulation decreased, and notes were cancelled when received back to the Treasury with
silver certificate replacement currency.34
This replacement with silver certificates had little effect on the economy
although silver coin and certificates in circulation increased from $70 million in 1879 to
$408 million in 1890.35 The idea behind the Treasury notes of 1890 would be that they
were more acceptable to the public than the heavy silver dollars.36 So, in effect, the
Treasury notes of 1890 are backed up by both silver bullion and gold reserves held in the
U.S. Treasury. Section 2 of the July 14, 1890 statute (26 Statutes at Large, 289), and its
last sentence defined the redemption feature:
That upon demand of the holder of any of the Treasury notes herein
provided for, the Secretary of the Treasury shall, under such
regulations as he may prescribe, redeem such notes in gold or silver
coin, at his discretion, it being the established policy of the United
States to maintain the two metals on a parity with each other upon the
present legal ratio, or such ratio as provided by law. (Dunbar 1897, 251)
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The shortcoming of the redemption of these Treasury notes of 1890 was that by U.S.
statute they were redeemable in silver or gold, and U.S. Treasury Secretary John G.
Carlisle did not refuse gold redemption, which was the choice of most holders.
On July 1, 1892, $3 million in gold was taken out of the Treasury for export with
only $500,000 of specie coming in for gold certificates.37 July 1892, became the turning
point for the U.S. government redemption promises to pay in gold. By the end of July,
$10 million in gold had been taken from the U.S. Treasury and the government’s fiscal
books only showed $1.5 million in gold certificates had been received.38 Senator William
Jennings Bryan, elected as a Democratic congressman to the 52nd and 53rd Congresses
(March 1891 to March 3, 1895), gave a good account of the questioning to Treasury
Secretary John Carlisle in a U.S. House committee report. Joseph Crocker Sibley, a
Democratic representative from Pennsylvania of the 53rd Congress asked Secretary
Carlisle, “What objection there could be to having the option of redeeming either in silver
or gold lie with the Treasury instead of the note holder?”39 Secretary Carlisle replied:
If that policy had been adopted at the beginning of resumption,
… the option of redeeming in gold or silver all of its paper
presented, I believe it would have worked beneficially and there
would have been no trouble growing out of it, but the Secretaries
of the Treasury from the beginning of resumption have pursued a
policy of redeeming in gold or silver at the option of the holder
of the paper, and if any Secretary had afterwards attempted to
change that policy … and especially if he had made that attempt
at such a critical period as we have had in the last two years, my
judgment is, it would have been very disastrous. (Bryan 1896,
132)
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It appeared that Secretary Carlisle knew of the danger of continued redemption of
these 1890 Treasury notes in gold, but continued to do so as a matter of precedence. The
Treasury notes were authorized under the act of July 14, 1890, known as the Sherman
Silver Purchase Act, which superseded the act of February 28, 1878, often known as the
Bland-Allison Act. These Treasury notes were used to purchase silver bullion at not less
than market value from western mining interests and coined into silver dollars at the
purchase rate of 4,500,000 ounces of pure silver monthly. John Jay Knox reported that
by November 1892, about $325 million in silver certificates and $116 million of the
1890 Treasury notes — for a total amount of nearly $450 million of new paper currency
— was thrown into circulation during the fourteen-year period from 1878 to 1892.
Knox also emphasized that despite an increase in U.S. Treasury currency, the
national bank notes issued by gold bonds as collateral decreased simultaneously from
$303 million in December 1878, to that of $146 million in December 1892, a difference
of $157 million.40 While the 1890 Treasury notes increased in circulation, there was a
marked decline in national bank note circulation. Knox asserted that in the five years
ending October 31, 1890, the aggregate currency circulation of the national bank notes
was reduced from $276.3 million to $125 million, a net decrease of $151.3 million,
while the number of National banks increased by 138. During the next two years on
September 30, 1892, there was little financial improvement with the amount of
circulating national bank notes at only $143.42 million, due mainly to the compulsory
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obligation of new banks to deposit their purchased bonds into the Treasury for the
exchange of their printed bank notes.41
Sprague, assistant professor of Banking and Finance at Harvard during the late
1890s, provided much information on how the abrupt change beginning in 1893 “was
certainly not in any definite way connected with the silver situation.”42 Sprague’s
emphasis is placed on the withdrawal of reserves in the three weeks ending with June
17, 1893, which reduced the amount in New York banks from $134 million to $110
million, and the surplus reserve fell from $24.6 million to $8.7 million.43 According to
Sprague, the withdrawal was due to a large number of bank failures and suspensions,
both state and national, with numerous private banks in the South and West. Sprague
characterized an overwhelming number of 3,401 mercantile failures during the period
from January to July 1893, with liabilities of $169 million. Many of these failures were
due simply to distance that separated banks from their reserve agents and their inability
to obtain their reserve bank’s balance in time to avoid their own suspension.44
Decreased National Bank Note Circulation Worsens the Currency Shortage
Margaret Myers also supported Knox’s figures on the decline in issuance of
national bank notes and stated that the withdrawal of national bank notes began in 1882
and continued to 1891, with a total reduction from $363 million to a low point of $168
million, thus cutting in half the circulation of the national banks.45 Myers added that it
41
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was no longer profitable for banks to buy United States bonds and then deposit the
bonds with the comptroller of the currency — just for the issuance of new notes based at
90 percent face value of the bonds — along with an added tax upon the notes issued.
James H. Eckels, comptroller of the currency in 1894, reported that “the total tax paid to
the Government by the National banks amounted to $145,234,650.46, and the profits
inuring to the Government from unredeemed circulation were $2,770,615.47,” or a total
revenue of slightly over $148 million derived from the national banks.46 Decidedly the
National Banking Act of 1863, with the intention of promoting a “national bank note
currency,” had the delayed effect of reducing the overall currency in circulation.
Eckels, during his tenure as comptroller, testified before the House Committee
on Banking and Currency during the 54th Congress, second session from January 28
through the early part of February of 1897. The purpose of the testimony was to
ascertain some “Proposed Remedies” that might alleviate the ongoing financial
depression that began in 1893.47 Pennsylvania Republican Representative Marriott
Brosius, who was a ranking member of the 53rd and 54th Congresses, also served on the
Committee on Banking and Currency. He asked Eckels in the hearing regarding the
“demand for additional note currency” if where the existence for the greatest demand for
additional bank note currency was where the least amount of bank deposits occurred.48
Eckels replied affirmatively in the hearing that the banks in the South and the West had
a shortage of deposits to be used for public purpose, and these regions were demanding
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additional bank note currency. In addition, Eckels responded to Representative Brosius
that the cities of the North and their population along with the middle states, “where
capital abounds and they have the habit of depositing, they are not demanding additional
bank note currency.”49 The sectionalism of the currency shortage problem was well
documented within this U.S. House of Representatives committee report.
The sectionalism in currency is further evidenced by the writing of Lance E.
Davis, who stated that the regional differential in interest rates acted as a quantitative
barrier to the inter-regional mobility during the period from 1870 to 1914 before the
enactment of the Federal Reserve Act in 1913.50 Davis used the six geographic regions
that were originally defined by the comptroller of the currency. In addition, R. M.
Breckenridge’s work provided an earlier account of “The Average Weekly Rate of
Discount, 1893−1897,” of the forty-three largest cities based on the 1890 Census, with
an average compiled by Davis of 7.3 percent for the southern states, and the Pacific
states with an average of 8.6 percent using Breckenridge’s Bradstreet’s data.51 Memphis
and New Orleans stood at a 6 percent discount rate during this period, while Nashville
and Louisville were closer to 7 percent, with New York and the New England cities of
Boston and Hartford approximated a discount rate of 4 percent.52 The interest rate
49
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differentiation demonstrated that regional areas further away from the New York reserve
city banks paid a higher interest rate than those closer geographically. Breckenridge’s
compilation of Bradstreet’s reports with the same forty-three cities have documented in
tabular form that the same differential discount rates held constant across the entire five
years of the depression from 1893 to 1897. New York City led all forty-three cities in
terms of “millions of dollars” in drafts cleared through its clearinghouses with a figure
of $33,427,000 compared with Chicago’s $4,575,600, and Philadelphia’s $3,222,800 in
clearinghouse amounts.53 Davis’s study goes beyond the five-year depression period of
1893 to 1897, with an extension of research out to 1910, and concluded that beginning
during the first years of the twentieth century national markets developed in banking
around 1910, and well before the Federal Reserve Act of 1913. However, Davis
presented a compelling argument that all mortgages and farm mortgages in particular, in
Region III (the South) and Region V (the Great Plains) had higher interest rates by a full
3 to 4 percent than New York City, New England, and the Middle Atlantic states for a
full decade preceding the depression of the 1890s.54
The symbiotic relationship between the U.S. Treasury and the national banks can
be ascertained. The U.S. Treasury received gold specie in its vaults in exchange for the
purchase of interest-bearing government bonds by national banks, which in turn were
deposited with the comptroller. National banks then were allowed to issue their own
national bank notes up to ninety percent of the bond amounts, with their own imprint,
and likewise loaned their bank notes out as currency with interest. However, with the
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shortage of gold worldwide and the annual production of gold constant in the United
States from 1887 to 1890, at $33 million, then gold began to be hoarded by national
banks.55 Cagan has emphasized that “The Treasury’s gold reserve declined steadily after
1889, most of what it lost going abroad or to national banks.”56 Cagan reported that “the
ratio of gold specie to total vault cash of national banks rose from an average level of 27
percent before 1892 to nearly 40 percent by 1895−1896.”57
During the fiscal years 1890 and 1891, government bonds exceeding the amount
of $230 million were redeemed to ward off the financial crisis that many thought the
Sherman Silver Purchase Act threatened to bring.58 Not all of the government bonds
were redeemed in gold. Some were redeemed with silver certificates, gold certificates,
treasury notes, or other forms of paper currency. However, those who demanded gold
redemption were able to receive it, and more than $72 million of gold disappeared from
the U.S. Treasury in the twelve months following July 1, 1890.59 James A. Barnes, using
the Report of the Finances from the U.S. treasurer in 1891, emphasized that almost “the
entire output of the silver mines in America was represented in the 1,851 tons of silver
the purchase of which the Sherman law had made compulsory, and yet the political
demands for free silver were still unsatisfied.”60 Barnes stressed that national banks
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virtually stopped buying government bonds and started hoarding gold, and with every
decline in the Treasury’s gold reserve, people were less disposed to pay gold into the
Treasury. Matilda Gresham, the wife of Walter Quintin Gresham who was President
Grover Cleveland’s secretary of state during the second term, remarked upon the
currency events in 1892, just two years after the enactment of the Sherman Silver
Purchase Act. Mrs. Gresham related that the Sherman Silver Act which provided for the
coinage of 800,000 ounces of silver monthly had certificates in the amount of $1, $2, $5,
and $10 issued against the actual coinage.61
Much of the blame was placed on the Cleveland administration, when in fact it
was Benjamin Harrison’s last two years in office under U.S. Treasury Secretary Charles
Foster which allowed silver certificates and greenbacks to be exchanged for gold and, in
turn, deplete the Treasury of gold.62 Another gold-depletion factor was the “Fifty-first
United States Congress” which was in session from March 4, 1889, to March 4, 1891,
during Benjamin Harrison’s first two years of administration, referred to by some as “the
Billion-dollar Congress.” This Congress seemed to give excessive pensions to Civil War
veterans’ dependents and some noncombatants as well, and diminished the U.S.
Treasury balance to almost $275 million by the time Cleveland succeeded Benjamin
Harrison.63 On April 15, 1893, Secretary of the Treasury John Carlisle “suspended the
further issue of gold certificates in accordance with the law of July 12, 1882, which gave
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him authority to do so when the reserve fell below $100,000,000.”64 The business world
was equally alarmed by April 1893 and expected at any time to be thrown precipitously
upon a silver standard.65
Europe, though, still plunged in a depression as a result of the Barings Crisis in
Argentina, had the necessary requirement of paying higher prices for its food supply due
to wheat crop shortages. Sprague emphasized that much of this European payment was
made with the sale of American railroad securities held abroad.66 In addition to
European wheat payments, there was some doubt as to America’s ability and intention
of maintaining its gold standard, and despite the best efforts toward increasing domestic
gold production, by March 1893; there was a falling off in the total amount of currency
in circulation.67 Beginning with the stock collapse of National Cordage on May 4, 1893,
and along with it the stock market crash, there began rapid withdrawals from national
banks that up to July 12, 1893 amounted to $194 million, and in addition to this amount,
an equally oppressive amount was taken from private banks.68
Stock Market Decline Precedes the Coming Depression
Rendigs Fels stressed that in the United States, the depression was postponed until
1893, where in Europe the Baring crisis of 1890 marked the beginning of a protracted
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decline that continued until the mid-1890s.69 According to Fels, the failure of the
Philadelphia and Reading Railroad on February 26, 1893, signaled the pyrotechnical state
by notable railroad failures, iron and steel companies, and banks.70 When the Reading
went into receivership, it had a floating debt of $18.5 million compared to cash and bills
receivable of little more than $100,000, while at the same time borrowing $3 million in
order to pay interest on its income bonds.71 The Reading was a major coal carrier and
when coal prices fell, it could no longer make good on its lease payments for two
subsidiary lines, the Lehigh Valley Railroad and the Jersey Central.72 After three years in
receivership, on May 1896, the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad along with one
subsidiary, the Coal & Iron Companies, were sold at foreclosure to J. P. Morgan &
Company for an aggregate amount of $20.5 million.73 The Reading eventually became
reorganized with new capital stock of $20 million at $50 per share in 1897.74
The stock market began to slide downward on Monday, May 1, 1893. The New
York Times has reported in its Tuesday issue that the London exchange was closed due to
a May Day celebration and the Chicago exchange was closed due to the opening day of
the World’s Fair.75 Trading was light since the total volume of shares traded in New York
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for May 1st was 531,446.76 The Wednesday issue of the Times reported that Tuesday’s
trading on May 2, 1893, was off as well in that General Electric went from opening at 96
to 91⅝ at the close and National Cordage, the most actively traded stock on the New
York exchange, closed at a price of 50 from an opening of 52½.77 Events became worse
each day during the first week of May, and Thursday’s New York Times reported “the
nearest approach to a panic which the New York Stock Exchange has witnessed since
1884, occurred today.”78 National Cordage dropped 14⅛ points from the previous close
of 50 the day before, and General Electric lost 3⅝ points to 88⅛ at the closing bell.79 The
New York Times financial page gave the reason for the May 3rd collapse as uncertainty
concerning the currency of the nation and stated, “This has caused men of money and
financial institution to put their houses in order against all possible trouble, and the
operation has compelled liquidation.”80
Douglas Steeples and David O. Whitten have given a good account of the stock
market events and reported that Thursday’s May 4th trading was a sell-off at the opening
bell.81 National Cordage at the opening on May 4th was at 36 ¾ and by the close was at 15½ ,
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while General Electric opened down 8 points at 80 and closed at 70.82 That Thursday
afternoon, May 4, 1893, National Cordage announced it was entering receivership and the
New York Times headlines on May 5, 1893, were “Cordage Trust Goes Under.”83 The
brokerage houses of Henry Allen & Co. and Schuyler Walden both made a market in Cordage
stock and stated in the New York Times: “that National Cordage failed because men long of
Cordage stock had not advanced funds when called upon to do so to protect their brokers. The
amount at stake, they said ran high in the hundreds of thousands of dollars.”84 These two
brokerage houses along with B. L. Smyth & Company, went down financially along with
National Cordage because promises of making margin calls were not kept, and the holdings of
all three brokerages were liquidated for the benefit of paying out their various customer
accounts.85
The fifth of May stock market crash sent shock waves of financial panic across the
country and it became increasingly difficult to borrow against commercial paper. Most note
brokers were located in New York City and interior banks bought directly from brokers or on
the recommendation of their city correspondent bank.86 Loan rates for commercial paper in
New York began to rise from an average of 7.12 percent in May to 10.33 percent in June, and
at an even higher rate of 11.83 percent in July.87 By 1893 year-end, 642 banks, including 69
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national banks, had failed with total liabilities of $211 million.88 The New York Times
reported that during the second quarter of 1893, a total of 3,179 companies failed, having
assets of $85,211,072 and liabilities of $131,436,078.89 The western states had the highest
number of failures at 881, the eastern states had 426 failures, and the southern states had 483
companies failing.90 Among these failures, in the second quarter of 1893, was the failure of
the Northern Pacific Railroad during the third week of May and the appointment of a receiver
for its assets.91
The Panic of 1893 caused financial havoc on the part of bank depositors. The New
York Herald on August 1, 1893, reported “that New York banks take advantage of their
lawful privilege requiring thirty, sixty, or ninety days notice on the withdrawal of
deposits.”92 The information regarding withdrawals was posted at different banks and
“the rule works to prevent depositors from withdrawing large amounts of money and
checking any symptom of panic at its inception.”93 Liquidity was a major problem
brought about during the Panic of 1893. In addition to limiting withdrawals, some banks
limited check-cashing privileges on balances to the accounts of customers as a matter of
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self-protection owing to the scarcity of hard currency.94 Oliver Sprague gave a good
account of the domino effect occurring after the disappearance of money took place
during the first week of August 1893. Sprague stated that people naturally refrained from
paying money into banks after the banks had begun to place restrictions upon withdrawal
of funds.95 Sprague emphasized that many banks during the early months of the panic
performed a partial suspension by limiting the amounts that depositors could withdraw
and the amount of checks that could clear. In comparing this financial crisis to that of
1873, when the banks restricted payments almost at the beginning of the disturbance, the
banks in 1893 took steps only after some months of struggle with adverse
circumstances.96 Sprague has described the illiquidity of the panic in that many factories
were temporarily shut down because of the difficulty of obtaining money for payrolls in
that they simply could not get their money out of the banks. O. M. W. Sprague’s work
takes a report from the Commercial and Financial Chronicle on February 25, 1894, to
depict the gravity of the financial crisis during the latter part of 1893, comparing it with a
normal productive year such as 1892.97
The figures in Table 4.2 “Railway Gross Earnings Per Month,” taken from the
Commercial and Financial Chronicle, depict double-digit declines in earnings for three
out of the last five months of 1893. As noted in Table 4.2, the railroad-earnings decline
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began precipitously in July 1893, and would continue throughout the year, following the
stock market crash that began in early May 1893.
Table 4.2. Railway Gross Earnings Per Month

1893
March

$61,900,000

April

1892

Percent increase (+) or decrease (-)

$58,700,000

+5.53

6,000,000

54,000,000

+3.42

May

65,000,000

60,300,000

+7.80

June

59,500,000

57,800,000

+2.97

July

56,800,000

59,700,000

-4.85

August

54,700,000

63,100,000

-13.29

September

58,200,000

64,900,000

-10.35

October

64,000,000

67,400,000

-5.00

November

56,700,000

63,100,000

-8.70

December

48,000,000

56,300,000

-14.75

Source: The Commercial and Financial Chronicle, Sept. 16, 1893.

Sprague described the financial debacle quoting the Commercial and Financial Chronicle:
The month of August will long remain memorable as one of the most
remarkable in our industrial history. Never before has there been such a
sudden and striking cessation of industrial activity. Nor was any section of
the country exempt from the paralysis; mills, factories, furnaces, mines
nearly everywhere shut down in large numbers, and commerce and
enterprise were arrested in an extraordinary and unprecedented degree.
The complete unsettlement of confidence and the derangement of our
financial machinery, which make it almost impossible to obtain loans or
sell domestic exchange and which put money to a premium over checks,
had the effect of stopping the wheels of industry and of contracting
production and consumption within its narrowest limits, so that our
internal trade was reduced to very small proportions—in fact, was brought
almost to a standstill—and hundreds of thousands of men thrown out of
employment. (The Commercial and Financial Chronicle, Sept. 16, 1893,
446)
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The economic uncertainty during the summer of 1893 aroused fear among the
populace, which brought about the hoarding of gold coins and foreign investors who
withdrew gold from the United States by the redemption of Treasury notes in gold.98 In
the first quarter of 1893, net exports of gold from New York amounted to $29 million, and
in April the gold reserve of the U.S. Treasury fell below the statutory reserve of $100
million.99
Call Money and Demand Loans Prolong Stock Market Declines and the Depression
A major problem occurred with the central reserve-city banks when New York City
reserve banks loaned their bankers’ deposits received from the interior banks out on call.
Edward C. Kirkland has described that “nominally the call loans were highly liquid, since
the customary security for call loans was a transaction of the stock exchange.”100 Sprague
has related that it is evident that the banks holding banker’s deposits lent to an excessive
extent, even though it was perfectly apparent that they were available but for a short
time.101 Sprague noted that “neither the industrial nor commercial business which is
centered in New York was of a nature to require temporarily large accommodation at the
particular time when the bankers’ deposits were large.”102 In other words, the central
reserve-city banks in New York never anticipated a stock market decline in May 1893.
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Call loans which were stock-exchange loans were favored because they were regarded
as particularly liquid, and the current view held that the use of bankers’ deposits for call
loans was a “proper basis.”103 While railroad stocks and bonds were heavily invested with
these call loans, many brokerage houses could not meet the demand during a financial
panic such as that of 1893, and thus, as with the firms that represented National Cordage,
they went under.
Kirkland emphasized that the New York banks once having their reserves drawn
down “had no means of meeting the demands of their local and out-of-town depositors
without calling loans at the precise moment when the stock exchange itself was whirling
downward.”104 In addition to these stock exchange loans being called, the interest rates
on call loans during times of financial crisis went up dramatically as well. Sidney Homer
has expressed that as late as 1899 call money on the New York Stock Exchange ranged
from a low of 1 percent per annum to a high of 186 percent per annum.105
This was at a time when other rates were not excessive; in contrast, during that
same year the yields of prime long-term American corporate and municipal bond
averages ranged from a low of 3.07 percent to a high of 3.23 percent.106 Sprague drew
conclusive data from a “New York bank statement,” that call loan rates were very
volatile, and did in fact go up during the Baring Brothers crisis in London between
November 1st and December 15th, 1890. Sprague’s data has depicted call loan interest
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rates ranging from a generally accepted low of 2 to 3 percent to a high for several days of
186 percent.107
In summation, call loans made the stock market and listed railroad securities more
volatile than usual and fueled financial panic. The Panic of 1893 was one extreme
example of a currency shortage that placed the reserve-city banks of New York in a dire
financial situation during such a crisis. The mandatory requirement to hold 25 percent
reserve funds in lawful money by the National Banking Act of 1893 and 1894 was a bare
minimum, and indeed it did not prove to be sufficient during a panic and during the
Depression Nineties. Many banks failed, and this, will be discussed in further detail in the
next chapter; although, some merchant banking houses such as J. P. Morgan’s and
August Belmont’s survived the economic storm. The reserve-city banks of New York
were ill-prepared for a major economic calamity such as the Panic of 1893, which was
ultimately brought on by a shortage of currency and monetary supply, and strongly
influenced by the Baring Brothers financial crisis of 1890. These banks expanded their
currency as best they could with the use of clearinghouse certificates, a type of interbank
loan or debit-credit voucher. But even this expanded form of script currency did not
provide the elasticity needed for an industrializing nation.
Farmers in Kansas and Nebraska were under dire financial straits, and national
banks were of no help to them, since the National Act prohibited mortgage lending by
national banks. Many Populists thought that a bimetallic policy would be the solution to
the monetary shortage. However, a stable parity between the two precious metals could
never be reached, as the history of the repeal of the Sherman Silver Purchase Act and its
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economic ramifications show. A descriptive analysis of a depleted U.S. Treasury
resulting from lost tariff revenue will be portrayed as well in chapter five. These topics
included in the next chapter will provide additional analysis as to major causes for this
depression, the likes of which had not been seen before. The occurrence of this
catastrophe in the late nineteenth century brought about many of the later Progressive Era
reforms and the Federal Reserve Act of 1913.
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Chapter 5
Repeal of the Sherman Silver Purchase Act and the Protective Tariff
This chapter is focused on two legislative acts: repeal of the Sherman Silver
Purchase Act of 1890 and the enactment of the McKinley Protective Tariff of 1890.
These two major political bills furthered the sectional economic divide in the United
States. Enacted during the latter part of 1890, during the four-year term of President
Benjamin Harrison (1889−93), each would have far-reaching effects into the depression
years of 1893−97.
The debates within both Congressional houses on the repeal of the Silver
Purchase Act of 1890 were page one headlines in the New York Tribune from September
through November. Several such headlines are highlighted in this chapter. While the
protective tariff laws should have created a positive economic effect, nevertheless they
had the opposite effect. Tariff revenues paid in gold at the various U.S. customhouses in
major cities were the major source of federal revenue in the late 1890s. Public land sales
diminished as the era of western homesteading frontier drew to a close from 1880−1890.
The Protective Tariff of 1890, proposed by Representative William McKinley of
the House Ways and Means Committee, lowered federal revenues by allowing raw sugar
on the duty-free list. The tariff reduction of the McKinley bill was vastly changed by the
time it reached and passed the U.S. Senate, much to McKinley’s dismay. Yet, the Tariff
Act of 1890 was enacted during President Benjamin Harrison’s administration when the
U.S. Treasury had a large surplus. Congress and President Harrison wanted to reduce the
surplus, and in turn, reduce tariff duties. Unfortunately, this same tariff increased the
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duty on tinplate to protect an emerging minor domestic industry and caused an extreme
hardship for the average household by raising the price of kitchen utensils, coffeepots,
and dinner tin plates. The McKinley Tariff of 1890 vastly reduced the amount of paid-in
gold from tariff duties. Each year the federal surplus diminished from $10 million in
1892, to a $2.5 million surplus in 1893, and then to deficit amounts of $70 million in
1894, which became the worst year of the five depression years.
U.S. Treasury Secretary John G. Carlisle attempted to correct the Treasury gold
reduction by selling U.S. bonds paying 3 percent to New York banks in February 1894,
with gold payment for the bonds. This temporary fix to the Treasury gold reserve only
lasted about six months, but the depression lingered. Secretary Carlisle approached J. P.
Morgan and August Belmont in February 1895, and obtained their commissioned
services in selling U.S. bonds overseas at 4 percent in return with the stipulation that
one-half of the gold received must come from Europe to the U.S. Treasury. By 1896, the
Treasury gold reserves stabilized, but the Wilson-Gorman Tariff of 1894, enacted to
raise federal revenue and replace the McKinley Tariff, had little effect and was “too little
too late.” The Wilson-Gorman Tariff generally raised the duty on crude leaf tobacco
used for cigar manufacturing and restored some of the duty on sugar imports.
This chapter has the objective of providing some examples of how these two
bills limited the amount of currency within an already faltering economy. An analysis
of both late nineteenth-century protective tariffs is given, in particular the McKinley
Tariff of 1890, which caused a decline in Treasury funds, along with its successor the
Wilson-Gorman Act of 1894, which changed duties based on sectional preferences such
as agricultural products, while still protecting manufactured goods.
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Much of the blame for the Panic of 1893 has been placed on the Sherman Silver
Act of July 14, 1890, which required the U.S. government to purchase 4.5 million
ounces of silver bullion per month with Treasury notes that could be exchanged for gold
coin on demand.1 President Cleveland believed that the nation’s difficulties resulted
from the Sherman Silver Purchase Act adoption in 1890, when the gold reserves
declined from a $190 million to $114 million in 1892, and the reserves went from
$100 million to $96 million in April 1893.2 President Cleveland had made known during
his first administration of a personal distaste for the Bland-Allison Act that passed on
February 28, 1878. Cleveland in the “Second Annual Message to Congress, December 6,
1886,” has described that during eight years under this compulsory silver-coinage act the
U.S. Mint had coined $247 million in silver dollars, which on November 30, 1886, only
had an intrinsic value or bullion price worth seventy-eight cents each.3
At this early date, President Cleveland was urging Congress to suspend the
compulsory coinage of silver with further evidence of gold exportations while silver
coinage was being produced at a far greater abundance than necessary for the needs of
the people.4 On February 10, 1891, in a “Letter to the Reform Club Meeting” in New
York, Cleveland, though not being able to attend and address the meeting in regard to
business interests, had expressed his desire against the continuance of the Sherman
Silver Purchase Act and an even greater scheme toward the unlimited coinage of silver
1

J. Rogers Hollingsworth, The Whirligig of Politics: The Democracy of Cleveland and Bryan (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1963), 11.

2

Ibid. (The Bland-Allison Act of 1878 and the Sherman Silver Purchase Act of 1890, took in large
amounts of silver into the U.S. Treasury.)

3

George F. Parker, The Writings and Speeches of Grover Cleveland (New York: Cassell Publishing Co.,
1892), 372.

4

Ibid., 373.

165

in the mints.5 During his second administration, Cleveland also issued a proclamation on
June 20, 1893, to convene a special session of Congress on August 8, 1893, to repeal the
Sherman Silver Act.6 The proclamation did not noticeably boost the morale of the
business community and the New York banks continued to lose reserves.7
In President Cleveland’s special message, an important issue was addressed
regarding securities that had previously been satisfactory for collateral but were now no
longer accepted.8 Within the message, Cleveland stated that the Sherman Silver Act
compelled the secretary of the Treasury to pay issued Treasury notes in redeemable
amounts on demand in gold or silver coin. Cleveland’s message added that up to July
15, 1893, Treasury notes in the amount of $147 million had been issued in payment of
silver bullion purchases. Out of this amount, $49 million was paid out by the Treasury in
gold for redemption of these notes, with a balance of redeemable notes in circulation
that could be paid in gold on demand.9 President Cleveland was getting to the fact that
the Treasury could no longer issue any more Treasury notes because they were
redeemable in gold. Therefore, the U.S. Treasury could not buy any more silver bullion
or it would risk losing all of the gold reserve in the Treasury. In order to prevent the gold
reserves from shrinking further, the Sherman Silver Act had to be repealed or be at risk
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of having the United States go off the gold standard for currency. A shrinking U.S.
Treasury gold reserve had made headlines in financial dailies on a constant basis.10 In
addition, the late nineteenth-century “gold standard facilitated international capital
mobility” with a monetary system where “individual countries agreed to exchange their
currencies for gold at a fixed rate.”11 Tariffs and custom duties were also paid in gold.
President Cleveland was very conscientious about getting the repeal of the Silver Act
underway. Despite having oral cancer, Cleveland had an operation done in secrecy to avoid
any delays in Congress. Shortly before Congress convened in August 1893, Cleveland had a
cancerous growth surgically removed from the roof of his mouth while aboard a yacht in
New York harbor.12 Performed in seclusion, appearing as a minor summer vacation, the
operation was successful and he was equipped with a jaw of vulcanized rubber and carried
on his duties as if nothing had happened.13 Cleveland used his political influence to get the
repeal bill through the House of Representatives, and although it was attacked by U.S.
congressmen from the western silver mining states, the measure was passed after two weeks
of debate in the House.14
It was during one of these debates that Cleveland’s proposal for repeal of the
Sherman Silver Act was answered by a young U.S. representative from Nebraska named
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William Jennings Bryan. On August 16, 1893, during one such debate, Bryan held the
House floor for three hours and urged a compromise rather than accept President
Cleveland’s unconditional repeal of the Sherman Silver Act.15 The U.S. House of
Representatives voted on August 28, 1893 to repeal the Sherman Silver Act. However,
before the vote, the pro-silver members of the House made every attempt possible to
retain free silver coinage.16 Bills were introduced to save silver coinage with the idea of
raising the value of the silver dollar by raising the required grain amount of silver from
the historic monetized amount of 371.25 grains established by the U.S. Coinage Act of
1792.17 The first bill attempted to forestall repeal of the Sherman Silver Act, advocating
an 18 to 1 ratio of coinage with a new silver content of 464.40 grains, and this bill was
rejected.18 The Congressional Record, 53rd Congress, described a further proposed
increase of silver to gold at a 19 to 1 ratio, and proposed to raise the silver grain content
to 490.20 grains which was rejected. The last attempt from the 53rd Congress to raise the
silver coinage content was for a 20 to 1 ratio with gold, which consisted of 516 grains of
silver, and it was also voted down.
One last attempt was made by the House “silverites,” as they attempted to revive
the Act of February 28, 1878, known as the Bland-Allison Act, purchasing not less than
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2 million ounces of silver, and not more than 4 million ounces per month at market rate.19
Some of the silver states felt that the earlier act to purchase silver was better than no
silver act at all, but this too failed, with the Congressional Record reporting that the
attempted revival of this bill was rejected as well. The final bill of the day was referred to
as the Wilson Amendment to repeal the “Act of July 14, 1890,” or the Sherman Silver
Act, as it was called in the press.
The fight for the repeal of the Sherman Silver Act was even more contentious in
the U.S. Senate. The bill for repeal known as the Wilson Amendment went into the U.S.
Senate, where for three months, western senators allied with the southern states fought
for every inch of ground.20 It first appeared that the spirit of compromise would prevail,
led by Democratic Senator Arthur P. Gorman of Maryland, while Republican Senator
John Sherman of Ohio urged his party to follow, and by early October, thirty-seven of the
forty-four Democrats in the Senate had lined up in support of a compromise plan
presented by Gorman.21 The compromise plan as reported by the New York Tribune:
Calls for silver purchases to end October 1, 1894; that the silver
purchased during the eleven months’ interim should be coined, together
with all the seigniorage to that date; that all paper money under ten
dollars except silver certificates should be retired; and that there should
be no bond issue. The plan also substituted silver certificates for the legal
tender greenbacks and treasury notes.22
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President Cleveland was rigidly opposed to a moderate plan, even though J. P.
Morgan advised a temporary compromise that would satisfy the nation until the Treasury
was in better financial condition.23 The chapter 8 statutory act is titled, “An Act to repeal
a part of an act approved July fourteenth, eighteen hundred and ninety, entitled ‘An Act
directing the purchase of silver bullion and the issue of Treasury notes thereon, and for
other purposes.’”24 On November 1, 1893, the U.S. Senate voted to repeal the Sherman
Silver Act by 43 votes in favor of repeal and 32 against.25
The New York Tribune had been covering the “Repeal Debates” extensively. The
Tribune’s Sunday edition on page one of September 3, 1893, depicted a quarter-page
illustration of a silver dollar being rolled down a large hill from the top of a fort labeled the
“House of Representatives.” The silver dollar coin had the words “silver repeal bill”
engraved on its side as it is rolling, and four senators were at the bottom of the hill with rope
outstretched to stop the “rolling” repeal bill.26 The rope had a label on it called obstruction
tactics and the caption at the top of the page reads “Senators Who Stand in the Way of
Repeal May Get Hurt” and these U.S. senators who had compromise bills sticking out of
their pockets were: Stewart of Nevada, Gorman of Maryland, Peffer of Kansas, and Vest of
Missouri.27 The November 2nd edition of the New York Tribune stated that the Senate vote
took place at 3:00 p.m. on November 1, 1893, and the Chairman of the House Committee on
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“enrolled bills,” Representative Albert J. Pearson of Ohio, brought the bill via cable car from
the Capitol to the White House for President Cleveland’s signature.28 The New York Tribune
reported that only President Grover Cleveland, Treasury Secretary Carlisle, and
Congressman Pearson were present for Cleveland’s 4:30 p.m. Wednesday signature. When
asked the next day by a reporter, “What will be the result of this repeal?” Senator Sherman in
Columbus, Ohio, replied, “That I can’t tell exactly. I can’t discount its effects in its entirety;
but it will certainly quiet the fears of the financial world.”29
The repeal of the Sherman Silver Act of 1890, which took effect on November 2,
1893, did very little to quiet the fears of the financial world. The depression which began
with a stock market decline in May of 1893 continued throughout 1894 and through the year
1897, a term of five years. The repeal of the act did not prevent the silver dollars in
circulation from continuing to do so, nor was the mintage of silver dollars discontinued.
In 1894, a total of $1,260,000, Morgan Silver dollars were minted from the silver bullion that
currently existed in the U.S. Treasury, and in 1895 this number diminished to $880,000.
Silver bullion simply was no longer purchased in the amount of 4.5 million ounces per month
with Treasury notes that could be exchanged for gold on demand.
The convening of Congress in “special session” on August 8, 1893, to deliberate and
repeal the Sherman Silver Act of 1890, had the foreseeable prediction of moving the price of
gold upward, and in effect it created a currency premium for gold coinage. This also had the
undesired effect of forcing New York central banks to a more complete suspension of
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honoring drafts with cash payments.30 Sprague emphasized that gold sold at a 2 to 3 percent
currency premium during twenty-one days in August of 1893, while the buying rate was at
1 ½ percent to 2 ½ percent premium.31 In turn, the Panic of 1893 created a withholding of
currency where “money was withheld by many depositors whose business brought to them a
constant stream of money.”32 Sprague further reported that depositors used various pretenses
and withdrew larger amounts of money than needed for their normal requirements, and in
turn sold the gold for profit.
Late Nineteenth-Century Protective Tariffs—Another Cause of Economic Depression
Tariff duties, per the international standard of payment, were made in gold and
an imbalance of trade would lead to more gold going out of the United States than that
coming into it. The Billion-dollar Congress thought that tariffs were too high, and the
amount of surplus in the Treasury was spent on “reckless appropriations for pensions,
rivers and harbors, public buildings, etc.”33 According to Arnett, the McKinley Tariff of
1890 was designed to reduce revenue while at the same time increasing protective
measures to favored interests. Some protected commodities had import duties, and
certain raw materials which had formerly yielded large revenues were placed on the free
list.34 In effect, the Tariff of 1890, introduced by William McKinley as a Congressman
from Ohio and then chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, passed with a
final version of a previously balanced tariff act that “bore little resemblance to what he
30
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introduced, thanks largely to action in the Senate.”35 According to biographers,
McKinley’s bill of 1890 came at a cost of non-reelection to the U.S. House, but with the
help of Mark Hanna and John Sherman from Ohio, McKinley became Ohio’s governor
from 1892 to 1896, which became a stepping stone toward the U.S. presidency.
It was Henry O. Havemeyer, president of the American Sugar Refining
Company, who said “the mother of all trusts is the Customs Tariff Bill” while speaking
before the Industrial Commission in June of 1899. Tariffs throughout the nineteenth
century had been the prevailing means of raising revenue for the federal government.
Only with the exception of brief periods of heavy land sales, the federal government had
to depend on tariffs to account for 80 to 90 percent of all federal government revenues
before the income tax was introduced by the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913.36 Next to
requirements of the Sherman Silver Purchase Act, the protective tariff was blamed by
the Democrats as the leading cause of economic hardship. These two issues helped to
return Grover Cleveland to the presidency in 1892, and defeated President Benjamin
Harrison’s attempt at a re-election bid.37 Samuel McSeveney maintained that the tariff
debates of 1893−94 held a Republican view that the “protective tariff was a means by
which government served a broad public, contributing to the high wages of American
workers and to the maintenance of a rich domestic market for American farmers, as well
as protecting the profits of American manufacturers.” Cleveland’s Democrats would
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have been glad to have waited on the McKinley Tariff of 1890; however, the
presidential election of 1892 was won chiefly on the current tariff issue.38 Stanley
Engerman asserted that the McKinley Tariff gave the United States the highest tariff
rates in the industrialized world, despite the Congressional debate over its passage.
Rather than allow the defection of voters to the People’s Party, the objective of
the Cleveland Democracy had been the conversion of western Democrats to the
conviction that the cause of their sectional ills was the high tariff, a cause with which
tariff reform and repeal of the McKinley Tariff would render relief and not with free
silver.39 The protective tariff of the late nineteenth century was a tax on the consumers
of the United States and whether one considered it an ad valorem tax or a revenue tax, it
weighed heavily upon the average household. Tom Watson, as a U.S. congressional
representative of the Populist Party, felt strongly against the high protective tariff of the
1890s, and spoke on behalf of the People’s Party of Georgia:
We support Free Silver as much as we favor Income Tax — and no
more. We hate the greed which strikes down silver in the interest of gold
— but we hate just as fiercely the National banks which strike down the
right of all people to obtain money from the government upon equal
terms; and the High Protective Tariff, under whose shelter Trusts and
Combines organize their forces and exploit the public; and the Railroad
tyranny which keeps its iron hand laid heavily upon every industry in the
Union. (Woodward, Tom Watson, 282)
The United States iron and steel industry of the late nineteenth century was a
major protected trust which Congress, beginning in 1878, had protected with tariffs
against British imports. David Ames Wells, a leading economist of this time, reported
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that from 1878−87 inclusive, the average price of $21.87 per ton for Philadelphia
anthracite foundry pig-iron consumed in the United States had a price disparity of seven
dollars with a concurrent market price of pig-iron in Great Britain at $15 per ton f.o.b.
shipped into the United States.40 Wells further emphasized that the refined product
during these years for best rolled bar-iron in Philadelphia was $50.30 per long ton of
2,240 pounds, while the average price for the same product of English Staffordshire
marked bars was $35.48, or a difference of $14 per ton.41 The Carnegie Steel Company
was a major beneficiary of these tariffs, even with steelworker jobs protected; Wells has
emphasized that the ten years’ consumption of 20,000,000 tons cost consumers
$280,000,000.
The McKinley Bill of 1890, which was a tariff with a larger list of raw materials
on the free list, was represented as a tax, a small portion of which went into the U.S.
Treasury, “but a much greater part was paid indirectly to favored manufacturers through
an increase of the price of their wares.”42 Edward Stanwood has emphasized that it
appeared on the surface that the Tariff of 1890 aided the manufacturing Northeast by
imposing high tariffs on imported English manufacturing goods, and was detrimental to
the South by exempting duties on numerous raw materials, such as raw sugar, while
requiring the agricultural South and West to purchase these manufactured goods at a
higher price than the imports with duties attached. However, Stanwood related that some
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of the tariff conflict came from internal competition by the opening of new land for the
production of wheat in the states and territories west of the Missouri River. This area
produced only one sixth of the total U.S. wheat production in 1870, and now in 1895, it
yielded more than one-third of the overall wheat production total.43
Stanwood has emphasized that simultaneous to the McKinley Tariff, the arrival
of a national market integration had occurred. For example, the meat packing industry
changed dramatically from 1870, when the densely populated regions of the East “drew
their meat supply from nearby farming regions,” and now in the 1890s there existed
“huge packing establishments of the West,” where cattle, swine, and sheep are raised by
the millions on the grazing lands of the West and Midwest.44 Stanwood, an economist of
this time, explained that these types of economic movements caused great displacements
and readjustments throughout the agricultural industry. The McKinley Tariff was passed
by the U.S. Senate by a vote of 40 to 29, on September 10, 1890, but only after 496
amendments are made, and by the U.S. House of Representatives the next day by a vote
of 151 to 81.45 The McKinley Tariff was signed into law by President Benjamin
Harrison on October 1, 1890. Stanwood argued that the McKinley Act listed a complete
schedule of protective duties upon almost every U.S. agricultural product raised.
The protective tariff of the late nineteenth century created a demarcation among
the two major political parties and created an economic sectionalism that divided the
manufacturing Northeast and Mid-Atlantic states such as Pennsylvania from the
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predominantly agricultural South and West. John Hicks has emphasized through a
“Governor’s Message” in North Carolina that though the protective tariff, while not
totally disliked in all farm circles, did meet with frequent criticism as a means of
“protecting one class at the expense of another — the manufacturer against the farmer,
the rich against the poor.”46 Hicks further argued that “because of the tariff the American
market was reserved for the exclusive exploitation of the American manufacturer whose
prices were fixed,” based not on the cost of production, but rather with the amount of
protection that they could secure.47
The McKinley Tariff of 1890 was a highly protectionist tariff which had
numerous reciprocity agreements for duty-free sugar imported from Hawaii, Cuba, and
Puerto Rico. The Latin-American reciprocity tariff agreements resulted from an
International American Conference held in Washington, D.C. during 1889.48 The United
States exported $52 million or seven percent of its total exports to South America, while
importing $120 million worth of articles leaving an unfavorable balance of trade of $68
million.49 The McKinley Tariff’s protectionist and discriminatory reciprocity policies
were designed to keep British exports from American markets and close Britain’s
lucrative markets in Latin America.50
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The Democrats during the 1890s wanted tariffs “for revenue only,” and wanted
to keep the duties low, while the Republican Party of the northeastern states supported a
“protective tariff” to protect home industry and keep out foreign competition in U.S.
industries such as steel manufacturing of rails and wooden finished products.51 The most
significant reduction of the McKinley Tariff of 1890 was the repeal of the duty on raw
sugar which previously had been a source of Treasury income. Stanwood made a
compelling argument that the remission of the raw sugar duty was a relief from the most
heavily taxed food item to U.S. consumers and its free duty reduced by one-third the
cost for this one household item.52 The U.S. consumption of this product came to the
extent of two and a half billion pounds of dutiable sugar in the fiscal year 1888−89, with
a value of $76 million dollars and paying a duty of almost $55 million.53
Though the duty was repealed on raw sugar with the McKinley Tariff, a reduced
duty still existed on refined sugar to one-half cent per pound.54 Ida Tarbell, a writer for
McClure’s Magazine, and Edward Stanwood, both expressed some disagreement with
the McKinley Tariff and how the pre-existing duty had generated over $55,000,000
annually in customs fees to the U.S. Treasury. Not only did repeal of duty on raw sugar
entry into the United States deplete the Treasury’s resources, but the McKinley Tariff
allowed a bounty to be paid to satisfy the American sugar cane and sugar beet growers;
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although in 1890, these interests only produced one-seventh or nearly 220,000 tons with
an even smaller amount of 3,000 tons coming from beets and sorghum.55
Stanwood’s table of U.S. Treasury receipts versus expenditures provided
evidence that the Treasury was depleted at a critical time in history, and as depicted in
the first five-year period from 1885 to 1890, the Treasury took in a reported surplus that
averaged $105 million dollars annually.56 However, the critical factor was that the
surplus declined to $37 million dollars just nine months after the McKinley Act was in
operation, then fell to $10 million in 1892, and next to only a $2.5 million-dollar surplus
in 1893, and its worst scenario of all with a $70 million-dollar deficit at the end of fiscal
year 1894. All of this lost Treasury revenue occurred simultaneously with the most
ruinous depression that the United States had witnessed up to that time.57
Stanwood described that if a comparison was made of the three fiscal years that
lapsed between September 1890 when the McKinley Act was passed, and July 1893
when the new Cleveland administration undertook to reform it, one would find a loss of
$54 million in revenue, and an additional new expenditure of $9 million for sugar
bounties. This expenditure and revenue loss, along with an increase of $52 million to the
accounts of Union war veterans’ pensions, were two major factors which would drive
the deficit up to $70 million and make this the first national deficit since the close of the
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Civil War.58 Benjamin Harrison’s administration never intended that the McKinley
Tariff would reduce prices as well on the protected articles of coal, iron, cotton cloth,
and woolen goods among other items such as tin.59 Stanwood reported that the Silver
Purchase Act of 1890 — though the “free silver” people argued it was used too little and
the “goldbugs” argued it was used too much — was never a factor in the faltering
economy; rather, the Treasury surplus retraction under the McKinley Act as a fiscal
measure was a political blunder.
Reduced prices and deflation accompanied declining wages during the late
1890s, and though the importation of raw materials intended for manufacture were
admitted free of duty, the quantity of goods in value increased from $119 million in
1890, the highest amount in any year up to that time, and then up to $149 million in
1891, and a further increase to $156 million in 1892, and $176 million in 1893, with a
much smaller revenue entering the U.S. Treasury.60 Stanwood emphasized that this
larger amount of imported value did not increase revenue to the Treasury since these
values were mostly “raw materials” transferred from an import duty list to a free duty
list. Foreign trade was a factor in balancing expenditures, and gold imports and exports
were most important when the United States was on a gold standard with the rest of
Europe.
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Theodore J. Kreps, a late nineteenth-century economist who worked under Frank
W. Taussig at Harvard, has put together data tables that supported Stanwood’s work.
Agricultural products such as raw cotton, cottonseed oil, cotton cloth, corn, oats, fresh
beef, leaf tobacco, wheat, and turpentine are just nine of the twenty-eight U.S. exported
products listed in a select article written that covered some aspects of international trade
from 1880 to 1914.61
Some of the imports on Kreps’ twenty-nine-item imports list are four types of
wool from raw carpet wool to raw wool clothing and finished cloth wool, tin, tinplate,
coffee, tea, cocoa, Canadian pine lumber, olive oil, and raw sugar cane. Kreps used the
Marshall-Edgeworth formula, and the base years specified were 1903−13 inclusive, or a
ten-year period when the quantity of exports and imports were at a “normal tide.”62
Kreps’ “Table I” has enumerated the five lowest consecutive values for the U.S. price of
exports from 1894−99.63 Imports are at a much higher value than exports thus averaging
87, while the ten-year base period average is 111.64 Kreps’ “Chart I,” portrayed five-year
periods from 1880 to 1914, which placed the annual price index of two simultaneous
curves comparing the prices of exports to imports, and the years 1895−97, at the bottom,
as trough years for both U.S. exports and imports during this thirty-four year period.
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These indices have offered further evidence for the argument that the five
depression years of the late nineteenth century were caused by numerous economic
problems, one of which was international trade. Kreps asserted that “up to 1897 the
prices of exported goods fell more than those of imports;” which in turn would cause
more gold to go out of the United States Treasury than would come into it based on
trade imbalances. Kreps blamed much of the dropping export prices upon the falling
price of U.S. cotton in the 1890s. Much of the demand for U.S. cotton from England had
been supplanted by new cotton production in India and Egypt, which took the place of
the greatly diminished U.S. supply during the Civil War years of 1861−65, when cotton
prices were much higher.65 Kreps emphasized that the direction of import price changes
was dominated by two items, coffee and sugar, and that at no other time in terms of
international trade was cotton less in terms of value to that of coffee and sugar than from
1892−95.66
Matthew Simon confirmed similar export price index results to those given by
Kreps using data from the “Freight Income Earned by United States Vessels.”67 Simon’s
results for the years 1894−98 inclusive are the lowest for exports among all years from
1866 to 1890, with those years having an index value above 100. However, Simon’s
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data represented a gradual downward index from 94.2 to 95.5, during the years
1891−93, and a much lower index value in the low-eighty range from 1894−98.68
One final summation on the United States trade balance during the five
depression years is partially covered in Ilse Mintz’s work titled Trade Balances during
Business Cycles: U.S. and Britain since 1880. Mintz defined U.S. trade balance as the
excess of total exports over general imports declared in f.o.b. values.69 Mintz based a
Chart 2, titled “Trade Balance in Relation to Cycles in World Trade,” on a U.S. dollar
that had a 1930 parity, by which the dollar was worth 0.048 ounces of gold during that
time. Mintz’s three-quarter moving average chart from 1879 to 1914, again confirmed
the work of both T. J. Kreps and Matthew Simon, with negative trade turns taking place
at their lowest point in 1893 and 1895, both trough years of the five-year depression.70
In addition to protecting its domestic industries at this time, the United States
was also trying to develop new industries at home, which created tariffs to protect its
domestic markets. One such industry was the tin plate industry which was used in
photography and during the mid-nineteenth century was among the first photographic
image-making processes. Tin plates were also used in the canning business and the
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process of industrial food canning became a large business in the late nineteenth century,
and this is one of the “market integrations” described by Edward Stanwood. This
emerging industry had only 450,000,000 pounds of imported tin plate in 1883, but by
1889, just six years later that figure reached 736,000,000 pounds.71
Stanwood stressed that the McKinley Tariff placed a duty of 2.81 cents per pound
on tin plate, and a duty of one quarter of a cent less on iron sheets coated with tin. The
first attempt of domestic manufacture of tin was introduced into the United States in
1873, when tin plate was globally competitive at $12 a box; however, the Welsh
manufacturers reduced it to $4.50 a box to compensate for the tariff placed on it.72 Ida
Tarbell maintained that the consumer paid for such tariff actions and that while this
fledgling industry had 57 tin plate industries by 1900, its employment only reached
4,000 people. This protected domestic industry turned out nearly $32,000,000 worth of
goods by 1900, but at a cost of taxation to the consumer between 1890 and 1900 in the
amount of $90,000,000.73 Tariff controversies and the Congressional debate on import
duties and which items should be on the duty free list were major sources of national
contention as both Stanwood and Tarbell emphasized during the late nineteenth century.
In full effect, the McKinley Tariff reduced the importation of tinplate in fiscal
year 1890−91, from over 1 billion pounds to a level of just 403 million pounds in
1891−92.74 One particular oddity occurred during this time in that tinware manufacturers
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who used plated tin, sent their tin peddlers through the country districts with their horsedriven vans loaded with familiar pots, pans, and kitchen utensils selling such wares with
marked-up costs and told farmers’ wives that it was due to the high tariff.75 However,
such reductions in imports also diminished a like amount of duties coming into the U.S.
customhouses. Thurston Peck has described the calamity that lay ahead:
The year 1894 is one to be long remembered in American history. In it
those elements of dynamic discontent which had long been gathering
strength, half unperceived, now loomed upon the political horizon with the
black and sullen menace of a swelling thunder-cloud, within whose womb
are pent the forces of destruction. For years, by bargain and compromise,
the day of reckoning had been postponed; but now both compromise and
bargain were impossible, and the nation had to face, however fearfully, the
issues which would no longer down. (Harry Thurston Peck, Twenty Years
of the Republic, 1885−1905, p. 353)
John G. Carlisle’s Attempts to Keep the Ship of State from Financial Mudbanks76
Treasury Secretary John Carlisle by January 1894 approached Congress for
action regarding the depleted Treasury reserves. By January 1894, the Treasury had a
gold reserve of $68,000,000 and bank notes under redemption and fractional silver coin,
which Alexander Noyes emphasized was the closest the government had approached
actual bankruptcy to the present time.77 Without any congressional action taking place,
Secretary Carlisle “formally notified the chairman of the Senate Finance Committee,”
Daniel W. Voorhees of Indiana, that “in order to avert public insolvency,” Carlisle
would assume the right previously asserted by prior Treasury secretaries and issue
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government bonds to restore the gold reserve.78 The first gold bond offerings required
payment in United States gold coin and paid the equivalent of 3 percent at par, with
Carlisle persuading the New York banks to buy into the sale.79 The gold reserve reached
$106,000,000, by February 1894, and it stood near that amount through March as well.80
Noyes emphasized that the bond sales for gold coin was a temporary remedy,
and gold exports began in large quantity during April 1894, and by August 1894, the
gold reserve had fallen to an even lower level than it reached in January. The gold drain
in 1894, according to Noyes, did not result entirely from an imbalance of foreign
merchandise trade going against the country, but also from a recall of invested capital in
American railway shares and bonds. Noyes’s answer for the gold drain explained in part
why gold reserves left the United States in 1893−94, which became a major occurrence
during the Depression Nineties when investors abroad cashed in their securities for gold.
The Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1894, has offered data leading to a
sustainable justification for some of the “silverite” claims that if a higher parity of silver
to gold had been allowed during the 1890s, then more coinage would have existed in
circulation; therefore, creating a greater money supply, as presented in the writings of
Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz. Silver became the fractional currency using
silver dollars, half-dollars, and quarters, while gold was the bigger currency in $5, $10,
and $20 gold coins. In addition, the usage of gold certificates in lieu of gold coins also
backed up this more expensive form of currency. According to the “Director of the Mint
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Report,” contained within the Statistical Abstract, more gold was coined in the year
1894 than most years during the last fifty years, including the bumper gold coinage year
of 1851, just after the California Gold Rush of 1849, in which $62,614,000 worth of
gold was coined.81 Carlisle’s Treasury Report stated in 1894, gold was coined in the
amount of $79,546,000, with only two years surpassing that amount, which were 1881,
with $96,850,000 of gold coined, and 1861, during the first year of the Civil War with
$83,395,000 of gold coined.
Simultaneous to the higher gold coinage in 1893 and 1894, just after the repeal
of the Sherman Silver Purchase Act, silver as predicated upon the repeal was no longer
purchased by the mint, however silver coin mintage continued from the silver bullion
located in U.S. Treasury vaults. The “Director of the Mint Report” provided a separate
mintage amount of gold and silver coinage. The data tables in the Statistical Abstract of
1894 revealed that a standard ratio of gold and silver coinage occurred simultaneously.
Gold and silver brought into the various mints from the western mining states was
purchased with gold at precisely $20.6718 per ounce, and silver purchased at $1.2929
per ounce.82 These bullion values held true for gold and silver minted by the U.S.
Treasury from 1889 to 1893, with the ratio of coinage value consistently 15.99 to 1 for
silver to gold mintage.83
John G. Carlisle was the secretary of the Treasury succeeding Charles Foster
who served 1891−93. Carlisle, who served 1893−97, was an “ardent advocate of the free
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coinage of silver.”84 Had the silver content been raised in the coinage of silver dollars,
then this coinage would have had a greater intrinsic value during this critical time. The
Director of the United States Mint data tables described the years from 1893 to 1894 as
an increasing amount of gold and silver being exported out of the United States.85 The
Statistical Abstract of 1894 reported a combined amount of $37,164,718 worth of gold
and silver coin that was exported in excess of imports out of the United States. During
the midst of the 1890s depression, tariff reform and legislative action was brought
forward as a means to increase tax revenue, which the Wilson-Gorman bill proposed.
The Wilson-Gorman Tariff of 1894 — A Cause of Sectional Divisiveness
William L. Wilson, a former president of the University of West Virginia, and
then a U.S. representative from that state, wrote the majority of the new tariff bill during
President Cleveland’s second administration. Wilson rose through the Democratic ranks
of the Cleveland administration and became U.S. House chairman of the Ways and
Means Committee. He, along with Senator Arthur P. Gorman from Maryland, both
Democrats, had to fix the tariff rates of the McKinley Tariff of 1890. The WilsonGorman Tariff of 1894 tried to be inclusive by granting financial relief to one or more
particular products that a region depended upon economically. For the South, it was
placing cotton ties on the free list and obtaining lower duties on manufactured articles at
the expense of the Northeast.86 William M. Springer, U.S. House Democrat from
Illinois, introduced one of the bills attached to the 1894 Tariff, called the Springer Wool
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Bill and more commonly called the “Cheap Clothes Bill,” which allowed for free wool
and free wool cloth to be placed on the duty-free list.87
This Democratic unification behind single bills provided for free binding twine,
free hemp, free flax, free lumber, free cotton ties, and Springer’s free wool were labeled
“pop-gun” measures by the Republicans.88 On manufactured goods, there was no major
reduction and the rate was 25 percent on steel rails, and refined sugar was decreased
from one-half to one-fourth cent per pound.89 Summers argued that the New England
Democrats were exasperated over the failure to provide for free coal and free iron ore
bills in the 1894 tariff, and it made for political capital for the New England
Republicans. This lack of economic sensitivity toward the New Englanders caused some
sectional divisiveness upon the authors of this new tariff.
A Democratic majority comprised the Fifty-third U.S. Congress, with a small
Senate majority of forty-four Democrats, forty Republicans, three Populists with
William V. Allen from Nebraska as its leader, and one Silver Party U.S. Senator,
William M. Stewart from Nevada.90 There were eighty-eight Senate seats at this time
representing forty-four states in 1893. Arthur Pue Gorman was the Senate majority
leader and as important a political figure as William Lynn Wilson of the House in
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writing the Wilson-Gorman tariff. The significance of Cleveland’s second term was not
just the win against Benjamin Harrison, but that the McKinley Tariff was the bigger
issue of the 1892 election, and the high-water mark as well for the Populists by winning
an additional two Senate seats for a total of three, and eleven seats in the U.S. House.
The reason for the high-tariff price discrepancy on manufactured goods coming
into the United States as imports and the low tariff duties on raw materials such as
cotton and unrefined sugar was that manufactured goods carried a much higher per unit
cost. Robert E. Lipsey emphasized that “the purchasing power of manufactured imports
(foreign manufacturers) over American exports of farm products fell by 20 percent or
more, between the middle 1890s and the 1920s.”91 Another purpose of the WilsonGorman tariff was the intended reduction on internal revenue taxes, particularly those on
alcohol and tobacco. These two products had a very large internal revenue tax placed on
them and Speaker of the U.S. House John Carlisle would not budge on a revenuereduction measure which did not provide a tariff on imported whiskey and tobacco that
would counterbalance that lost revenue in the Treasury.92 Barnes maintained that reform
editors such as Joseph Medill of the Chicago Tribune wanted Congress to reduce the
tariff on the real necessaries of life, and thought that tobacco and whiskey were cheap
enough. However, the direct tax levied on whiskey made the government appear as an
oppressor upon the weary laborer, but the government which increased the cost of their
coarse woolen clothes did not offend the same working class, for indirect taxes could not
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be seen, but direct taxes were highly visible.93 The Wilson-Gorman tariff did not reduce
internal revenue on tobacco and distilled spirits, but it did protect the U.S. manufacturers
by imposing tariffs on all imported whiskey, brandy, and other distilled liquors up to the
enactment of the federal income tax in 1913.94 Crude leaf tobacco suitable for cigar
wrapping was subject to the tariff duty; however, leaf tobacco from Cuba and Turkey
was excluded up to the year 1913.95 James G. Blaine, Republican presidential candidate
who ran against Cleveland and lost in the 1884 election, “decried the reform efforts of
the Democrats and recommended immediate repeal of the tax on tobacco, which he said
was one of the necessities of the workingman.”96
The most controversial and novel inception of the Wilson-Gorman bill was its
“income tax” provision. The income tax provision had always been a Populist cause to
reduce the tariffs upon manufactured items used by farmers, and tax the wealthier
manufacturers. Barnes wrote that history has it that Thomas B. Reed of Maine, a U.S.
representative, was one of the committee members and though representing the
Republican minority at that time, Reed believed that condemnation would befall any
political party which sponsored an income tax provision. Reed had no aversion to
allowing the Democratic majority to hang themselves, and held his Republican
associates in the committee room to complete a quorum which allowed the income tax
provisions to be forced into the Wilson-Gorman tariff bill with Democratic Benton
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McMillin’s sponsorship.97 The income tax provision of the Wilson-Gorman Tariff added
to the sectional divisiveness and the proposal brought immediate opposition from the
wealthier class. James Stillman, president of National City Bank of New York, wrote
Daniel S. Lamont of Cleveland’s Cabinet and voiced his vehement opposition.98
James A. Barnes related that the greater difficulty in levying an income tax at
this time lay in the fact that the financiers of banking and industry were the same people
that Treasury Secretary Carlisle had induced into buying government bonds in exchange
for gold coin to replenish the Treasury’s gold reserve. Barnes emphasized that the
eastern press condemned the proposal as a vicious product of Populism in the South and
the West. The Nation characterized it as “dangerous experiment,” while western papers
defended the idea.99 A finalized house version of the Wilson-Gorman bill made its way
through the U.S. House of Representatives in late December 1893. It was a moderate bill
and balanced the Democrats’ various sectional interests by offering New England lower
duties on raw material, and the South lower duties on manufactured goods along with an
income tax on corporate and personal incomes over $4000.100 The Wilson side of the
tariff bill “expanded the free list to include coal, iron ore, wool, cotton, lumber, salt,
sugar, hides, binding twine, and some agricultural implements.”101 The U.S. Senate had
a narrower Democratic majority by only two votes, and the bill when passed through the
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Senate had 634 amendments, many of which upset the public, and in the end sugar, iron
ore, and coal vanished from the free list, but wool and lumber remained.102 The 1894
Wilson-Gorman Act also repealed the two-cent bounty per pound paid to U.S. beet and
cane sugar producers, and substituted an ad valorem duty on foreign sugar for protection
in its place.103 This removal of the sugar bounty did little for the South Louisiana sugar
planters and “domestic prices for raw sugar fell from almost six cents per pound in 1889
to an average of three cents by 1894.”104 The Wilson bill applied some reductions in
duties compared to the McKinley Act, and President Cleveland on August 28, 1894, let
the Wilson-Gorman bill become law without signing.
Although Cleveland did write William Wilson a letter of appreciation, the
Wilson-Gorman Tariff Act of 1894 had little or no effect in replenishing the Treasury’s
gold reserves.105 The U.S. Supreme Court in the landmark case of Pollock v. Farmers
Loan and Trust Company ruled in 1895 that the income clause of the Wilson-Gorman
bill was illegal and the Court held in a 5 to 4 decision that the income tax was a “direct
tax” and therefore unconstitutional.106 Eighteen years passed before Woodrow Wilson’s
administration in 1913 obtained another chance of enacting a direct income tax to raise
revenue, but only after passing it as the Sixteenth Amendment.
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A major reason that revenue decreased during the latter part of the nineteenth
century was that while cotton supplied 80 percent of the increase in agricultural exports
between 1800 and 1860, “cotton lost its leading role and provided only 14 percent of the
growth over the last forty years of the century.”107 The “World’s Consumption of
Cotton,” which the South and Southwest were so dependent upon, remained steady from
1892 to 1897, with Great Britain, Continental Europe, and the United States remaining
within 25,000 bales of each year’s consumption and never actually increasing intake
from one year to the next.108 William Hair reported that in November of 1894, the
lowest price in fifty years was obtained on the New Orleans cotton exchange at four and
seven-eighths cents per pound.109
The main role then shifted to grain and meat products of the midwestern and
western states, which accounted for more than a 70 percent increase in production of these
products from 1895 to 1899.110 Adverse farm prices occurred due to drought, which Hal
Williams described as a summer heat wave in 1894, which struck the farm belt west of the
Mississippi River and created conditions unmatched until the Dust Bowl of the 1930s.111
Williams stressed the withering of crops, such as corn, while still growing in the field, and
in the South, the price of cotton falling below five cents a pound, far below the break-even
point for production costs. These and other adverse effects on crop prices are discussed in
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the next chapter, along with low wages and high unemployment figures in major cities. All
of these contributing factors culminated into the five-year depression of the late nineteenth
century.
Chapter six has produced the argument that deflation occurred in the late nineteenth
century with catastrophic results. As described previously cotton, corn, and wheat prices
all declined both in domestic and international markets. Chicago became the grain market
of the world, but it also became the arbiter of lower commodity prices. Farm wages
throughout the ten Southern states from 1889 to 1899 remained in a narrow range of from
.62 cents per day to a higher rate of .95 cents, nearing the dollar per day level, with all
wage rates given without board.112 Considering that most agricultural work days were ten
hours, this placed the hourly rate at 6.2 cents at the low end and 9.5 cents at the high end,
which corresponded with the “Aldrich Report” in Clarence Long’s Wages and Earnings in
the United States, 1860−1890. Long asserted that the ten-hour work day in 1890 was
standard fare, making up sixty percent of the workforce.113 Long described manufacturing
industries giving higher per hour wages with carriage and wagon makers receiving .25
cents and metal and foundry workers receiving in the range of .22 cents per hour in 1890.
Unemployment, low wages, and deflationary prices were sad facts of life during the late
nineteenth century. Much of the social unrest brought about by these dire economic
conditions will be analyzed in the following chapter.
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Chapter 6
Unemployment, Low Wages, and Deflation during Late Nineteenth−Century America
This chapter has discussed the rapid five-year change from 1890 to 1895 for
America’s industrialized North. Statistics are taken from Robert Margo’s work together
with U.S. Commissioner of Labor Carroll D. Wright’s analysis in the Eleventh Annual
Report of 1895−1896. The South remained primarily agricultural during this time.
Historical research has allowed some conjecture as to whether the eastern capital markets
were acting in a quasi-imperialistic fashion in the economic treatment of the South and
West. Statistics in a previous chapter show that the South suffered as a result of the
National Banking Act of 1863, with a diminished number of national banks and the levy
on the remaining state banks with a 10 percent tax on issued state bank notes. This
imposed tax caused many state banks, while still retaining their state charters, to stop
issuing state bank notes, thus reducing the money stock in the South. This distress in the
banking system made the allocation of credit more difficult for the southern farmer. The
Deep South was also relegated primarily to one agricultural cash crop, mainly cotton for
four decades from 1865 to 1905. Thus, following the enactment of the National Banking
Act, although Southern agriculture endured, it did so with a heavily indebted labor force.
The “Middle-Border” West also suffered economically. For example, wheat
prices fell to sixty-two cents in 1892 and remained at or below fifty cents per bushel for
the next three years. The lower commodity prices of the South and West caused
economic constraints, unemployment, and wage cuts. Statistical research compiled the
high unemployment numbers within this chapter by using a comparison of Stanley

196

Lebergott’s numbers with those of Paul Douglas and Christina Romer. Labor unrest
resulted from high unemployment and wage cuts. The American Railway Union and
Pullman Workers’ strike on May 11, 1894, and its end results are described as well. In
addition, the plight of the jobless workers is demonstrated by the march of Coxey’s
Army, which started in the West, along with Kelly’s Army, and hopped trains eastward,
arriving at the Capitol steps on May 1, 1894, in Washington, D.C.
The structure of the labor force in late nineteenth-century America shifted from
agriculture to that of industry. Since U.S. Census data is only given on a decennial basis,
one has to interpolate between the two labor force numbers given for 1890 at 23,547,000
and 1900 at 29,073,000 to derive an 1895 workforce of around 26,310,000 participating
members from a U.S. population of 69,471,500.1 The South Central region remained 65
percent agricultural in its labor force in 1895, the South Atlantic region was 60 percent,
and the Midwest region stood at 40 percent.2 The expected results are that the Northeast
has a 14 percent agricultural labor force and the Middle Atlantic with a 15 percent
agricultural labor force. Due to the industrialization of these two regions during the late
nineteenth century, these numbers only slightly decreased in 1900.3 Similar agricultural
workforce numbers are supported in Historical Statistics of the United States with
5,152,149 “Farm Operators” given in a data table compiled by Alan L. Olmstead and
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Paul W. Rhode.4 Utilizing the 26,310,000 workforce number in 1895 and those members,
agricultural workers represented 19.58 percent of the entire American workforce, with
one in five U.S. workers having agricultural occupations during that mid-decennial year.
Carroll D. Wright, the U.S. Commissioner of Labor, presented in the Eleventh
Annual Report of 1895−1896 revised downward numbers, but findings still in agreement
with Robert Margo’s more recent 1890 assessment. Wright’s total workforce year 1890
numbers included the results of the Eleventh Census of 1890, which added workers both
male and female, 10 years of age and over, for a total U.S. workforce of 22,756,661
which is 790,000 less than Margo’s figures.5 Wright reported an agricultural workforce of
8,285,668, which represented 36.40 percent of the U.S. workforce during 1890 and in
comparison just five years later, represented a dramatic increase toward industrialization.
The South Central region as emphasized remained at 65 percent agricultural in its
employment in 1895. A major point argued throughout this dissertation is that economic
sectionalism was prevalent for a number of reasons. The cotton culture, which went from
pre-Civil War slavery to a sharecropper economy and continued to produce cotton “with
the use of the simplest agricultural implements,” still remained a system largely outside
of capitalism, only requiring the minimum necessity for capital by persons working the
soil with the major requirement of raising this staple crop being a large volume of labor.6
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The protective tariff sectional argument “facilitated the job of insuring that the South
should sell its labor cheap and buy dear the products of the labor of other countries and of
other sections of this country.”7 A new large-scale industry developed in the North
characterized by administered prices and monopolistic competition with few of these
newly developed technological advantages of industrial progress ever accruing to the
southern farmer.8 The South Central region was agriculturally tied to cotton production
for many decades after the Civil War, and the system of sharecropping continued well
into the 1890s and beyond which had the “basic factor of high ratio of labor to land and
capital.”9 The South’s per capita income based on the national average remained in the
lowest range, and according to 1880 census data the estimated value of property in the
United States was $47.64 billion, of which the South had only $5.72 billion.10 The per
capita wealth average for the South during this time was $376, where in other states it
was $1,086.11
The price of cotton exceeded ten cents per pound for many years in the
antebellum period, but it would only break 10.3 cents in 1879, and 10.7 cents per pound
in 1881, and remained just above or under 7 cents per pound continuously from 1893 to
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1899, with the catastrophic price of 4.6 cents per pound in 1894.12 The argument of
overproduction of cotton does not hold in this particular case of falling prices due to the
law of supply and demand. James L. Watkins’ work, King Cotton: A Historical and
Statistical Review, is regarded as a leading authority in southern cotton production from
1790 to 1908. Watkins described in historical statistics that Mississippi was one of the
first cotton states to suffer through the “Nineties Depression” with a 40 percent drop in
production from 1,250,000 bales in 1891−92 to a twelve-year low of 755,000 bales of
cotton produced in the production year 1892−93.13. Other cotton-producing states in the
Deep South had equally poor production numbers with lower yields per acre. The same
low-bale production numbers have held for Louisiana, with its lowest yield of the entire
1890s decade in the 1893−94 crop year and the lowest production year of 1892−93 for
Georgia.14 Warren and Pearson have provided data on the purchasing power of cotton per
pound and per acre over a fifty-year period from 1875 to 1925, and emphasized
graphically that two of the “most disastrous” years were 1893 and 1894.15
These deflationary cotton prices continued throughout the depression years of
1893 and 1894. The Commercial and Financial Chronicle reported that middling and
upland cotton was quoted a fraction above 8 cents per pound throughout the week from
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June 25 to June 30, 1893.16 Not only did cotton prices fall in the South and Southwest,
but also midwestern corn and wheat prices fell as well during the Depression Nineties.
Corn prices remained well below the cost of production at less than fifty cents per bushel
during most of the Depression Nineties.17 Wheat prices stayed above eighty-two cents per
bushel during 1890 and 1891, but fell to sixty-two cents in 1892, and remained at or
below fifty cents per bushel for the next three years as documented by the Department of
Agriculture. These were the lowest prices for fifty years until 1917, with only the effects
of the First World War raising wheat prices above two dollars per bushel for the first time
since 1867.18 Cattle, hogs, and sheep prices suffered during the late nineteenth century as
well. While livestock production numbers stayed at a similar level to that of 1888−89, the
monetary levels for cattle per head fell to their lowest level from 1890−96, even
surpassing the 1930s Great Depression.19 The consumer price index, based on the Bureau
of Labor Statistics, fell in the late 1890s to a level not seen since before the Civil War at
8.319 during 1860−61; this same figure existed for years 1897−99.20
Robert Gallman’s data supported a true economic catastrophe occurring during
1893−97. Gallman’s persuasive article on commodity output for years 1839−99,
tabulated the decennial rates of percentage change made during this sixty-year period.
The decennial end year 1894 signified a 15 percent rate of change for output per capita
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for the 69,580,000 U.S. population.21 This is the third lowest decline from 1839 to 1899,
and Gallman’s commodity output is taken as the summation of agriculture, mining,
manufacturing, and construction. Gallman emphasized the U.S. industrial change in the
year 1879, where agriculture accounted for 49 percent of the commodity output to
manufacturing’s 37 percent; however, just 15 years later these roles are reversed in 1894,
with agriculture accounting for only 32 percent to manufacturing’s 53 percent of the
commodity output.
Many agricultural workers, with room and board included in their wages, worked
for a miniscule amount of wages at best. Carroll D. Wright does not include agricultural
wages within the occupational grouping of “agricultural laborers” though female
restaurant cooks working sixty hours per week made between $3.50 and $5.00 per week
as recorded in the Eleventh Annual Report of the Commissioner of Labor, 1895−1896.22
A statistical average of “Monthly Wages of Farm Labor,” without board has been
compiled by Whitney Coombs using figures reported by the Department of Agriculture.
Coombs’s Table 6 has depicted the lowest monthly wages of two depression years in
1894 at $18.57 per month, and in 1895 at $18.74 per month.23 During the late nineteenth
century out of the total labor force of 1890, the vast majority were low-scale “blue collar”
workers which included agricultural laborers, factory workers, miners, railroad hands,
domestic servants, and construction workers — manufacturing workers constituted five
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million or one-fifth of the gainfully employed.24 Walter Nugent has emphasized
managers, professionals, merchants, bankers, and even clerical workers such as telegraph
operators were the minority workforce group at the higher end of wages earned during
the late nineteenth century.25
Economic Contraction Caused Unemployment and Wage Cuts
The economic contraction during 1893−97 brought a deluge of unemployment,
particularly during the depression trough year of 1894. Bradstreet’s estimated from a survey
that it performed in August 1893, at the beginning of the depression, the number of
unemployed was between 800,000 to 900,000 people.26 The railroads were major employers
and Stanley Lebergott has given good baseline figures of the labor force during 1890, before
the depression began.27 During 1890, Lebergott’s figures depicted a labor force of 23,320,000
people, and 10 million (9,460,000) people or 42 percent were employed in agriculture
nationwide, 4.39 million were in manufacturing, 2.96 million were employed in trade, and
750,000 were employed as railway workers representing 3.25% of the total workforce in
1890. Lebergott’s numbers on employment occupations represented 1890 alone, and just five
years later in 1895, the data indicated a progressive industrialization of American society.
During the scant growth years 1890−92, the railroads increased their workforce to
873,602 people by June 30, 1893, which is a number they did not exceed again until the
24
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year 1900.28 Table 6.1 portrayed figures of lessening railroad employment from 1893−97.
Table 6.1. Decreasing Railroad Employment (ICC Reports)

Year Ending

No. of RR Employees Track Mileage No. of Locomotives No. of Total Cars

June 30, 1893

873,602

176,380.32

37,788

1,273,946

June 30. 1894

780,608

178,698.72

35,492

1,278,078

June 30, 1895

785,034

180,657.47

35,699

1,270,561

June 30, 1896

826,630

181,677.78

35,950

1,297,649

June 30, 1897

823,476

183,284.25

35,986

1,297,480

Source: Interstate Commerce Commission Reports

The table, a composite of Interstate Commerce Commission employment figures,
has enumerated a steep decline of 92,994 people or a 10.6 percent drop in railway
employment during the year 1894.29 Clarence D. Long’s book, Wages and Earnings in the
United States, 1860−1890, has given a good account of earnings and the hours being
worked in the 1890s. Long has described that based on thirteen industries combined for all
manufacturing, the average workday was 10 hours in the 1890s.30 Long has taken the 1890
Department of Commerce and Labor estimate for 456 occupations in 48 industries
weighted by employment, and has given 10 hours as the average workday. Daily wages in
manufacturing during 1890 went from $1.75 in the newspaper industry, $1.82 for the

28

U.S. Interstate Commerce Commission, Eighth Report, 65; Ninth Report, 19; Tenth Report, 94, Eleventh
Report, 110; Twelfth Report, 121 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1893−1897), 19−121.

29

Ibid.

30

Clarence D. Long, Wages and Earnings in the United States, 1860−1890 (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1960), 37.

204

lumber industry, to $2.44 in the carriage and wagon industry toward the higher end of
scale.31 During the Depression of 1893−97, wages begin to decline. Albert Rees’ book,
Real Wages in Manufacturing, 1890−1914, updates where Long’s research leaves off in
1890. Rees has used National Bureau of Economic Research statistics that the average
hourly earnings in the iron and steel industry dropped dramatically from 17 cents per hour
in 1892−93, to 15.8 cents per hour in 1894.32 Rees’ data has emphasized that wages for iron
and steel workers would not rebound to 17 cents an hour until the year 1899, and hourly
wages remained in the 15-cent range for these workers all during the depression.
Charles Hoffmann, using Historical Statistics, has found that the average annual
earnings including farm labor fell consistently from 1892−97, from $435 per year in 1892 to
$411 in 1897.33 Hoffmann emphasized that Stanley Lebergott’s data on “percent time lost by
unemployment” when added into the “full-time equivalent earnings” substantially reduced the
real money earnings of nonfarm employees in the United States during the depression.34
Henry Ludwell Moore in Economic Cycles: Their Law and Cause, presented a table
which is indicative of both the rail and steel industry. Titled “The General Cyclical Movement
and Difference of the Production of Pig-Iron in the United States,” it reflects a production
drop during the trough years 1894 and 1896 of the depression, with a mild respite in 1895.35
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Table 6.2. Moore’s Pig-Iron Production during Depression Years

Production of Pig-Iron in
Thousands of Long tons.
Year
1892
1893
1894
1895
1896
1897
1898

9,157
7,125
6,638
9,446
8,623
9,653
11,774

The General Cyclical
Difference between the
Movement (Progressive
Actual Production and the
Averages of Three Years.) General Cyclical Movement.
8,187
7,647
7,743
8,242
9,241
10,014
11,683

+970
-522
-1085
+1204
-618
-364
+94

Source: Data adapted from Moore, Economic Cycles: Their Law and Cause, Table 2, 129.
New England and the Northeast were the hardest hit because of heavier
industrialization. In major cities, unemployment and unrest marked the Nineties Depression.
Carlos C. Closson, Jr., has given an estimate of the unemployed through a response from
public officials of all cities that had over twenty thousand inhabitants in 1893.36 Closson’s
unemployment results as tabulated from thirty-eight cities gave 491,000 people unemployed
in manufacturing and for Bradstreet’s, a leading financial newspaper of the time, as 581,950
unemployed people.37 Stanley Lebergott’s manufacturing number of 4.39 million industrial
employees in 1890 could be taken as a 13.25 percent unemployment rate with the usage of
Bradstreet’s unemployment number. Closson’s numbers, by the author’s own statement, did
not include those partially employed, and indeed, these numbers seem low by other labor
estimates such as that of Bradstreet’s. Lebergott’s Manpower in Economic Growth, gave
36
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much higher results based on a labor force estimate of 23,320,000 used and stated an 11.7
percent unemployment rate in 1893.38 It is difficult at best to find an exact unemployment rate
for the Depression Nineties, and for this reason an interpolation of several data sources may
be required.
Lebergott’s data would mean that 2.73 million people within the United States were
out of work in 1893.39 Christina Romer’s article strongly supported Stanley Lebergott’s work
Manpower in Economic Growth as the now-standard unemployed series for 1890−1940.40
Romer emphasized that Lebergott’s unemployment statistics were derived by interpolated
data between the 1890 and 1900 censuses. Romer’s comparison of new historical data with
Lebergott’s old unemployment percentages presented a somewhat less drastic unemployment
number but the figures remained elevated nevertheless. Table 6.3 resulted from a composite
of Lebergott’s unemployment figures, Romer’s new updated unemployment figures, and Paul
Douglas’ figures from Real Wages as a source from manufacturing and transportation. Taken
together, these three data sources presented a persuasive view of unemployment for 1893−97.
Douglas’ figures based on a percentage of the total working population are an aggregate of the
total unemployment in manufacturing, steam railroads, and electric railways with the
difference from the total labor supply in these fields provided by the Department of Labor.41
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Table 6.3. Old and New Historical Data on Unemployment Figures

Year
1890
1891
1892
1893
1894
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899

ULEB
3.97
5.42
3.04
11.68
18.41
13.70
14.45
14.54
12.35
6.54

PD Real Wages
5.09
5.61
3.71
9.59
16.73
11.85
15.27
14.54
13.88
7.71

UA
3.97
4.77
3.72
8.09
12.33
11.11
11.96
12.43
11.62
8.66

Source: A Composite of Lebergott figures – ULEB, UA – Romer, PD – Paul Douglas

The figures are derived from the difference between those unemployed and
dividing that figure by the total labor supply to provide a percentage for unemployment.42
All three sets of unemployment percentages derived from Lebergott, Romer, and Douglas
independently gave a composite of the unemployment rate during the Depression
Nineties. Using the data within Table 6.3, the increased unemployment from 1893−97 is
visualized with a minor respite in 1895, but with an increased rate through 1897.
Low Wages and Low Commodity Prices Endure during the Depression Nineties
The railroad building boom of the 1880s had encouraged immigration into the United
States as the demand for labor increased. The railroads and various northwestern states,
with their own internal agencies, also promoted immigration on unused railroad land. One
such migratory wave was that of Russian Jews, fleeing persecution, after the assassination
of Alexander II in 1881, which had set off anti-Semitic riots in southern and western
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Russia, thus restricting Jews to the Pale of Settlement, Poland, and Western Ukraine.43
Cashman described Austria-Hungary and Italy in the late 1880s with a large number of
contract-labor immigrants who came to the United States working at a fixed wage under a
padrone system of sponsorship. The U.S. Congress made contract labor legal in the
“Act to Encourage Immigration” in 1864, and then switched their standing on this act
in 1885 by passage of the Alien Contract Labor Act which prevented “industrialists from
importing cheap labor for the express purpose of depressing wages and breaking strikes.”44
The Panic of 1893 and ensuing depression had a delayed effect on immigration into
the United States. The drop in immigration did not occur until 1894, when the total number of
immigrant passengers arriving in New York went from 404,337 in the year 1893 to a
decreased number of 253,586 in 1894.45 Cashman reported that “not only was the new
tide of immigration depressing wages, but also the closing of the frontier and settlement of
available land in the West had sealed off the traditional escape route for discontented
easterners.”46 Immigration to the United States during the beginning of industrialization was
selective of persons in the labor-force ages and this share of labor-force growth was higher
than other age groups with the median age of the entire U.S. population at 22 years of age in
1890, along with a 15 percent foreign-born population.47
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David A. Wells, founder of the Bureau of Statistics, argued that two key factors
intensified the ongoing economic crisis of the late 1890s. Wells emphasized that
globalization of wheat exports as a reason that kept wheat commodity prices depressed. The
examples given by Wells were countries that had little or no wheat production in 1873,
such as India, exported 56.5 million bushels in 1892.48 Wheat production was a crop that
became highly specialized in production and exports for emerging market countries
prior to the first World War.49 Wheat was one of Argentina’s main exports and in 1894, the
Argentines exported 60 million bushels of wheat.50 Russia due to a wheat crop failure in 1891,
produced only 168.5 million bushels, but made up the deficit through U.S. imports. However,
Russia increased their wheat production to 300 million bushels in 1894.51 In addition to global
wheat prices falling, Wells also used the price of pig iron to argue downward prices when it
sold for $50 per ton in 1873, now sold for $11 per ton of the same grade. Wells recognized
the monetary shortage as being one of the causes of these low wholesale commodity prices.52
Wells’ higher productivity argument holds for the Midwest wheat market as well.
According to the Yearbook of the United States Department of Agriculture, 1894, the United
States took in nine million bushels more wheat for the nine months ending September 30,
1894, than during the same nine months in the year 1893. However, during that time, the
United States did not maintain its position as a wheat seller in England and there was a falling
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off in American wheat in English markets amounting to 13.5 million bushels.53 The increased
shipments of wheat into England came from Russia, the Argentine Republic, and Australia.54
The Department of Agriculture Yearbook, 1894, also depicted the fall-off of crop prices in a
six-year cycle, 1890−1896, and the lowest wholesale commodity price for No. 2 Red Winter
wheat occurred on August 1894 at 47 ¾ cents per bushel. It took almost five years for wheat
to obtain a price above $1.00 per bushel once the price dropped during the summer of 1893,
and it took ten years, and not until the 1900s, for the price of No. 2 Red Mixed corn to go
above 60 cents per bushel.55 As the record demonstrated within the Agricultural Yearbook,
wholesale commodity prices fell during the depression years 1893−97, and wheat rebounded
in price before corn prices. On August 21, 1897, Charles G. Dawes, a Chicago businessman
and later vice president under Calvin Coolidge, records in his diary: “Wheat sold at one dollar
per bushel today — the highest price since 1891.”56
The falling prices of commodities also had a direct effect on falling or stagnant wages.
One such economic historian supporting the theory that wages of unskilled workers will rise
or fall to a level that will allow a means of subsistence as the standard of life is Henry
Ludwell Moore.57 Moore, a Columbia University professor of political economics, has
followed Jacques Turgot’s doctrine “that the wages of unskilled laborers vary in the same
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direction as the cost of the means of subsistence;” both following along a linear correlation.58
Moore emphasized David Ricardo’s chapter “On Wages” that the natural price of labor will
depend on the price of the required necessities and food for the support of a laborer and his
family.59 Moore further explained that the correlation of food prices and cost of labor varied at
different times within the same country and varied in different countries, which is an event
that occurred during the Depression Nineties. Sectional economic downturns were more
severe in the industrialized areas for wage earners while some farmers maintained a
subsistence living for their low crop prices. Moore’s fathomable argument was that food
prices rise and fall in correlation to earned wages. Therefore, because of depressed food
commodities such as corn and wheat, deflation occurred and wages fell.
Isaac M. Rubinow supported Moore’s argument that wages fell along with a series of
food commodity items during the 1890s Depression. Rubinow’s “The Recent Trend of Real
Wages,” investigated the Federal Bureau of Labor Statistics data for years 1890 to 1903, and
studied the average consumption of 2,567 families for thirty specific food items and how they
related to the cost of living.60 Rubinow found three economic trends which “ran a remarkably
parallel and close course,” during the depression years, 1894−97. These trends were the hours
of labor performed, the relative wages per hours, along with relative retail prices of food.61
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The Bureau of Labor Statistics data which covered 11,156 families, an even larger number
than Rubinow’s research, found that food represented 43 percent of the household
expenditure.62 Robert C. Chapin’s study on the standard of living within New York City used
1907 data obtained five years later than the Bureau of Labor, and found virtually the same
percentage of income spent for food, with 17 families having annual incomes between $500
and $600, spending 44.4 percent of their money for food.63 Despite the years and varying
differences in income, some ten years earlier with Carroll D. Wright reporting that the average
yearly income for males over the age of 18 was on average $6.75 per week, or $351 per year
during 1895−96, the percentages spent for family food despite income difference is the same,
in that food prices, up or down, followed wages earned.64
Paul H. Douglas and Frances Lamberson, using fifteen food items confirmed
Rubinow’s results for the years 1890−99 that demonstrated a decline in the purchasing power
of hourly wages in correlation to food commodities.65 The selected fifteen food items based
upon their retail price were granulated sugar, wheat flour, creamery butter, fresh milk, rib
roast, pure lard, cornmeal, fresh eggs, hens, round steak, sirloin steak, smoked ham, pork
chops, smoked bacon, and Irish potatoes and, as a group, formed approximately 40 percent of
the workingman’s expenditures.66 The fifteen commodities used by Douglas and Lamberson
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were taken from a weighted system that the Bureau of Labor derived from its nationwide
household survey conducted in 1901, which reported their relative importance in the
Eighteenth Annual Report United States Bureau of Labor, 1903. It was found that these
fifteen items represented 64 percent of the total expenditures for food for 2,567 families
in 1901.67 The point to be made from the well-defined Douglas and Rubinow studies was that
during the late nineteenth century, the average American workingman’s family food budget
during this period went from one-half to nearly two-thirds of their monetary income.68
Edwin Frickey, fifteen years later, supported Paul Douglas’ research which used
combined census employment data on manufacturing, mining, transportation, and building
trades. Frickey also added to this pattern analysis with the annual unemployment index
numbers pertaining to five industrial states which were Massachusetts, New Jersey, Ohio,
New York, and Pennsylvania. Frickey’s Chart 21. “The Pattern of Employment Indexes” for
the years 1890 to 1914, confirmed that 1893 and 1894 were the worst part of the late Nineties
Depression with a minor respite in 1895, and then again with unemployment increasing and
the chart pattern for the employment index dropping off significantly.69 In addition to
unemployment data, Frickey, added the structure of commodity prices as well, just as Paul
Douglas and Isaac Robinow did at an earlier time. All three historians are in agreement that
commodity prices dropped significantly along with a rise in unemployment and a declining
manufacturing wage structure during the 1893−97 years.
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Alvin H. Hansen also supported Douglas and Lamberson’s theory of falling wages
correlating to falling commodity prices. Hansen used the money wages data from the various
Bureau of Labor Statistics bulletins then cross-referenced that information with the same
index constructed by Douglas and Lamberson for the years 1890 to 1912. Hanson reached
identical results with Chart 1. “Money Wages,” which delineated 1893, as being a period for
much lower daily and weekly wages.70 Hansen gave the year of 1893 as being one of severe
decline in the purchasing power of farm products, and stated that “when industry is depressed
the market for farm products is poor” and while farmers were unable to control supply in the
late 1890s, they found themselves selling their commodities on the market during low wage
rates and generally low wholesale prices.71
Charles Hoffmann, who also performed similar research and followed along the same
research patterns of Paul Douglas and Edwin Frickey with the additional unemployment
figures in Dun’s Review, argued:
It seems safe to say that a 17−19 percent unemployment ratio is a reasonable
one. The absolute estimate on this basis is between 2.452 million and 2.714
million for the winter of 1893−1894. About one in six gainfully occupied in
industry and commerce was out of work at the height of unemployment during
the depressed period 1893−1897.72
Hoffmann emphasized that the sharp rise in unemployment in the autumn of 1893 also
reached a sustained level throughout 1894 with only a negligible incomplete recovery in 1895.
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However, as employment continued to fall off again in 1896 to 1897, the economy remained
contracted with unemployment at 15 percent.73 Roger Grant, another writer who described
urban unemployment in 1893, characterized the depression in Cleveland, Ohio, with a
population of 275,000. The lack of work during the depression’s depth in the 1893−94 winter
would include two of every five adult males as unemployed.74 In Chicago, despite the
Columbian Exposition closing on October 31, 1893, over 100,000 unemployed people
remained in the area, while at the same time the estimated number of unemployed in New
York City was counted at almost 70,000 and 20,000 homeless and vagrant.75
High Unemployment Brought Labor Unrest
Social and political unrest came about due to the high employment numbers. Two
labor events demonstrating dissatisfaction occurred during the beginning of the Depression
Nineties in 1894. Each event in its own right has books written about it, but suffice it for this
chapter to give a brief description of each to demonstrate the desperation of low wages and
joblessness of the Depression Nineties. The Homestead Steel strike began and ended in the
summer of 1892, and though not specifically related to the Depression Nineties, it does
precede two important labor events that followed it. Andrew Carnegie owner of the
Homestead Steel Works just outside Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and Henry Clay Frick, the
board chairman, went up against a national trade union, the Amalgamated Association of Iron
and Steel Workers. This union had at first been a Carnegie ally in the campaign for the
monopolistic control of steel, but would not support Carnegie’s union contract proposal to
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match their union wages on a sliding scale to the minimum price per ton of steel billets
ranging from $25 to $23 per ton.76 The 780 skilled union workers were on average receiving
about 20.25 cents per hour while unskilled workers were paid 14 cents per hour, and this
proposed sliding scale tied to the price of steel would cause workers to lose between 18 to 26
percent of their pay.77 The Homestead Strike was won by Carnegie and Frick with the usage
of 300 Pinkerton detectives. The detectives hired at $5 per day as “watchmen,” crushed the
union and the Battle of Homestead ended with Pennsylvania Governor Robert Pattison
placing the Homestead Steel Works under martial law by calling up 8,000 state militia on July
12, 1892, with the plant reopening just two weeks later.78 Seven strikers were killed and three
Pinkerton detectives were fatally wounded, and according to Cashman, it would be another
forty years before an effective steel union was formed in the United States.
The first major event of social unrest during the Depression Nineties was the Pullman
strike which followed the Homestead Steel Strike two years later. The labor dispute arose
between George M. Pullman and the workers of the Pullman Palace Car Company where
Pullman had built a company town just south of Chicago in Pullman, Illinois, and housed the
workers and their families as railroad car manufacturers.79 Despite the depression, the
company paid out $2,880,000 in dividends in 1894, while at the same time cutting the
wages of its employees on five occasions, though maintaining high factory housing rents in
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Pullman.80 At the end of the financial year July 31, 1893, dividends amounted to $2.52
million and wages to $7.22 million, and just one year later on July 31, 1894, dividends had
risen to $2.88 million while wages had fallen to $4.47 million.81 Paul W. Glad argued events
reached a desperate breaking point when 4,000 workers joined the American Railway Union
(ARU), and workers called a strike on May 11, 1894, after Pullman ignored their grievances.
The economy had already headed downward by the summer of 1894, following the
Panic of 1893. American locomotive works including Baldwin had made over 2,000
locomotives annually; but in 1894, the number fell abruptly to 695, and “the number of
railway cars constructed declined from over 50,000 to some 17,000 in a single year.”82 The
earnings of the Michigan-Peninsular Car Company which had been the largest manufacturer
of rolling stock other than locomotives in the United States fell within twelve months from
$867,000 to $36,000.83 Despite the crippling effect the Pullman strike had on Chicago
railways that entered into the city, some related industries survived the strike. One related
industry was the Baldwin Works of Philadelphia which entered into an agreement with the
Westinghouse Company of Pittsburgh for the manufacture of electric locomotives where
Baldwin supplied the body and Westinghouse the electrical machinery for mobility which
became part of Chicago’s Elevated Railway in 1896.84
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Three-quarters of the railroads entering Chicago had been stopped in their tracks and
the labor dispute developed into a showdown battle between the American Railway Union,
with its leader Eugene V. Debs and the Railway Manager’s Association which was headed by
twenty-four railroad managers.85 The strike crippled an already failing economy brought on
by the depression and tied up twenty-two railroads totaling 50,000 miles in the boycott.86
During the week ending June 30, 1894, the ten trunk lines entering Chicago had carried
42,892 tons of freight eastbound, but a week later the same ten railroads carried 11,600 tons.87
Despite Eugene Debs’ attempt to call a general strike, he lacked the backing of the American
Federation of Labor, with Samuel Gompers as president of that major union. The strikers,
when detaching the Pullman cars as switchmen, would be accused of interfering with federal
mails which the Pullman cars carried; so President Cleveland, with Attorney General Richard
Olney’s orders, hired 3,400 special deputies paid by the Railway Manager’s Association to
keep the trains running.88 Chicago District Attorney Thomas E. Milchrist, together with
federal judges, devised an injunction against the American Railway Union strike as a violation
of “restraint of trade,” under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act — that it was a civil as well
as a criminal offense — with a federal grand jury returning twenty-three indictments against
Eugene Debs and seventy-five additional members of the union.89 The strike was broken by
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President Cleveland’s call-out of an Illinois Army regiment to protect mail trains. Before the
strike ended, twenty people were killed when crowds rioted on July 7−9, 1894, with over
14,000 state and federal troops in Chicago just one year later after the end of the Chicago
Columbian Exposition.90
Illinois Governor John Peter Altgeld was infuriated with Cleveland’s intervention and
became one of the strongest Populist supporters after the strike.91 The Pullman strike placed
Eugene Debs outside the mainstream Democratic Party which still supported free silver
coinage and Bryan was the Democratic nominee in the presidential election of 1896. Along
with being blamed for the depression of 1893−1897, Cleveland was done in politics after the
Chicago Pullman strike and did not run for a third term.
The second labor movement that came from the unemployment unrest during the
Depression Nineties was Coxey’s Army of the Commonweal. Jacob Sechler Coxey’s main
goal was to organize an industrial army that consisted mostly of unemployed men and a few
women to attract the U.S. government’s attention to their economic plight.92 Coxey’s goal
was to solve unemployment with a “petition in boots” by putting pressure on Congress to
finance a program of public works employment for the jobless until the economy picked up.93
The intent was for Coxey’s “Army of the Commonweal” to move eastward to Washington,
D.C., from various western cities and to protest on the Capitol steps on May 1, 1894.94
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Coxey’s idea was to have Congress authorize state and local governments to deposit up to
$500 million of non-interest bonds as a security for a similar amount of new fiat currency that
would be used to pay and gainfully employ workers on various public work projects.95 Coxey,
a Democrat who espoused the Greenback cause throughout the 1870s to the 1880s, later
joined the Populist call for more circulating currency in the 1890s.96
The “Good Roads Bill,” introduced into Congress in 1892, which combined Coxey’s
public works highway proposal of fixing ruts and mud holes was the beginning program.97
The bill went nowhere in Congress and out of desperation during the winter months of
the depression year, 1893-94, Carl Browne, a Nebraska Populist, proposed to march on
Washington, D.C.98 A large number within the unemployed faction of Coxey’s Army were
unemployed western miners due to the Sherman Silver Act repeal, and there were many
camps set up along the way to Washington.99 Charles Hoffmann gave a brief description of
the organization and stated that at no time did the combined armies, Lewis T. Fry’s Army that
left from the Los Angeles area, and that of Charles T. Kelly’s which was the largest that left
from San Francisco on April 14, 1894, ever reached more than 10,000 people.100
Coxey’s group left Massillon, Ohio, on March 25, 1894, but it was Kelly’s Army
that travelled a greater distance from San Francisco by train to Ogden, Utah, on the Union

95

Steeples and Whitten, Democracy in Desperation, 88. (Coxey’s ideas of 1894 are very similar to the
Civilian Conversation Corps of America from 1933 to 1942.)
96

Schwantes, Coxey’s Army, 7.

97

Ibid.

98

Ibid., 38.

99

Ibid.

100

Hoffmann, The Depression of the Nineties, 69.

221

Pacific, packed tightly into twenty-seven box cars and cattle cars.101 Kelly then traveled on
to Omaha, Nebraska, and next to Council Bluffs, Iowa, where Kelly’s Army picked up Jack
London, the future best-selling author.102 Because the army factions arrived at different
times, and most of the other armies outside of Kelly’s and Fry’s never arrived, Coxey and
Browne never had more than 1,000 recruits of their Coxey’s Army at any one time in
Washington, D.C.103 Carlos Schwantes has related that the Coxeyites were trapped on the
Aqueduct Bridge during the morning of the May first demonstration and District of
Columbia officials prevented them from entering the nation’s capitol; however,
sympathizers did offer relief and arrived at noon bearing food and water, turning the bridge
into a soup kitchen. Coxey’s Army through district commissioners secured the permission
of Assistant Secretary of the Navy William McAdoo to quarter the men on the grounds of
the Naval Observatory.104 Jacob Coxey was arrested for attempting to give his speech on the
Capitol steps and received a twenty-day jail sentence and a five-dollar fine.105 The Populist
movement and the free coinage of silver that the Coxeyites sought became part of William
Jennings Bryan’s platform when he ran against William McKinley, Republican from Ohio,
in the presidential election of 1896.
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Unemployment along with a depressed economy with falling wages and prices
would seem harsh by any standards during this five-year depression from 1893−97.
However, one relief that U.S. citizens had during this time was Civil War pensions.
In 1866, the number of pensioners was 126,722, with a payment amount of $15,450,550, or
on average $122 per year.106 By 1875, the number had increased to 234,821, and the annual
amount received was $29,270,407, but when Congress passed an Arrears of Pension Act, it
gave each pensioner “back-pay” from the time when his disability first incurred; which
increased the number to 345,125, along with an annual sum of $65,171,937 paid in 1885.107
According to Thurston Peck, pensions had actually been bestowed upon malingerers
who had shot off their own fingers to escape service in the Union Army, and others who had
been dishonorably discharged were on the pension list as well. President Cleveland vetoed
many of these private bills which were sent to Congress for special action but only after
careful scrutiny, with some being sent back through the regular channels of the Pension
Bureau. Peck argued that Cleveland vetoed only one in every seven.
The major importance of these “Civil War” pension acts was that they rapidly
depleted the U.S. Treasury during the 1890s. Congress, in addition to overriding many of
President Cleveland’s vetoes, passed one rather extravagant act called the Dependent
Pension Bill which increased the number of pensioners from 350,000 to nearly 555,000.
President Grover Cleveland had vetoed this bill in his first term in office in 1887, but
President Benjamin Harrison had allowed passage as part of the Billion-dollar Congress.108
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This was at the same time that appropriations were made for the Navy and the exposition in
Chicago to celebrate the four-hundredth anniversary of America’s discovery.109 The total
expenditures for these bills and other lavish public works passed by the Fifty-first Congress
amounted to $170,000,000; however, the total amount of money voted for various purposes
came to the sum of $1 billion in 1889-91 currency.110 This federal spending did not bode
well for Grover Cleveland’s second administration and the ensuing depression that began
within two months of his taking office on March 4, 1893, along with the Civil War pensions
at nearly $150,000,000 per year represented nearly half the entire annual budget of the
United States.111 A supplement to Historical Statistics data revealed in 1892 that total
expenditures for the federal government were $365,773,904 and of that amount $124.5
million were Civil War veterans’ and dependent pensions. The federal budget increased
slightly in 1893 to $383 million, but the veterans’ pensions had increased to $159 million.
The economy never recovered during Cleveland’s second term and the next chapter will
describe how related railroad failures provided another cause for the Depression Nineties.
The next chapter is defined by the changing economic relationship that occurred as a
result of the massive railroad building. Because of competition, railroads set rate patterns
that affected how large commercial centers such as Chicago, New York, Philadelphia, and
St. Louis became major competitive points in the industrial economy.112 The railroad rate
structure favored these large metropolitan competitive centers, and the tendency for
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railroads to reduce shipping costs along major east to west points, the New York to Chicago
corridor, had the effect of persuading industry to concentrate at these larger metropolitan
terminal points.113 However, the competitiveness of railroads running along parallel routes
and serving many of the same major cities such as Chicago, had the disastrous effect of
causing rate wars that led to a “survival of the fittest” attitude in the rail industry.
Despite the Interstate Commerce Commission’s best efforts in its 1893 Seventh
Annual Report to determine “what are just and reasonable rates for public carriage . . .” the
railroads consistently competed against each other in what is termed rate wars.114 Such
“ruinous competition,” as J. P. Morgan called it, especially along parallel routes, led to rate
cuts and rebates to the railroad customers. These events increased railroad losses and
deepened the depression.
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Chapter 7
Overcapitalization and Disinvestment of Railroad Securities
Baring Brothers’ extensive investment with the Argentine government during the
late nineteenth century is examined in this chapter as part of the reason for the global
depression that hampered the United States economy for five years. Most economic
history books have dismissed this event as minor, but the escalating effects of Argentine
bond defaults during a depressed global economy greatly challenged the Bank of England
in its attempts to prop up the Barings Brothers investment house. Both the panic effects
from the Baring Brothers’ failure that caused financial upheaval and how and why the
Argentine government and its banks were caught up in this financial maze are thoroughly
explained in this chapter. Baring Brothers sold its investment in American railroad
securities to make good on the Argentine bonds which it had underwritten for its own
British investors. This sell-off was one of many factors that brought on the Panic of 1893
in America and the depression years extending from 1893 to 1897.
The overcapitalization caused many railroad systems to go into bankruptcy and
reorganization, which gave the impetus for the beginning of the Panic of 1893 and the
following depression. Once railroad stock liquidations occurred in leveraged margin
accounts, an irreversible downward spiral of financial ruin followed. The interconnection
between London and New York correspondent trading houses which bought and sold
U.S. railroad securities was a major influence that this chapter examines as well.
The investment of Baring Brothers within the United States was neither a novel
nor unique way for this British investment house to engage its resources abroad.
Illustrating this point prior to 1890 would be the fact that Barings, under the leadership of
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Alexander Baring, along with the Amsterdam investment house of Hope and Company,
had acquired $11,250,000 of the 6 percent American bonds against the U.S. payment to
France for the Louisiana Purchase negotiated in 1803.1 Baring Brothers extended their
investments to U.S. railroad securities primarily to state railroad subsidy bonds, but like
many English capitalists were wary of American railroad bonds that had little backing
other than the credit of the road.2 However, the president of the Baltimore and Ohio in
1836 was able to sell Baring Brothers $3 million of Maryland bonds paying 6 percent
dividends with the railroad receiving the payment of the state subscription to the stock.3
Baring Brothers continued to invest in transcontinental railroad securities and
such London firms as George Peabody, successor to J. S. Morgan and Co., who were
promoting American railroad stocks and bonds. Cleona Lewis in a Brookings Institution
publication cited an estimate from the American Railroad Journal in 1857 that Britain’s
holdings in America’s railroads increased from $300 million dollars in 1852, to $500
million in 1857.4 This chapter will describe how a series of defaults in Argentine bonds in
1890 to 1891 caused Baring Brothers to liquidate a major portion of their U.S. holdings
to make good on a series of Argentine public works bonds that they had underwritten.
This disinvestment was one of several causes of the Depression Nineties in the United
States along with the additional burden of overcapitalization of the railroads themselves.
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The Argentine Crisis of 1891
Professor John H. Williams documented that between 1882 and 1890, Baring
Brothers and Company underwrote $101,093,800 in Argentine bonds payable in gold.5
According to Williams, the Argentine national government borrowed $114,000,000 by
foreign loans. Among “the largest loan was the 5 percent ‘Public Works Loan’ for
$42,000,000, of which $20,160,000 was issued in January 1886, and $21,622,000 was
issued the following year.”6 Another notable bond issue was the Buenos Aires Water
Supply Loan, which Barings had underwritten in 1888, and required that $21,000,000
of the amount had to be paid in gold in three annual installments.7 The Argentine
government forestalled default in 1890 by the sale of its Western Railway to an English
syndicate for $21,000,000 in gold; however, in 1891 a payment on the Barings foreign
debt issue ceased and created a near global panic.8 Williams emphasized that there were
few exceptions where any country surpassed that of Argentina in the history of foreign
borrowings in the late 1880s. The total Argentine foreign liability stated in gold pesos on
January 1, 1892, was $922,545,000. This amount is raised to $3,063,000,000 when stated
in paper money due to gold having a premium that currently averaged 232 percent.9
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As a comparison, Cleona Lewis used government reports to derive a figure of $2.7 billion
dollars of foreign obligations for the United States in 1893, and $3.39 billion dollars of
U.S. foreign obligations as late as 1899.10
The Argentine government attempted to remedy its internal financial crisis by
creating an internal paper currency that was inconvertible into gold. Concurrent to these
paper pesos, the government maintained a hard currency of gold pesos for exports and the
required payment of foreign debt amounts in gold. In order to obtain gold, the Argentine
government exchanged Guaranteed Bank bonds in exchange for gold pesos released by
twenty Argentine banks. Williams explained that 197 million pesos in bonds were
delivered to the banks, while the actual amount of gold pesos paid for the bonds was 76.5
million pesos, or 38.8 percent of the total value of the bonds. A long-term inflationary
effect resulted as more paper pesos went into circulation from 74.8 million in 1885, to
261.4 million in 1891, as the yearly average gold premium increased as well from a ratio
of 37 to 1 in 1885, to 287 to 1 in 1891.11
The major reason that the Argentine government borrowed so heavily from
Baring Brothers and investors abroad was to develop their infrastructure, primarily
railroads to run across the Pampas to the grain-producing interior. Argentina was
undergoing a land boom in the 1880s, and according to Alec G. Ford many Europeans
became dazzled with the prospect of a second America, to the degree that the investment
boom became self-expanding and self-generating.12 While the work of J. H. Williams on
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Argentina is mainly concerned with “foreign trade theory under conditions of fluctuating
exchanges,” Alec G. Ford has proposed that “the Baring crisis can be attributed to such
factors as maladministration, over borrowing, and falling world prices,” and how it
should be considered as a “development crisis,” versus an exchange rate crisis of rising
gold prices with internal currency parity.13 Both Williams and Ford have argued that the
Argentine bond default came about due to a fixed rate of interest with a service charge
fixed in gold. Ford has stated that the only exceptions were the land mortgage bonds or
cédulas in which the interest was payable in paper currency.
However, the most significant reason for the Argentine default crisis was the
falling prices of world commodities. The Atlantic world between Europe and South
America was linked to a global economy during the late nineteenth century and falling
prices on both wheat and wool, along with an increased price in gold, ultimately led to
Argentina’s default and the Baring Brothers Crisis. Ford argued that so long as funds
continued to flow in from abroad, all went well with the Argentine balance of payments.
However, this foreign currency inflow was required to meet overseas debt-service
charges and their own maintenance level of import consumption which could be provided
from current export proceeds and fresh borrowings abroad.14 Ford emphasized that this
crisis was precipitated by the curtailment of foreign funds before wheat, wool, and other
exports had expanded the Argentine economy at a sufficient level to service their debt
load and at the same time maintain a tolerable level of imports.
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Ernesto Tornquist, an industrialist and entrepreneur in Buenos Aires, analyzed
economic data and compiled results demonstrating the significant outflow of gold that
occurred during this default crisis.15 Tornquist himself was born to immigrant German
parents that came from Hamburg and as an industrialist did much to encourage European
immigration into the Argentine Republic during the late nineteenth century. Despite the
fact that Argentina exported over one million tons of wheat worldwide from 1893 to
1895, the depressed global wheat prices diminished Argentina’s ability to pay their
foreign debt service when required.16
Table 7.1 is compiled data taken from Ernesto Tornquist’s Extracto Estadistico de
la República Argentina and from J. H. Williams’s usage of the same publication. The
table has statistically represented the Argentine default on payments to Baring Brothers,
which sent Argentina’s economy into disarray. Immigration began to drop dramatically in
1890, and immigration virtually stopped and more people left Argentina than arrived in
1891, the year of the default. As table 7.1 has indicated, loans also came to a standstill in
1891, the year of Argentina’s default on Barings foreign debt issue. The circulation of
paper pesos would continue to be increased to the extent that they would be devalued
against gold currency with a fixed conversion rate of 44 cents gold for each paper dollar,
as Argentina devalued its paper currency permanently in 1899.17
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Table 7.1. Argentine Import and Export Amounts in Gold with Foreign Borrowings
Years

(18861892)

Imports
$ gold
(millions)

Exports
$ gold
(millions)

Net
Immigration
(real values)

Total
foreign
debt (gold
pesos)

Interest
charged
on loans

Paper
pesos in
circulation
(millions)

1886

95.41

69.84

+ 79,209

67.58

26.76

89.20

1887

117.35

84.42

+107,212

153.50

37.31

94.07

1888

128.41

100.11

+138,790

247.80

49.52

129.50

1889

164.57

90.15

+222,260

153.61

59.80

163.65

1890

142.4

100.82

+ 30,375

45.40

60.24

245.10

1891

67.21

103.22

- 29,835

8.24

31.58

261.41

1892

91.48

113.37

+ 29,441

n. a.

281.61

n. a.

Source: Ernesto Tornquist and John H. Williams (all monetary amounts in millions).

The Argentine government made some attempts to forestall default in years prior
to 1891, along with inducements to increase the European population into the country. In
1889, President Celman issued a decree “ordering the sale in Europe of 24,000 square
leagues of land at a minimum price of $2 gold per hectare.”18 Williams has emphasized
that the government was grasping at straws since the 216,000 square miles of land
offered for sale was at an immense distance from commercial markets, without
communication, and much of the land was in bad condition. Williams further added that
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the Buenos Aires Standard gave an opinion that it would cost more to carry out the
colonization scheme than money taken in, and ultimately the Argentine Congress did not
approve President Celman’s plan. Williams called this Argentine default the Panic of
1891 in England and it preceded the Panic of 1893 and the Depression Nineties in the
United States.
Baring Brothers had a prior history of raising bond-funded debt to loan money to
the Government of Buenos Aires as a provincial entity with its only foreign loan called
the Buenos Aires Provincial Loan of 1824.19 Desmond Platt argued that the Buenos Aires
Loan of 1824 was rather insignificant in that Barings had loaned funds in the 1820s to
Mexico in the amount of £7 million and Gran Columbia £6.75 million, while the Buenos
Aires Loan had a nominal value of only £1 million. But rather than being used for
internal improvements, the funds went to finance Buenos Aires’ war with Brazil which
broke out in 1825 over the status of Uruguay. The significance of the loan was that it was
contracted by a group of merchants in Buenos Aires: William and John Parish Robertson,
Felix Castro, Braulio Costa, Miguel Riglos, and Juan Pablo Valiente.20 Platt described
how these merchant capitalists of Buenos Aires acted as an agency of Baring Brothers in
July 1824, and were able to secure the £1 million ($5 million) at a 6 percent rate.
Merchant-erected guilds, consulados, in Buenos Aires had allowed a free trade to develop
within the Atlantic system.21
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D. C. Platt established that Argentina’s first loan through Baring Brothers had the
usual customary deductions of the day — the withholding amounts for the first years of
service and amortization — and since the bonds were sold at a discount, Argentina
received £570,000 passed to the government from a contracted amount of £700,000.
Funds were dispensed partly in gold, but mainly in drafts on Barings, with London at this
time the center of the world’s money market using the “bill on London” as the most
general currency of the world’s commerce.22 Juan Manuel de Rosas, the Argentine
dictator in power during a period of thirty-four years, could not service the Barings debt
at £60,000 annually, representing only one-tenth of Argentina’s revenues in the 1850s.23
According to D. C. Platt, Baring Brothers sent their agent Francis Falconnet as
early as 1842, to try to bring their 1824 Argentine loan up-to-date, but to no avail. It
would be thirty-three years later in January 1857 when George White, a senior clerk at
Barings, was sent to complete negotiations for the settlement of unpaid arrears on the
1824 loan.24 Platt’s accurate account of events stated that bondholders received about
one-third repayment of their original investment, and the issuance of deferred bonds
which carried only 1 percent interest from 1861−66 inclusive, 2 percent interest from
1866−70, and 3 percent interest thereafter, with most of the Argentine proceeds for
repayment deriving from the sales of public land. Platt argued that despite Argentina’s
embarrassment over its funded debt, most of the government revenue it received was
from import duties from England, France, Holland, Italy, and Portugal, and it would take
22
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the shock of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 before any enthusiasm would again be
generated for South American securities, because of the uncertainty in Europe. It would
be well into the 1880s before Barings would again back Argentine debt securities on a
large scale. This was the result of Argentina formally rejoining the gold standard in 1883,
even though struggling at this time toward maintaining convertibility of its currency.25
Some British historians such as Alec G. Ford have stated that the Argentine
government borrowed too much too soon. Ford emphasized that Argentina’s
infrastructure of railroads and agricultural grain exports could not outpace the interest
costs of its foreign borrowings. Baring Brothers was acting inside of its own realm when
it issued these Argentine Public Works bonds of 1886−87 with interest payable in gold.
The Bank of England did not guarantee these bonds, and Baring Brothers were relying
strictly on their capital reserves to make good on these bonds. The extensiveness of
Argentine investment is documented by Henry S. Ferns with the year 1889, as a year of
miracles “when Argentina absorbed between 40 and 50 percent of all British funds
invested outside the United Kingdom.”26 Ferns stressed that by 1890, “a smaller
percentage of British investments were in stocks of the Argentine Governments,” but “a
new field for the fixed-interest investor seeking security rather than high profits or capital
gains was opened up in the form of railway debentures.”27
In addition to railroad debentures, Ferns related that the British investing public
manifested a speculative spirit in a quest for Argentina’s land boom through cédulas or
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land-mortgage bonds, and that by 1890; these in fact outpaced the amount of money
invested in urban utilities that Baring Brothers was backing.28 Ferns also supported
Ford’s argument that “capital investment tended to run ahead of productive capacity in
the 1880’s” that led up to the Baring Crisis.29 President Julio Roca attempted to establish
a currency that would freely convert into gold or silver, but such attempts, according to
Ferns, only lasted eighteen months. In January 1885, President Roca issued a decree
suspending the convertibility of the paper pesos into specie for two years.30 President
Miguel Celman succeeded Roca in December 1886, as the Argentine President, and with
the approval of the Argentine Congress, “extended the suspension of specie payments for
another two years, till January 1, 1889.”31
According to Ferns, Argentina’s interior could not maintain a level of production
for export that would allow Argentina the capacity to pay interest on its bonds and at the
same time maintain specie payments in its currency. Ferns described the financial
maneuvering in 1885 of Dr. Carlos Pellegrini, Argentina’s former Minister of Finance,
who made attempts to secure funds from the Banque de Paris and was able to float a loan
of £8,400,000 at 5 percent. This loan gave the bankers a first mortgage on the customs
houses, and a promise from the Argentine government that it would not borrow any more
money without the bankers’ consent.32 Ferns emphasized that this loan initiated a
railroad-building boom under President Celman at a period when Argentina had “no
28
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fewer than twenty-one private railway companies and three state railway companies . . .
struggling for the business of approximately 4 million people.”33 Ferns stressed that the
British investment in Argentina was to a much larger degree than just railway bonds and
public works bonds. Outside those investments were the cédulas or land-mortgaged
bonds which became a financial half-world of their own in Europe. According to Ferns,
Arthur Herbert, the British Commercial Secretary in Buenos Aires, estimated that
£28,625,745 in total value sterling for all the cédulas issued by the Argentine banks was
pledged as collateral throughout London and Europe. These bonds purchased new farm
equipment as well as building imitative French châteaux, English country mansions upon
the pampas, and encouraged Argentine land barons to educate their children abroad.34
Ferns estimated that landowners borrowed on land to buy more land and then used that
land as collateral for further purchases with best estimates that land values appreciated
nearly 1,000 percent between 1883 and 1887 in Buenos Aires Province.35 Ferns further
accentuated that land companies, such as the Central Argentine Land Company, sprang
up instantly as immigration to Argentina increased during the boom years, while paying
dividends above 20 percent per year during the 1880s.
Argentina’s default came about for several reasons previously explained, but
ultimately their monetary policy rested upon their banking system maintaining exports in
grains, Argentine beef, and wool to offset the outflow of gold. Economic historians such
as Walt W. Rostow have argued that this period from 1873 to about 1896 resulted in an
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“increase in ‘commodities’ with the amount of ‘money’ stagnant.”36 Rostow argued the
premise from a money-theorist point of view that the gold stock failed “to increase at its
previous rate and to the large new gold demands that accompanied the widespread
movement to a single standard.”37 Rostow further concluded that the monetary factor
of a short gold supply occurred in conjunction with cheapened costs and foreign
competition.38 Wool was an example where foreign competition forced prices downward.
The English, Spanish, New Zealanders, and Australians were raising more of their
own wool in the form of Merino sheep, and wool ranked first in exports for Argentina.39
During 1890−91, the price of gold rose most sharply as Williams ascertained, and at this
occurrence, a trade imbalance took place when Argentine wool exports decreased as well.
In 1892, this imbalance of Argentine wool trade was reversed and the demand for
Argentine wool increased and was reflected in the gold price for falling wool prices.
There was an inverse relation for the tonnage amount of Argentine wool exported and the
accompanying price in gold. Argentine wool per ton fell in price in 1889 from $400 in
gold, to $287 a ton in 1892, and finally down to only $200 gold during 1893.40 Export
tariffs were not a factor. The United States at this time had maintained raw wool on the
free list both in the McKinley Tariff Act of 1890 and its successor bill, the Wilson-
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Gorman Act of 1894.41 To reverse the decline of wool exports, Argentina gradually
changed its breed of sheep-raising from the Merino breed, which produced a fine short
fiber suited for woolens, to that of the Lincoln breed which generated a long-fiber wool
best suited for worsted wool cloth.42
Alec G. Ford upheld Rostow’s argument on the short gold supply causing the
Argentine default crisis. Ford calculated that of the funds borrowed abroad between 1885
and 1890 (708 million gold pesos), public loans comprised 35 percent, railways
32 percent, land mortgage bonds (cédulas) 24 percent, each of which might be expected
to affect differently goods imported, as well as the long-run growth of production and
exports.43 Ford emphasized that by 1890, the foreign borrowing “had increased the
annual foreign debt-service charges to 60 million gold pesos (or 60 percent of export
proceeds in 1890 — a very heavy charge), of which the public sector’s share amounted to
28 million gold pesos, payable in gold or sterling at a fixed rate.”44 In addition to its
financial crisis, Argentina suffered rioting in downtown Buenos Aires from July 26−30,
1890, with insurgents attempting to overthrow President Juárez Celman’s administration.
Great Britain had two warships stationed nearby to protect British interests, the HMS
Beagle and the HMS Bramble.45 Ferns explained that this coup d’état was quick and
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allowed some financial maneuvering by replacing Celman with Dr. Carlos Pellegrini as
the provisional president on August 6, 1890.
Argentina had begun to suffer a greater internal financial crisis that began in April
1891, with a run on the Bank of the Province of Buenos Aires, which along with the
Banco Nacional were declared in liquidation on April 7, 1891.46 Williams maintained
that over nineteen thousand customers held bills convertible into gold pesos in the
amount of $50,000,000 gold, all of which went into default. According to Williams,
Baring Brothers and Company did in fact temporarily close its doors and, during the
moratorium negotiations with the Argentine government, the Bank of England appointed
a committee headed by Baron Rothschild to act as receivers for Baring Brothers. The
Bank of England had to ultimately prop up the Argentine government by first giving a
moratorium on existing loans for three years from January 1, 1891 to January 1, 1894,
and the committee granted Argentina a “6 percent funding loan of £15,000,000, to be
secured on the customs, whose coupons were to be receivable as gold in payment of
customs duties.”47
The Argentine default and the Baring Crisis caused global disinvestment to occur,
and the financial affairs of Argentina were such that the investing public refused to buy
Argentine securities. Baring Brothers and Company would with the aid of the Bank of
England prove solvent, but the liabilities of Barings were revealed to be £28,000,000.48
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The Bank of England, under the guidance of William Lidderdale as governor of the bank,
approached the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Viscount Goschen, and suggested a
government guarantee of Barings’ liabilities.49 The guarantee was refused by the
Chancellor, but he promised a “Treasury Letter” if necessary. However, Lidderdale, to
avert a panic, approached the leading bankers and was able to obtain more than
£18,000,000 within a week.50 Victor Morgan has described that the Bank of England as
the central bank simply acted as a liquidator for Barings and did not subscribe to the fund
itself, but at the same time it did protect the gold reserves and maintained a stable bank
rate. Action taken by the Bank of England involved selling £1,500,000 of Treasury bonds
to Russia for gold, and a loan of £3,000,000 in gold “was arranged with the Bank of
France through the agency of Rothschilds.”51 Philip Ziegler emphasized the global
solidarity of the financial world with the rationale that if Barings had been allowed to
collapse, then most of the great London financial houses would have fallen with them.
On November 25, 1891, Baring Brothers reorganized and re-capitalized with £1 million,
transferred their business with limited liability to be called Baring Brothers and
Company, Limited.52
Disinvestment of American Rail Securities by European Investors
The Baring Crisis had inevitable repercussions on foreign investments and “the
transaction of borrowing gold from Russia and France was felt as something of an
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humiliation.”53 British investors began to divest hundreds of millions of dollars in
American railway bonds and stock that were pitched upon the New York market and sold
at enormous sacrifices.54 In 1869, David A. Wells, the Special Commissioner of the
Revenue, estimated the foreign holdings of railway bonds at $130,000,000 and of railway
shares at $113,000,000, with the greatest share belonging to British investors.55 In 1876,
some seven years later, the New York Journal of Commerce had estimated European
holdings of U.S. railway stock and bonds had increased to $375,000,000.56 John L.
Ringwalt, editor of the Railway World, has confirmed from the official abstract of the
1850 census dated December 1852, that the cost of American railways completed in the
United States was $372,770,000.57 The total amount of European holdings in American
rail common stock, preferred stock, first mortgage railroad bonds, and equipment trust
certificates very often exceeded the original cost of the completed railroad. Ringwalt
noted that American railroads built prior to 1852 were completed at a cost of $34,307 per
mile. However, this cost rapidly rose with the building of trunk-line railroads and even
longer transcontinental lines. Stuart Daggett has written that due to excessive cost
overruns by Thomas C. Durant, Crédit Mobilier’s construction company manager, the
Union Pacific costs were reported to be $102,951 per mile in 1870.58
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After the Baring Crisis, British overseas investment manifested itself in South
African and West Australian gold-mining shares abetted with the improved cyanide
extraction process for processing gold.59 Even though it is difficult to ascertain the exact
amount of disinvestment of railroad securities by British investors in the 1890s, it is
evident that to cover their losses in South America some of the more solid investments
abroad had to be sold. Albert C. Stevens stated in January 1894, “Such withdrawals and
withholdings of foreign capital have been variously estimated at not less than
$500,000,000 between the passage of the Sherman silver law in 1890, and the beginning
of the heavy export movement of gold in 1893.” 60 Philip L. Cottrell analyzed that “the
Baring crisis resulted in a general fall in all security prices on the London market,” and
that investors sold American railroad securities in order to lessen their financial losses in
South American holdings.61 Reports that Barings’ liquidity problems caused New York
dealers to execute their daily sell orders from London have been verified by Charles J.
Bullock, John H. Williams, and Rufus S. Tucker. These historians, not restricting
disinvestment just to railroad securities, used data from the Commercial and Financial
Chronicle and have placed an average net annual withdrawal of $60 million, from 1890
to the end of 1896, or a total of almost $300 million.62 In addition, gold exports from
New York to London were heavy and “the New York banks were holding less than the
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legal 25 per cent reserve limit in eleven out of the twenty weeks from mid-August to the
end of 1891.”63 Financial disaster was averted in 1892, due only to a phenomenal U.S.
wheat harvest and America’s exports, which delayed America’s crisis until 1893.64
A compelling argument can be made that Britain’s disinvestment in railroad
securities led to a greater number of railroad reorganizations as a form of economic
efficiency through economy of scale. Stuart Daggett has stated in the conclusion to a
monograph that impending insolvency, though the usual cause for reorganization, is not
the only one, and that “management may desire to get rid of hampering restrictions, or
they may desire to manipulate the conditions of control.”65
Overcapitalization of Railroads
It was during this downturn in the economic cycle or the Depression Nineties
particularly in 1894−99, that a greater number of reorganizations occurred where short
line railroads were absorbed into larger railroad systems. Holding companies increased
during the late 1890s as a device for changing the control of a railroad or to secure a
combination of several smaller railroads under one single management. Daggett stressed
that a syndicate of Eastern capitalists bought control of the Chicago, St. Louis, and
Kansas City railroad and reorganized the property by forming a holding company by
exchanging new shares for the old in 1899. Alfred D. Chandler has given the explicit
mechanism by which these holding companies were formed in the form of a business
trust. According to Chandler, railroad companies “turned their stock over to a board of
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trustees, receiving in return trust certificates of equivalent value.”66 The New Jersey
legislature expedited the railroad owners’ wishes during its 1888−89 session, when it
modified New Jersey’s incorporation law “to permit manufacturing companies to
purchase and to hold stock in other enterprises within and without the state, and to pay
for property owned outside the state with stock issued for that purpose.”67
Leland H. Jenks emphasized the same theory of overcapitalization and the
railroads’ innovation to satisfy a demand for money capital. Jenks sustained the
argument that disinvestment occurred during the1890s financial crisis, and rail expansion
changed from a 10 percent annum increase from 1840 to 1890, to that of an irregular
downward curve since 1890.68 Jenks argued that while foreign capital amounted to only
one-fifth of the nominal value of American railroads in 1873, during 1890 preceding the
Baring crisis this proportion increased to one-third. The historical significance of the
foreign capital infusion was often disregarded or taken as a minor consequence, when
compared to the monetary equivalents of land grants given by the federal government or
states. Jenks further stated that land for railroad construction was generally new land, or
frontier land, and that “it cost virtually nothing to the railway companies,” and that “land
devoted to railroad purposes more than paid for itself by the increment in productivity of
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adjacent land.”69 Frequently landowners were given a subscription in stock of the railroad
to be built, as in the case of the Ohio and Indiana railroad, or the Pittsburgh, Fort Wayne,
and Chicago railroad in exchange for a right-of-way. In some cases, landholders on the
route donated the right-of-way and sometimes timber as well for building the
superstructure, as in the example of the Georgia railroad route.70 When donated land was
not forthcoming, government action was necessary and the power of eminent domain was
used to secure a right-of-way that forced the sale of private property to the railroads.71
Railroads had to be creative in their financing since gold currency became a
scarce monetary source. Hard currency even for railroad building was difficult to obtain.
Irving Fisher added more support to the monetary theory of a short money supply that
Rostow has maintained as well. In describing the course of price movements during the
nineteenth century, Fisher emphasized “between 1873 and 1896 prices fell. This fall was
presumably due to the slackening in the production of gold; to the adoption of the gold
standard by nations previously on a silver basis, and the consequent withdrawal of gold
by these new users from the old; …”72
The American railroads during the 1880s had gone through a building boom and
an overcapitalization phase. Carl Hovey’s biography of J. Pierpont Morgan has detailed
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the rate wars that preceded the Panic of 1893, and its ensuing five-year depression.
Hovey placed much of the blame for overbuilding upon the speculators who constructed
useless parallel lines, where they made fortunes in railroad construction, and then left,
thus leaving the railroad’s problems to others.73 The beneficial result of this construction
boom was that laborers were paid wages and these wages were spent for the purchase of
goods and produce from America’s farms and mills.74 As railroad track mileage increased
during the boom years 1879 to 1883, and 1886 to 1892, as identified by Albert Fishlow,
the rail system became the “life-blood of the American common market,” and the linkage
“brought prosperity to the more remote outposts of a large, continental economy.”75
Railroad stocks were not actively traded by regional banks, but rather by
partnerships that specialized in handling railroad securities. Many of these partnerships
had correspondents in Europe where they brokered the securities in London or Paris, and
Chandler emphasized that “railroads were the first private enterprises in the United States
to acquire large amounts of capital from outside their own regions.”76 The partnerships
involved in railroad securities sold them for a straight fee or a commission, and acted as
the transfer agent through their New York offices. In doing so, they perfected all the
modern techniques of securities marketing and speculation.77 Chandler reported that
railroad builders generally underestimated the cost of rail construction and, therefore
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second and third mortgage bonds quite often followed first mortgage bonds. Clearly new
forms of capitalization took place with these investment measures and railroad
overcapitalization became the rule in the nineteenth century rather than the exception.
Such extensive capitalization in trunk lines and transcontinental rails brought forth an
entirely new managerial staff to oversee rail construction and maintenance. The telegraph
office and telegraph lines that ran along the rail systems changed communication of the
late nineteenth century forever. By the end of 1866, Western Union resulted from the
merger of three different companies and enabled communication between rail stations.
Each had a station manager, which facilitated the timeliness of rail schedules with an
entire new level of management. Chandler supplied in-depth analysis of how the newly
merged Western Union divided the nation into four regional divisions — the Eastern, the
Southern, Central, and Pacific — each headed by a general superintendent.78 Chandler
emphasized this new business structure of “the great railway systems were by the 1890s
the largest business enterprises not only in the United States but also in the world.”79
Reorganization as a Result of Overcapitalization
Many railroads went into receivership before reorganization, and Alexander D.
Noyes has stated that as late as 1895, during the five-year period of the Depression
Nineties, receivers were operating 169 railways, which represented a capitalization of
approximately $2.4 billion.80 Many overseas investors that stayed with America’s
railroads after the Baring Crisis stood to lose interest on their dividends during the Panic
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of 1893 and its succeeding years. Lewis enumerated that during this period one dollar of
four in railroad securities was in receivership, and with the general rate of interest return
at 7 to 8 percent, an annual loss of interest paid to foreign stockholders accumulated in
the amount of $11 million.81 The enticement to foreign investors had been a rate of return
averaging around 6.5 to 7.3 percent on American railroad bonds, which compared more
favorably than yields of only 4.25 percent on similar investments in Great Britain.82
During the reorganizational phase, unlike today’s non-assessable stock shares,
holders of stock in bankrupt American railroads were often assessed a pro rata amount to
provide needed cash for the reorganized railroad company during the 1890s.83 One noted
example was that of the 1898 reorganization of the Baltimore and Ohio (B&O). Edward
G. Campbell described the process where a number of railroads could have avoided
receivership, but were pushed into reorganization due to an extreme shortage of capital
liquidity. Campbell explained that in the last four months of its receivership with the
fiscal year ending June 30, 1896, the Baltimore and Ohio was obligated to pay its
preferred stock dividends and payments to retire its 6 percent bonds. The B&O with a
deficit of $1,700,000 brought forward from 1895 would otherwise have had a small
surplus of $127,505 were it not for their dividend and bond interest payments.84 During
the reorganization of the B&O railroad, its common stockholders had to pay a 20 percent
assessment for which they would receive an equivalent amount in new preferred stock,
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which would later be exchanged for new common stock at par.85 This reorganization was
led by a syndicate of investment bankers such as Kuhn, Loeb & Company of New York
and Speyer Brothers of London and New York with the issuance of $70,000,000 of
3½ percent prior lien bonds, $63,000,000 of 4 percent first mortgage bonds, $40,000,000
of preferred stock, and $35,000,000 of common stock.86 This $208 million plan for
reorganization confirmed the capital intensity that nineteenth-century railroads required
from investors on both sides of the Atlantic. Campbell argued that often railroad
reorganizations could be comparatively generous to the original stockholders, and at a
very slight cost in their assessments. The Baltimore and Ohio railroad did in fact pay
Baring Brothers on its 6 percent bonds that were retired as part of its reorganization.
The Union Pacific provided another example of overcapitalization during the
years 1884−90, when 3,132 miles were built or newly acquired branch lines were added
to the transcontinental route.87 The years 1886−89 were boom years of rail construction
and the Union Pacific grew from a system of 5,825.6 miles in 1886, to one of 6,996 miles
in 1889, adding an additional 1,100 miles of trackage.88 Prior to the Union Pacific going
into foreclosure in November 1897, the railroad had a government debt in the amount of
$56,000,000 from an outstanding issuance of $122,000,000 in well-secured bonds.89 The
first installment of the government debt was due on November 1, 1895, and with interest
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accruing, the total debt, principal, and interest combined amounted to over $70,000,000.90
The Union Pacific was in reorganization by 1893, with a committee composed of six
major principals and previous board members.91 The U.S. government was in a quandary
as to what to do to protect its interest within the Union Pacific. A suggestion was made
that the government should exercise its right to assume control of the road and take over
its operation. However, if this were done it would have to pay off those claims that
preceded its own, and it would only get that part of the railroad built with government
subsidies for which the lien applied.92 A new reorganization committee was formed in
October 1895, with Louis Fitzgerald as the chairman, and the only member remaining
from the original committee. Other members represented different railroad interests such
as Chauncey Depew, president of the New York Central, and Marvin Hughitt, president
of the Chicago and Northwestern93
Investment bankers such as Kuhn, Loeb & Company represented the foreign
investors in the reorganization plan, and the plan was submitted to security holders in a
thirty-five-page pamphlet on October 15, 1895, with a favorable reception by the
Commercial and Financial Chronicle.94 Campbell related that only the original Union
Pacific and its Kansas branches were reorganized at this time with old bondholders
receiving 80 percent of their face amount in new bonds, but also 50 percent in new
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preferred stock, and an additional preferred stock for accrued interest on the old
liquidated bonds. This new bond issue, a result of reorganization totaling $100 million
and the preferred stock, had a par value of $75 million, which was used to settle the debt
to the U.S. government in exchange for its securities of the old bonds.95 Campbell
emphasized that the government’s repayment at 75 percent of the total owed was an
inducement for early acceptance in the reorganization plan since prior lien bondholders
did not receive a cash-out offer. Campbell further described that Congress actually balked
at this offer, and it was only through the action of President Grover Cleveland who
instructed U.S. Attorney General Judson Harmon to negotiate an agreement with the
reorganization committee. Harmon’s action allowed the U.S. government to join in the
foreclosure of the Union Pacific in 1897. The reorganization committee guaranteed that
at least $50 million would be the bid-in price at foreclosure, and the U.S. government was
to keep a major portion of the proceeds in the amount of $17 million in the sinking fund,
which was used to pay the prior bond interest to the bondholders.96 The reorganization
committee retired all existing mortgage indebtedness by the issuance of $100 million in
first-mortgage railway land grant, 50-year, 4-percent gold bonds.97
Collectively, the U.S. government received $33,539,512 — the principal lent to
the Union Pacific — and $36,944,300 in interest, which according to Attorney General
Judson Harmon was equivalent to a rate of 3.45 percent calculated to June 1, 1897.
However, the principle payback amount of $50 million was increased before the final
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agreement was executed between the government and the reorganization committee.98
Campbell reported that President McKinley used his Attorney General to forestall this
agreement and in the end the U.S. government received $74,592,046, which represented
the principle in full and interest up to October 1, 1897, with the new Union Pacific
railroad reorganization taking effect on January 1, 1898.
Many of these reorganization plans and agreements were published on both sides
of the Atlantic. In America, they were generally published by editor William B. Dana in
the Commercial and Financial Chronicle at New York, or in the London Economist.
Douglas Steeples and David O. Whitten have used Dana’s publication and its statistics in
their own major work, Democracy In Desperation: The Depression of 1893. Steeples,
supporting Chandler’s argument, reiterated “by 1890 the growth of railroads and the
advance of manufacturing had struck a new balance. Capital invested in railroads and
manufacturing for the first time surpassed that in agriculture.”99 Steeples emphasized that
the Commercial and Financial Chronicle introduced in 1865, was the successor of
Hunt’s Merchants’ Magazine that William B. Dana had purchased on February 1, 1865.
The Commercial and Financial Chronicle was the first business weekly published in the
United States. Dana also had literary experience as a staff member of Yale University’s
newspaper, The Yale Tomahawk (1847−1851).100 After Yale, Dana became a successful
lawyer and partnered with Curtis White at 91 Genesee Street, in Utica, New York under
the firm name of White & Dana, and was later joined by wife Katherine’s younger
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brother John Gelston Floyd.101 It was William B. Dana and John G. Floyd who would
form a partnership and buy Hunt’s Merchants’ Magazine after Dana’s mustering out of
the Union army as a captain in the 145th New York Volunteers.102
Steeples’ biography on Dana’s Commercial and Financial Chronicle
demonstrated how and why the weekly business journal quickly became a source of
information for railroad reorganizations and receiverships in the late nineteenth century.
Other than the London Economist, which was a weekly report from Europe, no other
resource provided the detailed information of this business weekly. Steeples related that
Dana’s Chronicle published such a comprehensive record of trading in railroad securities,
that it later generated a reference book titled Prices of Rail Road Stocks for 32 Years,
1854−1886, published in 1886. William Buck Dana (1829−1910) died on October 10,
1910, from complications of a broken femur that resulted from an accidental fall, and
passed away quietly in his suite at the Belmont Hotel in New York City.103
Other journals which reported on railroad reorganizations along with the
Commercial and Financial Chronicle are: The Economist, published in London; the
Railroad Gazette founded in Chicago in 1856, and its successor Railway Age; and the
New York Journal of Commerce. Two more encyclopedic types of railroad references
are: William Z. Ripley’s Railroads: Rates and Regulations published in New York by
Longmans, Green, and Company in 1920, and Henry W. Poor and Henry Varnum’s
Poor’s Manual of the Railroads of the United States published in New York extensively
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from 1895 to 1917. Poor’s Transportation Manual is still published but in a much more
abbreviated format than the years given previously.
Investment Houses and Their Role in Railroad Financing
This chapter began with Baring Brothers as an example of one of England’s large
investment houses, so it would seem appropriate to conclude the chapter with a
description of the role that these investment houses played and how they differed from
regional banks. During the 1880s and 1890s, a number of firms that were domestically
oriented rose to prominence as investment bankers, such as Kidder Peabody and
Company, and members of the “Standard Oil Crowd,” with the important component of
Kuhn, Loeb & Company. The firm of J. P. Morgan and Company held the summit of
American finance and served as a standard for all other investment bankers.104 J. Pierpont
Morgan learned investment banking largely from his father, Julius Spencer Morgan, who
also had a distinguished investment house named J. S. Morgan and Company, and did
correspondent work with George Peabody, the great London banker.105 J. Pierpont
Morgan opened up his own Wall Street firm in 1862, and in combination with the Drexel
family of Philadelphia, formed Drexel, Morgan, and Company in 1871, a firm that
became widely known for its railroad reorganizations of the Baltimore and Ohio, the
Chesapeake and Ohio, and the Erie.106
Hugh Rockoff argued that a combination of falling prices, competitive rate wars,
and overbuilding had left many railroads bankrupt or on the verge of bankruptcy.
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J. P. Morgan acted as a facilitator for many of the bondholders and stockholders as a way
to receive something of value in exchange for their acceptance of a reorganization plan.
Edward G. Campbell and Stuart Daggett explained in their works on railroad
reorganization that these first-lien bondholders were generally given preferred stock with
a dividend which had a lower interest rate than their prior lien bonds paid. In addition,
these bondholders were also given a certain number of new common stock shares.
J. P. Morgan and Company, as part of their refinancing and reorganization of railroads in
receivership, generally placed the most trusted and competent financial people on the
board of directors for assurance that the bondholder’s interest would be protected from
unscrupulous managers while undergoing reorganization.107 Rockoff maintained during
the Depression Nineties that Morgan created a network of New York banks, insurance
companies, and trust companies as resources to raise capital on a larger scale than had
been done before. Morgan’s main competition was the “Standard Oil Crowd,” which
combined the financial resources of John D. Rockefeller’s Standard Oil Company, the
National City Bank under James Stillman, and the investment banking house of Kuhn,
Loeb & Company under Jacob Schiff.108 Rockoff gave the rationale for this rising form
of financial capitalism led by investment houses, as a result of the current banking
regulations, which barred banks from owning equities and branching across state lines.
Lance E. Davis noted that the British had large commercial banks during the
1890s, with numerous branches nationwide and worldwide such as Lloyds, Barclays, or
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the Westminster Bank for all their financial needs.109 The “Davis Thesis” has stated that
American industrial firms had no local capital sources, and “to raise capital, the
American firm had to create an intangible asset that could be traded elsewhere, in a major
center, for capital funds.”110 According to Davis, the American firm had to create
intangible assets such as first mortgage bonds, second mortgage bonds, and preferred
stock as instruments with which to finance activities such as mergers and reorganizations.
The specialized agencies for such capital-raising industrial reorganizations were the
investment banking firms located in the financial centers of New York City, Boston, and
Philadelphia who did business under names such as J. P. Morgan, Brown Brothers,
Harriman, Kidder-Peabody, and Kuhn, Loeb.111
Rockoff noted that historians continue to debate the net impact of the investment
banking houses with some seeing them as sources of a monopoly that undermined
competition and exploited the consumer. J. P. Morgan saw “ruinous competition” as a
destroyer of railroads and brought financial resources to bear that would create more of
an economy of scale and a more efficient industry.112 Despite creative financing, mergers,
and reorganization, many railroads could not survive the economic downturn of the
Depression Nineties. Some of the smaller railroads not surviving the depression simply
sold their rolling stock in liquidation, and leased out their trackage to one or more larger
railroads and received lease payments in return.
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The ensuing consolidation phase of the railroad industry during the late nineteenth
century as a result of the depression 1890s is developed in the next chapter. This
consolidation phase also aided the extension of transcontinental rail lines that had been,
up until that time, only regional lines and a few extended trunk line systems between
major cities such as New York and Chicago. Many Eastern promoters changed their
emphasis from the China trade to railroad building investments, and as a result this led to
some of the overbuilding that happened prior to the late nineteenth-century depression.
The next chapter also depicts an analysis of this revolutionary phase of railroad
building that followed along many of America’s waterways. As result of overextension
and rapid railroad expansion, it took American industrialization some time to assimilate.
Railroads hired their land agents as a means of promoting settlement in their regions in
order to increase their agrarian rail freight use.
The railroads of the 1890s were firmly integrated into America’s industrialization
process. The Baring Brothers Argentine bond crisis undoubtedly caused disinvestment of
America’s rail stocks, but this situation, along with the monetary shortage brought about
by these same European investors cashing in their “gold-bonded” rail certificates, also
resulted in more gold being pulled out of the U.S. economy and sent back to Europe.
Steel and pig iron prices were also uniquely linked into the rail economy, and this
industry among others suffered during the depression of the 1890s. The end result in this
“survival of the fittest” economic environment was more extensive railroad
reorganization along with merger and acquisition as a means of economic survival. But
this was also big business, leaving no room for small investors, adding more fuel to the
Populist Movement.
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Chapter 8
Railroad Reorganization and its Westward Link during the
Late Nineteenth−Century Depression
This chapter analyzes the consolidation phase of the railroad industry during the
late nineteenth century, which resulted from the financial downturn. William Cronon’s
“central place theory” is used in part to explain why Chicago became the major Midwest
metropolitan transportation hub. Chicago’s grain nexus to New York City via the Erie
Canal was the most economically viable transportation route of the middle and late
nineteenth century for East-to-West railroads. A description of eastern capitalization for
railroads is accompanied by an argument that capitalists in Boston transferred their China
trade interest to railroad transportation. An analysis is included of how the early railroads
followed the right-of-way of various state-controlled canals including the Erie,
Chesapeake and Ohio, and the Illinois and Michigan. Railroads following rivers and
canals were the most expeditious routes for their building. Even the Illinois Central
Railroad, which runs in a north to south direction for its 704 miles upon completion to
Cairo, Illinois, by 1854, followed many of the internal Illinois River routes and then the
Mississippi River to Cairo.
With the Illinois Central charter and its vast land grants, this measure became a
major means for financing railroads, in addition to the backing from promoters. Large
tracts of land were sold off by railroad land agents and much of the inducement for
immigration to the United States after the Civil War resulted in railroads promoting their
land overseas for potential farming in the trans-Mississippi midwestern states, such as
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Kansas, Iowa, Nebraska, Minnesota, and South Dakota. The improvements of the
McCormick reaper and its mass production in Chicago helped make wheat cultivation
more successful for farmers.
The railroads promoted westward expansion to the ultimate frontiers and when
the financial depression of the late 1890s began, it led to another consolidation phase for
railroads greater than that of the Panic of 1873. Railroads were financed mainly by bonds
bought by overseas investors. U.S. railroad bonds paid a higher interest rate than what
could be obtained in England and Europe. Once these bond defaults began, it indeed
became “the survival of the fittest” and the Wall Street houses such as J. P. Morgan that
specialized in railroad reorganizations became even larger. This chapter will describe
how the railroads and their reorganization (many went into bankruptcy receivership
during the late 1890s) led to a consolidated phase of transportation and communication
that began in earnest with the Panic of 1873, and would be greater during the Panic of
1893. As William Cronon has so aptly related, the westward railroad expansion allowed
“the expansion of a metropolitan economy into regions that had not been tightly bound to
its market, and the absorption of new peripheral areas into a capitalist orbit.”1 Cities of
the midwestern region became a major impetus for which railroad building took place.
The most notable of these was Chicago. Situated just off Lake Michigan, and its rapid
urbanization in the late nineteenth century would be boosted by a giant railroad-building
network which allowed feeder railroads from the various hinterlands of the entire
Midwest, thus making Chicago a transportation hub to New York and the East. Cronon’s
1
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central place theory has explained in part why Chicago became so industrialized, just as
the economic importance of St. Louis began as a major riverboat transportation center for
upriver trade at the confluence of the Mississippi and Missouri rivers, and New Orleans
as the premier antebellum cotton-trading port in America’s South at the mouth of the
Mississippi.2
Wyatt Belcher emphasized that St. Louis relied too much on its steamboat
riparian traffic, and though it maintained a stronger lower Mississippi River trading route
throughout the late nineteenth century, the city was surpassed by Chicago regarding
transportation in the upper Mississippi-Iowan regions after the “golden age of
steamboating” had passed during the decade from 1850 to 1860.3 Scott Marler’s
reference to “The Course of Trade on Rail-Roads” from De Bow’s Review (1851)
articulated that banking facilities of the East were accommodating western commerce and
drew trade away from New Orleans as much as the canals and railways that capital had
constructed.4 In addition to financial backing, Chicago had a large amount of geographic
determinism that resulted in its becoming the major transportation hub of the late
nineteenth century in the Midwest. Chicago’s link to the Erie Canal at Buffalo on Lake
Erie allowed Chicago to become a major Great Lakes shipping port. Chicago also had
access to the Mississippi River via the Illinois River with the completion of the Illinois
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and Michigan Canal in 1848, and by usage of the Illinois River, it “provided a continuous
waterway between Chicago and the Mississippi.”5 Thomas C. Cochran also supported the
argument that despite the railroads being set back following the Panic of 1837, that even
as late as 1845, while the American rail system was a mere fifteen years old, the
commercial cities of Boston and New York had through trunk-line routes to water
transportation on the Erie Canal and onward to Chicago.6
The financing of state internal improvements projects for canals during the 1830s
through the early 1840s would set a precedent for how railroads would primarily be
financed as well. Despite the denial of financial assistance by Congress to the state of
New York in building the Erie Canal, the U.S. government did make substantial
contributions toward the construction of other canals.7 Largely due to the commercial
success of the Erie Canal, by 1860 the government had granted nearly 4,000,000 acres of
public domain to canal projects in Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin.8
Outside the land grants the states still made some of the major capital contributions
toward financing canal projects such as the Chesapeake and Ohio, along with the
financing of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad by subscribing to stock and issuing bonds
where state credit had been used to subsidize railroad construction.9 The state of
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Maryland and Baltimore eventually held a majority of the stock of the B&O Railroad and
early on appointed a majority of its directors.10
George Rogers Taylor emphasized that several railroad builders initially followed
the routes of many existing state canals; by example, the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad
tracks paralleled the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal with a right of way extending fifty to
eighty feet from the water surface. Another well-known example of railroad usage for
canal right-of-ways was the Illinois and Michigan canal which connected the Des Plaines
and Illinois Rivers from Chicago to LaSalle, Illinois, on the Mississippi River. Two
connecting railroads used its right of way, the Chicago & Alton Railroad which went
from Chicago to Alton, Illinois, opposite St. Louis, and the Chicago & Rock Island
Railroad which headed southward through South Chicago and Blue Island, Illinois, to
Joliet where it picked up the I&M Canal to Peoria and then headed northward away from
the canal to Rock Island near the Mississippi River.11 The Erie Canal itself was the most
notable right-of-way along which the early components of the New York Central Railway
followed. These component railroads were incorporated within the state of New York and
followed alongside the completed Erie Canal: the Utica and Schenectady opened in 1836,
the Syracuse and Utica opened in 1839, the Schenectady and Troy Railroad opened in
1842, the Rochester and Syracuse opened in 1853, and the Rochester, Lockport and
Niagara Falls opened in 1852. All together they provided a completed rail system from
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Troy and Albany on the Hudson River to Buffalo, New York, on Lake Erie.12 Many of
these railroads were in fact built as tributaries to the canal, such as the Auburn and
Syracuse, and for several years had to pay the same tolls into the Canal Fund “for the
carriage of property . . . as would be paid to the State for the transportation of the same
property on the Canal.”13 Many of these early internal improvements funded by the states
were part of Henry Clay’s earlier vision of an “American System,” that would bridge
time and space, along with John C. Calhoun’s national transportation system such as the
Cumberland or National Road over which farmers could take produce to market.
The federal government would assist in other ways by using its teams of army
engineers, ordered out by later Secretary of War John C. Calhoun. His War Department
laid out plans for the Miami Canal connecting the Miami River in Ohio to Lake Erie, and
also an extension of the Ohio and Erie Canal from Cleveland to Akron, which was part of
a 308-mile waterway that originally went from Cleveland in the north to Portsmouth on
the Ohio River, completed in 1833.14 The canal-building era financed by various states
came to an end when states overextended themselves, and at least three states had
strained their credit almost to the extent of bankruptcy during the Panic of 1837.15 A few
of the trans-Mississippi short-line state railroads were supported by local governments to
12
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connect large country towns and river ports with the use of railroads as an aid toward
river transportation.16 Individual subscriptions to the capital stock of the railroad
company were made by individuals, with some city and county municipalities buying
shares as well, and “very frequently the swamp lands given to the national government to
the states were regranted [sic] to the railroads.”17
The Panic of 1837 took public financing of internal improvements toward an era
of private financing through the sale of common stock to the public.18 Railroad building
was a very intensive capital undertaking. The Pacific Railway of Missouri, later renamed
the Missouri Pacific, was chartered in 1849, to begin a line from St. Louis headed
westward across Missouri, with ground not being broken until July 4, 1851; some nine
years later in 1860, it only reached Sedalia, Missouri – a distance of 188 miles at a cost of
$10.5 million or $55,851 per mile of track.19 The early states’ enthusiasm for internal
improvements was diminished after the Panic of 1837, and the railroads were not the
culprit in this panic, but rather other public works projects with $170 million of state
indebtedness occurring up to 1838, with the railroads obtaining less than $43 million, and
banks and canals being the chief beneficiaries.20 Another cost-saving measure was the
merger of the various short-line railroads running along the Erie Canal which were
16
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consolidated in 1853, at the request of the New York State Assembly. The valuations of
each were based on track mileage and passenger revenue rather than their capital stock at
par, with some stockholders receiving a greater percentage of the newly formed New
York Central Railroad.21 This consolidated railroad from Albany, New York, to Buffalo
on Lake Erie was 788 miles, with an 1853 valuation of $26 million or $33,000 per mile.22
The original line of the Illinois Central Railroad upon completion in 1854, from
Chicago to Cairo, Illinois, was 704 miles long at a cost of $26 million or nearly $37,000
per mile.23 The promoters, with Robert Schuyler as president in March 1851, estimated
that the cost of constructing these 700 miles of road would be $16,500,000, a difference
of ten million dollars from the actual cost.24 Despite this deficit amount, the Illinois
Central began as the first major “land grant” railroad and was awarded 2,595,000 acres,
which were sold at various values based on location and quality of the land from $20 to
$5 per acre.25 Paul Gates related that buyers had six years to pay, which went toward the
required 7 percent of the gross revenue required to be paid to the state by the Illinois
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Central.26 The Illinois Central made between 40,000 and 45,000 individual sales from
1854 to 1900 in disposing of its land grant of 2,595,000 acres, including the donation of
some of its land during 1870 as the future site of the University of Illinois at Urbana –
Champaign campus.27 By 1855, the public domain of Illinois had been disposed of,
having passed into the hands of settlers, by using David Neal’s Illinois Central credit
plan, with an initial 2 percent interest rate for two years and cultivation of at least onetenth had to begin during the first year, and no principal payment until the third year of
possession.28 The federal government retained the odd-numbered sections on either side
of the proposed Illinois Central route and these tracts of land priced at $2.50 per acre
were available as well.29
Land agents for the Illinois Central wisely decided not to apply the credit terms to
timberlands and decided to sell these tracts on a cash basis only.30 Paul Gates and John
Stover have both written extensively about the colonization work of the Illinois Central in
selling its right-of-way land to prospective immigrants from Norway and Sweden.
Francis Hoffmann, the German land agent, also the elected lieutenant governor of Illinois
on the Republican ticket, generally sold 40-acre farms and was able to induce as many as
1,500 new farm families into eastern Illinois.31 Land sales slipped after the Panic of 1857,
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with the best sales year being 1855, with 374,000 acres sold for $4,848,000, or nearly
$13.00 per acre. No doubt these land sales opened up prairie farmlands which supported
Chicago’s growth in the grain markets. The Illinois Central Chicago headquarters on
South Water Street was composed of a four-story office building, sixty-feet in height.32
Stover described the facility covering over two acres with enough track room to house
both the Michigan Central and the Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy trains as well.
The transportation of wheat as flour from the Midwest grain belts firmly fixed
Chicago’s rail-transportation hub as the major nexus to feeding the growing masses of
immigrant workers in New York and the rapidly rising steelworker industry in the
Allegheny peripheral regions. Along with westward railroad expansion, the center of the
wheat industry moved westward to the prairies, land that was ideally suited to Cyrus
McCormick’s mechanical reaper and the more practical wheat-threshing machine.33
Agricultural economists Marvin Towne and Wayne Rasmussen emphasized that when
this late nineteenth-century westward expansion occurred, of the ten leading wheat states
three were east of the Allegheny Mountains in 1860, and only Iowa was west of the
Mississippi River. However, just ten years later in 1870, only one of the ten leading
wheat states was east of the Alleghenies, and four were west of the Mississippi.34 The
Erie Canal and Buffalo, New York at the western end was the nexus for the grain trade of
the Old Northwest. Buffalo with its commission houses acted not only as agents for
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dealers in New York, but also as agents for millers at flour manufacturing centers.35
Improvements in railroad transportation and telegraph communications put western
markets in close touch to price changes in the eastern financial centers, with the degree of
risk lessening as the time and distance variance decreased.36 There was an early
determination on behalf of businessmen, investors, and promoters to build railroads in
advance of traffic that gave the “railroad idea” a prolonged force in American economic
life.37 Railroads were built in the last quarter of the nineteenth century for whatever
mercantile needs that could prove feasible.
The impetus for railroad building occurred alongside Chicago’s success. Even
though the Chicago and North Western railroad had a line from Oshkosh to Green Bay,
Wisconsin, with the insistence of lumbermen and material assistance on crossties this line
was extended further from Green Bay to the Menominee River.38 Such expanded railroad
needs created more railroad trackage extending into the hinterlands of the Old Northwest.
The Wisconsin Central Railroad, one of the most important lumber railroads,
completed a line from Milwaukee to Ashland on Lake Superior in 1877, along with
branches to Green Bay and Portage, allowing sawmills to spring up in the wake of
construction.39 Several other railroads such as the Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis and
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Omaha; the Wisconsin Valley Railroad which ran from Tomah to Wausau; and the Green
Bay and Minnesota Railroad running all the way to the Mississippi River, enabled
lumbermen of the “Wisconsin Lumber Line,” as a cooperative network to compete with
Chicago and other distribution centers for the western markets.40 Lumber mills were now
prepared to ship by rail the complete millwork for an entire house from the rough sills
and framing to the finished doors, casings, flooring, moldings, or hardwood mantels.41
In addition to grain and lumber, other railroads hauled specialty materials as well. The
Philadelphia and Reading was an anthracite coal hauler, and some of the transMississippi railroads such as the Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy (C.B. & Q.) which
helped connect to the regional centers of St. Louis, Kansas City, Denver, and Chicago by
1890, became a leading American railroad which hauled grain, livestock, and lumber.42
Chicago predominated in the corn market and the railroads that brought the
midwestern product to its shores were the C.B. & Q. Railroad being the chief carrier. The
Illinois Central, the Chicago and North Western, the Chicago and Alton, the Wabash, St.
Louis and Pacific, and the Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul were among the top six
railroads that helped to deliver 1.6 billion bushels of corn produced in 1890, within the
North Central Division out of 2.1 billion bushels produced nationwide within the U.S.43
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By 1885, Chicago would have 22 different railroads arriving into the city hauling freight
of various commodities.44 This entire corn-commodity and grain system was located
within the Chicago Board of Trade which was supported in 1893, by the largest grain
depository in all the United States with a capacity of 32,800,000 bushels in storage and
grain elevators as high as ten stories located in the neighborhood of 19th and 20th streets
near the south branch of the Chicago River and adjacent to the railroad tracks.45
The railroad-consolidating phase of the late nineteenth century, with Chicago as a
pivotal point for the hauling of grain, allowed for national market integration. The vast
U.S. wheat market that went to Europe in the 1870s and 1880s did not originate on the
East Coast, but rather in the Midwest with Chicago as its main shipping port.46 The
globalized wheat market and a market economy allowed transport costs to fall
competitively between the American Midwest and East Coast of New York at an even
greater rate than the transatlantic transport costs during the late nineteenth century.47 The
improvements in railway freight hauling not only lowered freight costs over time, but
also narrowed the price spread of wheat and other commodities as the consolidation
phase took hold. Jeffrey G. Williamson emphasized the convergence of regional prices as
the wheat price spread between New York City and Iowa fell from 69 to 19 percent from
1870 to 1910, and the price difference between New York City and Wisconsin fell from
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52 to 10 percent during this same timeframe. Kevin O’Rourke and Jeffrey Williamson
stressed other valid reasons for globally decreased grain prices of wheat, barley, and oats
along with other commodities such as coal, tin, and coffee during the late nineteenth
century. They made the argument that international transport costs were also declining
within Europe as well due to efficient modes of transportation such as improved
steamships, the compound engine, and the opening of the Suez Canal on November 17,
1869.48 Therefore, improved transportation had a deflationary effect upon grain prices
along with market competition.
East to West Rail Expansion Promoted by Eastern Capital and Consolidation
The initial construction costs were just the beginning expenses for railroads, as
many railroad historians have explained that fixed charges existed on an annual basis.
When the acquiring railroad of a merger bought out a smaller feeder line, it would also be
obligated to pay the annual dividends or the lease payments for that short-line railroad, as
well as their own debt interest.49 Most of the financing for these trunk-line systems
heading westward and the consolidation of feeder short-lines originated with outside
capital. Just as the various lines of the New York Central Railroad merged in 1853 and
the Illinois Central was completed in 1854, various forms of capital began to emerge that
placed railroading building into the hands of the promoter during the years succeeding
the Panic of 1837. One such railroad promoter of the Old Northwest involving Illinois,
Indiana, and Southern Michigan was John Murray Forbes, a Boston capitalist who took
China trade profits from an earlier seafaring and mercantile career and placed them into
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various railroad-building adventures.50 Not only did John Forbes make use of the profits
obtained from the China trade, but, he in turn acquired from the Canton Hong merchant,
Houqua, large amounts of capital to invest in America’s western railroad expansion.51
Forbes was also able to obtain support from Baring Brothers in London from their
American railroad advisor, William H. Swift. The Barings had extensive connections in
America’s finances, and the firm of Bryant & Sturgis of Boston had been taken over by
Baring Brothers & Company in 1828, with a cousin of William Sturgis married to Joshua
Bates, one of the Baring Brothers partners.52 Ralph Hidy maintained that William H.
Swift had an extensive background in railroading as a former president of the
Wilmington, Philadelphia and Baltimore Railroad Company in 1847, and from that
position just three years later, he became president of the Western Railroad Corporation
of Massachusetts. Swift in turn was retained from 1852 forward as Barings’ special
adviser on railroad matters, and as a long-time trustee for foreign bondholders in the
Illinois and Michigan Canal, he was able to lend support in the building of the Michigan
Central Railroad, and such financial support from Europe helped Forbes to build the
Michigan Central Railroad and the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad.53
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The Michigan Central, like a few earlier railroads in the Old Northwest, had been
started as an internal improvement in 1837, and the railroad had actually been completed
from Detroit to Kalamazoo, a distance of 145 miles, as the Detroit and St. Joseph
railroad, when purchased by Forbes and Boston associates for a price of $2,000,000
which the state of Michigan had spent upon it.54 Forbes issued 8 percent convertible
bonds to cover their initial $2,000,000 investment in March 1848, and on April 23, 1849,
the Michigan Central was completed to New Buffalo, Michigan, on Lake Michigan, with
an additional 73 miles for a total of 218 miles of track from Detroit.55
Barings joined Forbes’s associates in buying $450,000 of a $600,000 Michigan
Central bond issue in 1855, which were taken at 89 and soon sold at 100, plus interest.56
Barings generally purchased American railway securities and then sold them quickly for
a profit. John Murray Forbes and the Boston group of associates had gained some of the
confidence from Barings and they had accepted bonds on nearly all of Forbes’s roads, the
Michigan Central, the Central Military tract, the Chicago & Aurora, and the Joliet &
Northern Indiana, but only as collateral for debts contracted in purchasing rails.57
Hidy explained that Barings offered bonds held in collateral of purchased steel rails with
a commission for buying the rails at 2 ½ percent, with six months credit on the
outstanding purchased amount by the railroad promoters, and 5 percent interest for any
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extension of that six months to pay.58 Barings had performed this financial undertaking in
1856, for the Virginia Central in the amount 4,700 tons of rails and 3,750 tons of rails for
Forbes in 1854.59
Water, Water Everywhere and All the Boards Did Shrink
Forbes, like so many railroad promoters of this 1850s era, was using a financial
technique that would come back to haunt the railroads in the late nineteenth-century
depression. Forbes, with other Boston capitalists such as William Sturgis of Sturgis and
Company, David A. Neal of Neal and Company, and John E. Thayer, would subscribe
heavily to an initial railroad stock capitalization such as the Michigan Central, and then
issue the stock at $76 per share, and mark it at par or $100, thus increasing its
capitalization and evaluation.60 This technique was called watering of the stock where
“commentators recognized that in the case of stocks there was a wide divergence between
the stated par value and the amount of money originally paid for them.”61 Philip Locklin
has explained that “stock-watering” referred to the dilution of a railroad’s capitalization
by issuing new securities without an equal increase in assets.62 Overcapitalization related
to the evaluation of the total assets of the railroad, such as rail trackage and rolling stock,
and its capitalization at par, where par was always $100 per share value.63 If the total
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value of the carrier’s assets did not equal the stock valuation at par when issued along
with its annual dividend and bond interest debt, then there was overcapitalization.64
Henry Varnum Poor blamed the panic and depressions of these earlier periods “to the
cumulative effects and concluded that the increase in railroad capital and indebtedness
from 1880−82 only 52 percent represented actual cash expenditure,” and Charles Francis
Adams, Jr. in A Chapter of Erie estimated a representative sample of railroads all had
stock price increases due to pure “unadulterated water.”65
In addition to the grain traffic, a partial explanation of how Chicago increased as a
metropolis for railroad interchange was involved in trackage rights by aiding in the
construction of the Illinois Central. The Michigan Central management led by John
Forbes agreed to carry $2,000,000 of Illinois Central Railroad’s 7 percent bonds for two
years in exchange for the Michigan Central having the use of the Illinois Central line
where the two roads met south of Chicago, since the Michigan Central by charter could
not gain access to Chicago.66 Rapid railroad expansion was usually followed by a
contraction or consolidation period, and these usually occurred during economic
downturns such as the Panic of 1837, the Crisis of 1857, the Panic of 1873, and the Panic
of 1893 and the five depression years that followed. Leland Jenks has emphasized that
“railroad building proceeded in an undulating pattern, paralleling closely the general
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contours of major business cycles,” from 1850 to the nineties.67 The trans-Mississippi
expansion from Chicago, St. Louis, Memphis, and New Orleans would be another phase
of railroad expansion which began with the consolidation of smaller lines into existing
lines to form railroad systems. This rapid form of railroad consolidation began
straightforward following the Panic of 1873.
A beginning of the Panic of 1873 was the failure of Jay Cooke and Company of
Philadelphia on September 18, 1873. Cooke’s association with the Northern Pacific,
chartered in 1864, went back to 1869 when Jay Cooke & Company were appointed
financial agents and on July 1870, “issues of $100,000,000 in 7.3 percent first mortgage
bonds and $100,000,000 in stock were authorized.”68 The bonds were sold to agents at
88, with the bulk of the stock going to the same agents as a bonus or to the financial
syndicates that took them.69 The Northern Pacific went into receivership when Jay Cooke
& Company failed in 1873, and again when the Northern Pacific Railroad defaulted in
1893, during the Depression Nineties. However, in 1874, the section of the line extending
from Duluth to Bismarck on the Missouri River was completed.70 A syndicate controlled
by Henry Villard purchased this fragment at a foreclosure sale in 1875, and then pushed
the construction of the line on to the Pacific Coast.71 Campbell described that the
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difficulties and liquidations brought on by Baring Brothers in 1890, just when the
Northern Pacific had contracted for building extensions to its system, caused it to cancel
these contracts and suffer heavy financial losses along with the ensuing 1893 bankruptcy.
There were other major problems with railroad expansion that occurred within the
Panic of 1873, one of which was the corruption with Crédit Mobilier, organized under a
Pennsylvania charter to take over the stock of the Union Pacific and to carry out its
construction.72 The Union Pacific was the most expensive railroad ever built at $104,561
per mile, along with 20 square miles land-granted per each constructed mile, and
government loans up to $48,000 per mile, secured by second mortgages.73 Congressional
hearings on the Crédit Mobilier construction costs began in February 1873, and Myers
maintained that the top-heavy credit structure collapsed, and many of these new western
roads had expanded into areas which for a long time would not provide enough traffic to
cover their borrowing costs.74 All in all, by year’s end, fifty-five railroads were in default,
as well as the banks and insurance companies that had loaned them money when railroad
stock subscription sales were in difficulty.75 Investment banking houses suffered through
both the Panic of 1873 and 1893 as well. For example, in 1873 there were approximately
forty-three investment houses that were on the boards of various railroads.76 Several
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Eastern investment houses would serve on major railroad boards such as, Brown Brothers
on the board of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad which defaulted in the 1890s. J. P.
Morgan associates were also on the various boards of many reorganized railroads, and
were instrumental in consolidations and reorganizations.
When the Northern Pacific Railway underwent reorganization in May 1895, the
new company issued $100 million in shares and a maximum of $200 million in gold
bonds, with all of the working capital raised by J. P. Morgan & Company and the
Deutsche Bank.77 One of the finer points of the 1890s railroad reorganizations was that
rarely did the old bondholders lose their original investment. For instance, in the
Northern Pacific 1895 reorganization, each $1000 Northern Pacific second mortgage
bond was exchanged for a new $1125 Northern Pacific guaranteed bond, and at least
$250 in shares.78 Part of the rationale for these lucrative reorganizations — where newer
bonds were exchanged for old bonds — was to maintain an economic rapport with
European investors abroad since a vast majority of railroad money had come from
abroad, as well as the investment banking houses salvaging their own assets. Edward
Campbell related that the Union Pacific had been largely financed by English and Dutch
interests, with the Great Northern supported by Canadian and English capital. In addition,
German interests and Deutsche Bank almost exclusively owned the Northern Pacific, and
European and English investors held three-fourths of the Louisville and Nashville stock.79
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Commercial failures in 1893, outside of railroad receiverships were three times as
numerous as those of 1873, and the total liabilities involved were 50 percent greater.80
During the Depression Nineties, some of the major railroads that went into receivership
were the New York, Lake Erie and Western Railroad on July 1893.81 The Philadelphia &
Reading Railroad became insolvent on February 20, 1893; the Baltimore and Ohio went
into receivership on February 1896; and the New York and Erie Railroad was in
reorganization from 1874 to 1878 due to the Panic of 1873. Although the Erie struggled
from 1887 to 1893, it underwent reorganization on August 26, 1895.82 Campbell reported
from the Interstate Commerce Commission Statistics of 1894, that as of June 30, 1894,
there were 192 railways in receivership and the mileage of line operated by these
defaulting companies was 40,818 miles.83
During this phase of consolidation in the 1890s other major railroads, somewhat
more solvent, made use of the economic downturn for creating larger railroad systems.
One such notable example was the Illinois Central Railroad which extended it trackage
from Cairo, Illinois, down to New Orleans. During the two decades that ran from the
Panic of 1873 to the Panic of 1893, the principal additions were the Mississippi and
Tennessee Railroad, a hundred-mile road that ran from Grenada, Mississippi to Memphis;
the Louisville, New Orleans and Texas Railroad acquired in 1892, which was 800 miles;
and the Chesapeake, Ohio and Southwestern Railroad, acquired in 1893, which was 392
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miles.84 During this reorganization process of the 1890s, J. P. Morgan was also able to
create the Southern Railroad system from a consolidation of the Richmond and Danville,
the East Tennessee, Virginia, and Georgia Railroad, the Georgia Central Railroad, and
the Mobile and Birmingham Railroad.85 Both the Richmond and Danville and the East
Tennessee Railroad controlled the Coast Line railroads from Richmond to Charleston,
and the Memphis and Charleston from Chattanooga to Memphis.86 Edward Campbell has
emphasized that the Southern Railway Company was a good illustration of the well-timed
consolidation of thirty-five or thirty-six corporations which became a major rail system.
The Steel Industry Suffers a Blow with the Railroads
The railroads continued to build new tracks during the Depression Nineties, but
on a much smaller scale. The Commercial and Financial Chronicle reported for the year
ending December 1894, that a decreased amount of 1,919 miles of new tracks were laid.
Table 8.1. New Rail Track Mileage
1893
2,828 mi.

1892
4,648 mi.

1891
4,620 mi.

1890
5,657 mi.

1889
5,696 mi.

1888
7,028 mi.

1887
12,983 mi.

Source: Commercial and Financial Chronicle, Dec. 23, 1894, vol. 59, 1128.
The railroads and the steel industry were seamlessly interrelated. Many of the
railroads had certain specifications for rolling mills that produced their rails. For
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example, the Pennsylvania Railroad owned and controlled the Pennsylvania Steel
Company, Lackawanna Steel rolled its rails to the New York Central’s specification, and
Maryland Steel rolled rails for export, and special sections of the Pennsylvania Railroad’s
division as well as the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad.87 Andrew Carnegie, a major force in
late nineteenth-century steel manufacturing began a career in the railroads in 1853, as a
telegraph operator for the Pennsylvania Railroad, and then was promoted to
superintendent of that railroad’s western division for six years beginning in 1859.88
It took the various railroads a long time to agree to a unified track gauge of
4 feet, 8 ½ inches, but the Bessemer open-hearth process of rolling steel helped in this
rail-making process.89 Mergers and consolidation were the result of both the economic
depression and the rising costs of maintenance and rails. The heavier freight traffic had
required shifting from rails weighing 60 to 70 pounds per yard to those weighing 85 and
even 100 pounds per yard after 1895.90 The railroad system had consolidated as well.
Commodore Vanderbilt purchased the New York Central in 1851, and expanded the
system by acquiring much of the rail system that John Murray Forbes had begun in
Detroit and Chicago. By 1893, the New York Central had acquired the Chicago and
Northwestern, the Michigan Central and Canada Southern, the Lake Shore and Michigan
Southern, and the New York, Chicago, and St. Louis Railroad (Nickel Plate), all of which
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expanded the New York Central system to more than 15,500 miles of track.91 The New
York Central felt the effects of the Depression Nineties; however, because it had built up
its assets and rolling stock, it was able to counterbalance a 7 percent loss in gross receipts
by an equal reduction in operating expenses.92 Campbell reported the slight economic
maneuvering when the New York Central decreased its dividend to 4 ¼ percent from the
usual 5 percent, even though the deficit was $786,380. However, the New York Central’s
rail assets and trackage were significant enough, and it also served as a commuter line for
the New York metropolitan area to the degree that J. P. Morgan in May, 1895, was able
to sell 45,717 shares on the London market at $105.93 Not all lines were so fortunate;
many had quit paying dividends for some years, and many of the railroad first-mortgage
bonds were trading flat, meaning that interest was not paid when due. The railroad
reorganization resulting from the Depression Nineties further escalated the
unemployment and wage problem as described in a previous chapter, and it would be
some time up – until 1897 – before the economy actually turned around with a higher
monetary capacity, with heavier industrialization. The supply of transportation had
exceeded the demand during the depression years and it would take a larger economy to
take up the excessive railroad building that had occurred earlier. But that also meant that
the U.S. would have the transportation it needed well into the twentieth century.
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Epilogue
The Escalating Effects of the Late Nineteenth−Century Depression, 1893−1897
While an assumption can be made that the gold standard and bimetallic parity
between gold and silver were the most important monetary issues of the Depression
Nineties, in actuality, it was the inadequate money supply and the Populist demand for a
greater circulating currency for an increasing U.S. population that became the most
pressing economic matters. The global economy and the development of an expanded
international gold standard by emerging industrial countries coincided with the enormous
growth in international trade and cooperation.1 The United States, as a result of its
expansive railroad building in the West and financial policy during the 1880s and the
early 1890s, supported by overseas investors, which relied upon dividend payments, had
little choice but to follow suit by maintaining its own gold standard monetary system.
However, this dissertation asserted that one must also look at the cultural context,
which included an emphasis on class consciousness, sectional economic division, and
competition, which arose primarily as a result of the National Banking Act of 1863.
Looking at the depression this way has placed less emphasis on the mechanics of the U.S.
Treasury’s restrictive policy to maintain its gold reserve balance. The requirements of
the National Banking Act of 1863 were difficult at best during the depressions years
1893−97, and would not be effectively amended until the Federal Reserve Act of 1913,
during Woodrow Wilson’s administration.
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The requirements of financial markets were difficult during the Depression
Nineties. The simplest form of finance was the call money rate. It had the shortest
possible maturity, generally sixty days at best, and was the loan most commonly found in
money markets such as New York and London.2 The problem was that lenders had the
right to call an outstanding loan at any time.3 The National Banking Act’s pyramid
reserve structure had two noticeable results on monetary policy. This act made interest
rates relatively higher in more remote regions of the country that drew mainly on state
banks, making interest rates much higher in those regions than in eastern markets.4 The
second result was that the country banks “funneled vast amounts of short-term loanable
funds into the New York Stock Exchange,” where they fueled longer term investments in
railroad securities.5 Therefore, with the Panic of 1893, railroad securities were liquidated
and there were runs on banks, due to a liquidity crisis from not being able to pay out
currency on demand.
The Commercial and Financial Chronicle reported that during the mid-term
period of the first depression year, 1893, the call money rate for a 60-day loan not subject
to demand was at 12 percent interest, while those subject to demand on notice went from
7 to 12 percent.6 A. Barton Hepburn, a former comptroller of the currency, and chairman
of the board of directors for Chase National Bank, gave a grave warning when rural
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banks began withdrawing large portions of their New York deposits in order to meet their
legal reserve requirements. This forced New York banks to call in these demand loans,
which further pushed the call money rate as high as 74 percent at one point.7 Hepburn
recalled that during this crisis, money was hoarded and a currency “famine” began, where
a premium as high as 4 percent was paid for currency of any kind, even silver dollars.
Commercial paper rates also varied widely from one part of the country to another, and
rates of interest were proportional to the population of the city and its distance from New
York.8 Bankers’ Magazine emphasized that the range of rates was lower in the East,
beginning with Boston having a range of 3.83 percent to 5.05 percent, even lower than
New York, but rates got progressively higher as the borrower went westward and
southward, to a high of 10 to 11.67 percent in Denver.9 Not until the Federal Reserve Act
of 1913, did the government establish a more centralized system of discount rates and
borrowing among member banks.
The money supply during 1893−97 was lessened to such a degree that in 1893,
clearinghouse certificates were printed in small denominations and paid out to the public.
To facilitate payroll disbursements, manufacturers issued scrip currencies.10 Phillip
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Cagan said that some form of monetary payment was better than none at all, and no
lawsuits appeared to have been initiated against the issuers. At the end of June 1893,
there was an authorized circulating currency of $985 million against $80 million in an
unauthorized amount for a total of $1.065 billion circulating outside of banks.11 Hepburn
reported that the temporary currency of clearinghouse certificates “performed so valuable
a service in such a crucial period, in moving the crops and keeping business machinery in
motion, that the government, after due deliberation, wisely forebore to prosecute.”12
This dissertation has argued that a rigid money supply led also to lower wages and
lower prices for commodities during this depression. Chapter six provided statistical data
from U.S. Commissioner of Labor Carroll D. Wright’s Eleventh Annual Report, which
demonstrated that the United States was switching from an agricultural to industrial
workforce. The 1890 U.S. agricultural workforce made up thirty-six percent of the total,
with a higher percentage in the South. Wright noted in the report that agricultural workers
were not included in the workforce numbers; thus one can only surmise whether the
South’s unemployment rate was much greater than the North’s.
Stanley Lebergott’s foundational work, Manpower in Economic Growth: The
American Record Since 1800 (1964), provided data tables showing the “Depression of
the Nineties” had unemployment levels from a low of 11.7 percent of the labor force in
1893, to a high of 18.4 percent in 1894, and continued with a 12.4 to 14.5 percent range
through the year 1898. Lebergott further suggested that history books stressed the
depression’s severity by wage cuts, labor strife, and railroad strikes from its beginning in
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1893, but stated that the “unemployment level reached in a single bound was not reduced
for six long years,” and paralleled the Depression of 1873−1878, with the longer Great
Depression.13 History books generally have not regarded the high unemployment rate
from 1893 to 1897, as a cause of the Depression Nineties, but rather as a result of the
depression. Clearly, unemployed workers could only buy the bare necessities, if that, to
survive these disastrous times.
The Inelastic Monetary Supply

During this time, the monetary supply was inelastic, and once the Sherman Silver
Purchase Act was repealed on October 30, 1893, there were senators such as Arthur Pue
Gorman of Maryland and George Gray of Delaware who attempted to pass a seigniorage
bill (with Treasury Secretary Carlisle’s reluctant backing) that would have forced the
Treasury Department to coin all the silver bullion lying in the vaults.14 These influential
Democratic senators were joined by Republicans from the silver states, and though the
Bland seigniorage bill passed both Houses of Congress quickly, it was vetoed by
President Cleveland on March 29, 1894.15 It was during this time that the more vehement
silver Democrats such as William Jennings Bryan denounced Grover Cleveland’s efforts
to sustain the gold reserve by selling issues of government bonds in Europe in exchange
for gold as catering to Wall Street and J. P. Morgan.16
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Banks in major cities were feeling the downward economic effects as well.
Clearinghouse bank returns were listed on the front page of the Commercial and
Financial Chronicle in its weekly Saturday edition. Seven major city banks from New
York, Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Chicago, St. Louis, and New Orleans sent their
weekly return figures by telegraph to the Chronicle, reflecting bank clearings completed
by noon on Saturday. The percentage decrease in bank clearings for the week ending on
September 16, 1893, were lower than the previous year of 1892, by a downward amount
of -35.4 percent in New York, -25.2 percent in Boston, -22.7 percent in Chicago, to the
least amount of -9.2 percent decrease in New Orleans.17 Another well-known financial
reporting service, R. G. Dun and Company, stated in March 1894 “that the volume of
domestic trade as measured by bank clearings was nearly one-third less than a year
before.”18 Bank clearings dropped continuously throughout the depression.
Iron ore production used for steel manufacturing was another major indicator of
the decline in industrial manufacturing. Both pig iron and steel rail production dropped
during the depression years, 1893−97, and The Commercial and Financial Chronicle
reflected on the decreased production of this bellwether industry:
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We referred last week to the great reduction in the production of
pig iron which has recently taken place. One of the effects of
this is seen in the curtailment of the shipments of iron ore. From
the statement of the traffic shipments for the St. Mary’s falls, or
“Soo,” canal during August, we see that only 688,840 tons of
iron ore passed through the canal in August, 1893, against
958,774 tons in August, 1892, which means of course that the
ore-carrying roads to the Lakes suffered a reduction of their
traffic in that class of freight. (Commercial and Financial
Chronicle, vol. 57, p. 442, September16, 1893)
Railroad earnings began going down in 1893. The Commercial and Financial
Chronicle reported in the same volume issue, that “When the history of this period of
industrial paralysis comes to be written, the falling off in railroad earnings will no doubt
be referred to as one of the most striking evidences of it.”19 This issue of the Chronicle
reported that 42 railroads all had losses during August 1893, with the Northern Pacific
(whose earnings last year had been cut down by one-third) reporting a decrease in the
amount of $916,027. The Chronicle reported that two southwest railroads, the Missouri
Pacific had losses of $837,236 and the Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe lost $765,885.20 In
addition, the Chronicle stated, in the Northwest region, the Milwaukee & St. Paul had
decreased earnings of $496,709. In the mining region of Colorado, the Denver & Rio
Grande had a decrease of $461,700, while in the South, the Louisville & Nashville had a
decrease of $384,520, and the East Tennessee suffered a loss of $121,550.21 The
Chronicle reported only two railroads had the distinction of greater earnings, at a time
when other railroads were suffering from a catastrophic reduction in their revenues.
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These two railroads reported slightly better earnings for August 1893 than for the same
month the previous year. The Illinois Central had a gain of $262,018 and the Chicago &
Grand Trunk (the Chicago line of the Grand Trunk of Canada) a gain of $108,449 for five
weeks ending September 2, 1893.22 The Chronicle reported that both railroads owed their
gains to extra passenger traffic resulting from travel to the World’s Fair in Chicago,
which extended from the “dedication ceremonies,” October 21, 1892 through October 31,
1893.23
The Vanderbilt trunk-line railroads heading east to west, such as the Lake Shore
and Michigan Southern Railway, which Commodore Vanderbilt acquired from
receivership during the Panic of 1873, did better during the Depression Nineties. The
acquisition of this line by Cornelius’s son, William Henry Vanderbilt, allowed the New
York Central Railroad to extend beyond Buffalo, all the way to Chicago. In essence, the
New York Central became a major trunk-line system between the two trading centers of
New York City and Chicago. The Lake Shore acquisition also gave the New York
Central access to Cleveland, Toledo, Detroit, and Ft. Wayne, Indiana, all industrialized
cities in the Old Northwest.24 The Chronicle reported that during the lean years of the
mid-nineties, the Lake Shore made construction improvements from earnings rather than
floating more stock. The company also avoided any increase in its charges during the rate
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wars and by reducing expenses was able to survive the late Nineties Depression and still
pay its semi-annual dividend of 3 percent.25
Railroads further contributed to the scarcity of gold by utilizing it to pay interest
in what was called “sound money.” Some railroads paid their bond interest in gold, which
made them more attractive to the investing public. The Memphis & Charleston Railroad
had a 6 percent bond that paid its interest in gold or gold certificates, and in March 1894,
it sold for $57 to $58.50 per bond.26 The Louisville & Nashville Railroad had a 50-year
bond, issued in 1887 that matured in 1937, and paid 5 percent in gold. The majority of the
railroads paid their bond interest in gold during the1890s.27 The fact that American
railroads paid bond interest in gold made them attractive to European investors, who also
received a higher rate of interest, one not normally obtained on the Continent. Banks that
acted as trustees or transfer agents for the payment of railroad bond interest, while
holding their stock as collateral, were often on the hook for repayment from earnings.
The dividend payments could be passed over by a railroad company, but the bond interest
was sacrosanct. If a railroad missed a bond interest payment, foreclosure proceedings
began and the railroad went into receivership. This was what happened to Jay Cooke &
Company during the Panic of 1873, when Cooke could not make the bond interest
payments on the Great Northern Railroad. The bankruptcy of the Philadelphia & Reading
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Railroad in February 1893, along with the bankruptcy of National Cordage, a major stock
on the exchange, in May of the same year, began the onset of the Depression Nineties.
First-mortgage bonds on railroads were perhaps the safest form of investments for
overseas investors. These bonds were secured by the real estate that the railroad tracks sat
on and by the rolling stock as well. Receiverships of railroads became a routine practice
for federal bankruptcy judges who believed that these national systems needed protection.
They used a court-appointed trustee who separated bondholder ownership of the
reorganized line from daily managerial control. The end result was a reduced, fixed-cost
debt for the reorganized railroad by an average of one-third.28 Margaret Myers stressed
that the tide of securities buying by foreign investors turned even before the Panic of
1893. For five years, inclusive from 1890−94, the average net withdrawal of capital and
return of American securities was about $60,000,000 per year, with the heaviest return in
the two-year period, 1893−94.29 The Commercial and Financial Chronicle prepared a
table that depicted the downturn in new bond listings on the New York Stock Exchange:
Table: 9.1 Railroad Bond Issuance30
Year Bonds Issued New Issue Amount total
1894
$134,785,000
1893
$139,279,000
1892
$175,125,600
1891
$191,397,700
1890
$198,158,850
1889
$206,864,000
1888
$261,989,631
Source: Commercial and Financial Chronicle, vol. 58.
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Not only was there a decreased number of new railroad bond issues being placed
on the financial markets, but those that existed were being cashed in from overseas
causing a downward spiral in bond prices. Consolidations also took effect under the 1889
New Jersey corporation laws that allowed the formation of holding companies under a
New Jersey charter. The holding company thrived during the Depression Nineties,
allowing a form of consolidation that had not previously existed. Because holding
companies could own the stock of other corporations, a new form of financing occurred
that facilitated railroad management in merger and acquisition activity. The issuance of
general collateral trust bonds issued by a holding company such as a bank or trust
company, could act as the transfer agent and issue the new bonds based on the underlying
collateralized securities held in the account.
Alexander Dana Noyes emphasized the “watering effect” of the “collateral trust
bond.” Both the Great Northern Railroad and the Northern Pacific, itself a reorganized
railroad that had gone into receivership on August 15, 1893, pushed up the stock of the
Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy Railway in 1900 from $144 per share to above $180 per
share and issued “collateral trust bonds” jointly in the amount of $50,000,000 to acquire
the C.B. & Q.31 Noyes argued collateral trust bonds were issued merely for the cost of
purchasing another corporation or railroad; and that when issued, these bonds covered
only the purchasing cost of the acquired company. The highly-leveraged collateral trust
bonds were much less secure than mortgage railroad bonds which represented an actual
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lien on the rail franchise and roadbed of the issuing company.32 Thus the “watering” of
railroad bond issues increasingly pushed the country toward the Depression Nineties, as
well, a means to finance further railroad consolidation.
More railroad mergers came about as a result of the Panic of 1893 and the
Depression Nineties, with many of these railroads destined to become parts of larger
systems. An example is the Philadelphia & Reading Railroad holding 1,152 miles of
trackage under lease, out of a total 1,586 miles of its entire roadbed.33 This railroad was
reorganized in 1886 and again when it failed in February 1893.
The problem with the Reading Railroad was that its subsidiaries, Lehigh Valley,
Jersey Central, and Delaware, Lackawanna & Western, were not earning enough to pay
out their own dividends and were draining the Reading of its capital in the amount of
$330,000 per year.34 A. A. McLeod, president of the Reading, attempted to borrow on
collateral trust bonds, worth $10,000,000; and although accepted by Speyer Brothers,
London, they were refused by Drexel and Company of Philadelphia. This forced Drexel
to sell its own Reading securities at any price.35 Once the Panic of 1893 began, nothing
could save the Reading whose large blocks of shares had been purchased on margin.36
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Mergers and Reorganizations — An Escalating Effect of the Depression Nineties
Alfred Chandler emphasizes that the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 would “have
a profound impact on the evolution of modern industrial enterprises in the United
States.”37 The holding company had taken the place of the trust as the coordinator of
consolidated enterprises, and New Jersey enacted a set of general incorporation laws in
1888−89. Taken together, they, authorized the formation of holding companies that might
be operated on a national scale, allowing a holding company to hold the existing stock of
several corporations chartered in any state.38
Chandler reports that the first wave of mergers occurred between 1890 and 1893,
resulting from the passage of the Sherman Antitrust Act and the revisions of the New
Jersey incorporation laws that allowed for holding companies. Fifty-one holding
companies were formed between 1890 and 1893, but with the depression of 1893,
mergers fell off, with only 27 coming into being during the total three years after 1893.39
The New Jersey holding company incorporation law allowed larger railroads such as the
Pennsylvania and the New York Central to incorporate several of the short-line railroads
that went into receivership during the Depression Nineties.
One of the escalating effects of the Panic of 1893 and the Depression Nineties as
described by Naomi Lamoreaux was the great merger movement that increased prior to
the passage of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, which compelled manufacturers to
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form consolidations, pools, and trusts to “escape the severe price competition that
developed during the depression of the nineties.”40 The shortage of money created less
demand and sent prices downward during the depression. As a result, industrial
manufacturers and railroads struggled for a greater share of the market. This brought
mergers and acquisitions to reduce costs from capital-intensive rail systems.41 Both
Lamoreaux and Chandler emphasized the importance of two Supreme Court decisions,
United States v. E. C. Knight Company (1895), known as the “Sugar Trust Case,” and the
Addyston Pipe & Steel (1899) case, which held that pools and similar price-fixing
associations were in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, but that
consolidations and mergers were not in violation.42 The E. C. Knight Company decision,
along with the New Jersey “holding company” incorporation laws enacted two years
earlier, set off merger activity and reorganizations for railroads already in desperate
financial straits. Railroads also merged due to increased competition, which resulted in
rate cutting, as Daggett explained, either openly or by secret concessions, as well as
reckless extension of lines into territory where there was no business to justify it.43
As mentioned, the Philadelphia & Reading Railroad went into receivership on
February1893, and in July 1893, the New York, Lake Erie & Western also became
insolvent. In mid-August, the debt-burdened Northern Pacific system with its two chief
subsidiaries, the Wisconsin Central Railroad and the Chicago & Northern Pacific, applied
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for bankruptcy protection.44 During October 1893, the Union Pacific and two of its
subsidiaries, Oregon Railway & Navigation Company and Oregon Short Line & Utah
Northern, went into receivership. On December 18, a third subsidiary, Union Pacific,
Denver & Gulf pled insolvency.45 Stuart Daggett reported on the demise of the Atchison,
Topeka, & Santa Fe Railroad, which had floating debt that increased by $4.5 million in
just four years from 1884 to 1888. By 1889, the Atchison Company had outstanding
bonds in the amounting to $163,000,000, and as Cornelius Vanderbilt had famously said
about railroads and credit, “They robbed Peter to pay Paul.” For instance, the Atchison
directors issued 4 and 5 percent general mortgage bonds for $213,000,000 to replace the
previous issue, and used the $50,000,000 difference for fixed charges.46 The Atchison
went into receivership and sold at foreclosure on December 10, 1895. Representing the
reorganization committee, Edward King, Charles C. Beaman, and Victor Morawetz
purchased it for $60,000,000.47
According to Alexander Noyes, writing during this period, the Atchison had over
$100,000,000 in shares distributed throughout Europe. For three continuous years, the
management of the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe had overstated their earnings while
actually having deficits for three consecutive years in 1892, 1893, and 1894.48 This
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incident and similar disclosures become public knowledge during 1894 to such a degree
that it started a greater wave of foreign liquidation.49 Stover also reported that there were
improper accounting methods where operating expenses were charged to construction
costs.
An important secondary contribution of this dissertation is the argument that not
only were railroads overcapitalized due to the intensive capital outlay from roadbed and
railroad track construction, but additionally, the receivership and reorganization of failing
railroads during the Depression Nineties intensified the financial efforts and created a
method of refinancing these bankrupt rail carriers. Rail mergers and acquisitions occurred
on a broader scale during the late nineteenth century than at any time in history, and yet
willing investors came back into the market. The 1890s and railroad reorganizations
stimulated the emergence of a new class of private bankers who tied their ambitions to
the growth of Chicago and Western cities such as Omaha, Kansas City, and Denver.50 A
unique outcome of the Depression of 1893−97 was the ingenuity involved in railroad
reorganizations. James Livingston explains that the corporate innovations born out of
necessity during the crisis that followed 1893 had the end result of allowing hundreds of
railroads in receivership to consolidate and absorb smaller lines competing for the same
traffic.51
J. P. Morgan & Company did much of the reorganizations of railroads that went
into receivership during the Depression Nineties and were completed in 1895, 1896, and
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1897.52 Reorganization and the means by which it was performed became one of the
major consequences of the Depression Nineties, where foreclosed railroads were
purchased by merchant banks such as J. P. Morgan, Brown Brothers and Company,
Drexel, or Kuhn, Loeb & Company on behalf of former shareholders, who were often
assessed a pro rata share of their holdings to raise needed cash resources.53 An example
of stock assessment occurred when the Union Pacific Railroad, sold in foreclosure during
November 1897, was bought by a new Union Pacific Company, where former
shareholders exchanged their $60,868,000 in former shares on a share-for-share basis, but
paid an additional $15 per share in cash.54 Often a merchant banking syndicate, organized
as a guarantor for these cash assessments, committed themselves to a cash reserve to step
in for shareholders that either had thrown away their old bankrupt stock or had sold it
previously at cents on the dollar.55 Noyes emphasized that in 1895 receivers operated 169
railways representing 37,855 miles of trackage, or one-fifth of the entire U.S. railway
mileage, with a market value of $2,400,000,000 in stocks and bonds.
It is accurate to say that J. P. Morgan had more to do with the railroad
reorganizations of the Depression Nineties than any other firm on Wall Street. The
Morgan firm had perhaps the largest expert legal staff in railroad reorganization during
this time, according to both Edward Campbell and Morgan’s biographer Carl Hovey.
Francis Lynde Stetson, for example, was “on the roster of nearly every reorganization
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committee working under Morgan’s direction” and was known as “Morgan’s attorney
general,” receiving an annual retainer of $50,000 just so he would always be at Morgan’s
beck and call.56 During the time between Grover Cleveland’s administrations, at the end
of his first term in 1889, he joined the New York City law firm of Bangs, Stetson, Tracy,
and MacVeagh at Stetson’s request.57 Francis Stetson, though rarely in public view, was
instrumental in arranging railroad reorganizations in the best interests of all parties
involved and handled the reorganization of the Philadelphia & Reading Railroad.
Stetson’s firm was asked by southern businessmen who had no pecuniary interest in the
railroad for their assistance in the reorganization of the Richmond Terminal lines in
1893.58 Between February and September 1894, he took the bankrupt remnants of the
Richmond Terminal system and restructured various railroads into the Southern Railway
system.59
The charter for the Southern Railway Company organized in the state of Virginia
“involved two trustees’ sales, one receivers’ sale, ten foreclosure sales, and six
conveyances without foreclosure,” all occurring within a six−months span.60 Charles E.
Tracy of the same law firm as Stetson, was credited with inventing no-par value stock.
Moreover, during the Depression Nineties, Tracy was instrumental in coming up with
future railroad mortgage debentures, many of which extended into the mid-twentieth
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century.61 Another of J. P. Morgan’s staff was Charles H. Coster, a partner in the Morgan
firm, who invented non-cumulative preferred stock as an instrument of railroad
reorganization financing. According to the New York Times, Charles Coster sought to
give every class of security holder their just share of reorganized property at its value
prior to the reorganization, as well as the new value that might be created for it.62
These reorganization financial instruments opened up totally new avenues for
other corporations and companies to imitate in future reorganizations. J. P. Morgan was
the architect of the buyout and merger of Carnegie Steel in 1901. It began in September
1899, with Carnegie’s purchase of the Lake Superior Iron Company and its fleet of
barges along with the merger of Henry Clay Frick’s Frick Coke Company in March 1900.
The resulting holding company was called the Carnegie Company of New Jersey.63 Only
one year later, Carnegie accepted the offer of J. P. Morgan to sell out his entire Carnegie
Steel Company. Morgan formed the United States Steel Corporation in 1901 for slightly
more than $492,000,000, the largest price ever paid for a business enterprise up to that
time.64 This consolidation of several major steel producers included Federal Steel
organized by Eldridge Gary, the National Steel Company, and the American Steel and
Wire Company, which included the Rockefeller iron ore holdings in the Lake Superior
district.65 According to Victor S. Clark, this consolidation of companies into one large
holding company gave U.S. Steel an annual production of 750,000,000 tons of iron ore;
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112 steamships; a thousand miles of railroad; the ability to produce 7,900,000 tons of
finished steel per year; the production of 9,400,000 tons of steel ingots; and 7,400,000
tons of pig iron.
Vertical integration of this type through mergers and acquisitions became a longlasting effect of the Depression Nineties. Lamoreaux and Clark both stated that U.S. Steel
was the first modern example of vertical integration but that other steel industries had
also achieved the same result by controlling their iron ore resources as well as their rail
transportation. However, U.S. Steel became the most fully integrated enterprise in the
industry.66 This type of vertical integration allowed the United States to maintain
protective tariffs on imported steel, since it could be produced at lesser expense in the
United States.
A major contribution of this dissertation is the analysis of American evolutionary
industrial change in the late nineteenth century, which demonstrated how market forces
consolidated, and led to the beginnings of a major industrialization that would carry over
into the twentieth century. The pattern of vertical integration and merger activity leading
out of the Depression Nineties was indeed painful. The “National Market Integration,”
was a paradigm used by rail traffic managers to maximize high volume, long-distance
traffic over inter-regional systems. These managers favored full carloads of freight and a
long haul, versus a short haul and less−than−full carloads of freight.67 Gerald Berk
argued that “corporate liberalism” won out over “regional republicanism,” thus the title
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of the work, “Alternative Tracks.” The term “National Market Integration,” mentioned
only casually became somewhat analogous to such terms as “national market
development.” The terminologies are similar in that “regional republicanism” occurred
when moderately sized, regionally-based railroads, with shared authority between owners
and managers, were replaced during the Depression Nineties by reorganized and
consolidated national systems based on national markets where ownership was separated
by hundreds of miles from district managers.68
Summation of the Leading Causes of the Depression Nineties
Scholars have always viewed financial problems as a primary cause of the 1890s
Depression. The analysis of the monetary shortage is supported by primary sources found
in government statistics, leading economic journals such as the Commercial and
Financial Chronicle, as well as authors who lived during this period.
O. M. W. Sprague, a former professor of banking and finance at Harvard, and
Alexander Dana Noyes, financial editor for the New York Tribune in 1891 and also
financial editor at the New York Times in 1920, gave leading accounts of events during
the financial depression. Many modern economists such as Milton Friedman, Anna
Jacobson Schwartz, and Margaret Myers, along with leading railroad reorganization
historians such as Stuart Daggett and Edward G. Campbell provided analysis of
economic data that supports the underlying “monetary shortage” dissertation theme.
Most important, the National Banking Act of 1863 and its revision in 1864, which
carried over until the Federal Reserve Act was enacted in 1913, was a leading cause of
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the Panic of 1893. An in-depth analysis is presented in chapter five, of the reverse
pyramid reserve structure of the national banking system. The use of clearinghouse loan
certificates among member banks, decreased national bank note circulation, and currency
sectionalism throughout America are evidence of a problematic monetary system.
However, the currency shortage also had a socio-economic side.
The Populist Movement and the agrarian revolt caused divisiveness that led to an
alliance of the Populists in Kansas and Texas with those in the South, against the “sound
money” advocates of the East. Farmers at this time could not obtain mortgages for more
than three years in duration from commercial loan companies, and national banks were
prohibited from making real estate loans. The repeal of the Sherman Silver Purchase Act
of 1890 hastened the bond redemption totaling vast sums by European investors. They
were dumped upon U.S. financial markets after the Baring Crisis in Argentina. The
United States was caught up in a gold currency global economy, and it had to abide by
the gold standard since London was the leading financial capital market.
Alec Ford’s The Gold Standard 1880−1914, Britain and Argentina offers an
explanation of why London was the world’s capital market center. Along with Paris and
Berlin, London possessed the liquid resources to ease the stress during stringent times.
Grover Cleveland made a great effort during his first presidential term to get a global
parity of 16 to 1 for silver to gold at various monetary conferences, but to no avail.
The second cause of the Depression Nineties was the overcapitalization of
railroads. The Panic of 1873 began with the failure of Jay Cooke and Company and the
failure of the Northern Pacific Railroad, which underwent numerous reorganizations
during downward economic panics. The major difference was that during the 1893−97
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Depression, reorganization and restructuring occurred more urgently and with more
severe financial consequences than other times, but despite the negatives, it was also a
period of intense consolidation and creative railroad-bond financing for merchant banks,
which became specialists in this area, such as J. P. Morgan and Company. The United
States was not alone in depressed railroad issues. A compelling argument can be made
that the depression was shared on the European continent as well. The Chronicle reported
on September 15, 1893, that “It is rather interesting to note that at present English
railways are showing losses in earnings just as striking as our own.”69
The third cause of the Depression Nineties was the McKinley Tariff of 1890,
which led to reduced customs revenue in gold for the U.S. Treasury. Chapter six of the
dissertation expands upon the theme that the McKinley Tariff of 1890, which reduced
tariff rates, had the profound effect of reducing revenue for the U.S. Treasury. Although
the Wilson-Gorman Tariff of 1894 attempted to rectify that mistake and also enact an
individual income tax, it was a matter of too little, too late. Much of the revenue that the
U.S. Treasury took in had come from the sale of public lands, but by the late 1890s much
of the public domain had already been sold. Attempts were made by Carl Schurz, when in
control of the Land Office, to restore about 50,000,000 acres of unearned lands originally
granted for railroad construction back to the public domain.70 However, it was not until
September 29, 1890 that Congress passed a general forfeiture act to cover all unearned
land grants in the United States. Robert Riegel emphasized that by this time most of the
large western grants had already been revoked if new rail construction had not been
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completed. Frederic L. Paxson stressed that between 1880 and 1890, the American
frontier had become largely settled and open for trade. The railroads with lands to sell
had planted more farming families on the western plains than they could hold.71 The low
income levels at which the U.S. government operated during the Depression Nineties,
from the midpoint of 1895, were insufficient, because of an inflexible monetary policy,
based on a gold standard, and a substantial reduction in tariff revenue, which wreaked
havoc on U.S. financial markets.
John Firestone accentuated that between 1880 and 1910, federal income
corresponded closely to population growth, and that government receipts rose at an
annual rate from $350 million from 1880 to $650 million in 1910, just as the U.S.
population had grown from 50 million to over 90 million.72 Firestone illustrated that total
receipts from May 1891 to June 1894 were $28.58 million per month or $343 million per
year, while total expenditures were $30.58 million per month or $367 million per year. A
smaller receipt amount of $26.83 million per month, with expenditure total of $30 million
per month existed from June 1894 to June 1897 at the end of the Depression.73 This
three-year period represented some of the worst years, and had the lowest federal receipts
of any period during the preceding seventy-nine years. Not until the Federal Reserve Act
of 1913 was enacted, did federal receipts rise significantly during a five-year period from
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December 1914 to March 1919. Customs revenue declined as well during the 1890s. The
customs revenue amount represented just over 50 percent of the total federal revenue.74
The Wilson-Gorman Tariff of 1894, which passed both Houses of Congress with
some sectional divisiveness, could not eradicate a deficit that had grown over the last four
years. There were also spending legislation by the “Billion Dollar Congress,” particularly
Civil War veterans’ pensions that consumed nearly one-third of the federal budget in
1893. Not until 1916, some twenty-three years later, was the Sixteenth Amendment
passed, allowing for direct income taxation by the federal government. At which point,
the U.S. government would reduce its tariff revenue from 50 percent to less than 10
percent and rely more heavily on corporate and individual tax. The Spanish-American
War was financed without an income tax and funded by higher excise rates, more internal
revenues from liquor and tobacco taxes, and the higher tariff rates imposed from the
Dingley Tariff Act of July 1897.75
The fourth cause of the Depression Nineties was depressed farm commodity
prices in cotton, wheat, and corn. Midwestern and southern farmers could not endure the
many years of low prices that occurred during the 1890s Depression, and foreclosures on
family farms were devastating to rural Americans. Farmers wanted an expanded
monetary policy and a greater money supply in the form of free coinage of silver.
However, the parity between silver and gold could not be stabilized and the Commercial
and Financial Chronicle under “The Financial Situation,” a regular weekly column,
spotlighted India’s suspension of the free coinage of silver in the last week of June 1893,
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which added more financial uncertainty in the United States.76 The Chronicle reported
that without the free coinage of silver in India after 1893, prices for cotton would have
risen, since the price of silver depreciated and the commodities had to be paid in higher
coinage.77
Southern cotton was not priced any better than Kansas or Nebraska wheat during
this time. The Chronicle gave weekly average prices from the various markets opening
six days per week. Middling cotton went for 7 ⅛ to 7 ¾ cents per pound in Memphis,
New Orleans, and Charleston, reaching 8 ⅛ to 8 ¼ cents per pound for better quality in
the week ending June 30, 1893. Other commodities such as No. 2 Red Winter wheat for
June 1893 delivery fared no better, with price ranges of 70 ¾ to 82 ⅛ cents per bushel for
December 1893.78
Unemployment, depressed prices, and lower profits, led to factory closings and
farmers being forced off their land. In the same issue of the Chronicle, R.G. Dun &
Company reported 3,199 business failures for the second quarter of 1893, compared to
2,119 for the same quarter of 1892.79 Chapter five of this dissertation notes that the
unemployment rate went from 17 to 18 percent during these years. Not only did farmers
suffer from overdue mortgages, drought, depressed commodity prices, locusts, and prairie
wildfires, but additionally there was flooding in the South. During the depression’s first
year from August 27−28, 1893, there was a major hurricane off the coast of Savannah
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that killed over 1,000 people, and caused major crop damage in North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, and to a lesser degree in Florida.80
The fifth related cause of the Depression Nineties was the overcapitalization of
railroads. Railroad promoters were selling and issuing watered-down stock because
railroads were significantly overcapitalized based on earnings. In addition, many
railroads were being built in sparsely populated western regions that had no means of
sustaining commercial enterprise that could support railroad traffic at the needed level.
European investors began to sense these credit problems, and once disinvestment began
to take place, it created a downward spiral with margin calls made as a result of falling
stock prices. Demand loans were called in as the monetary stringency worsened.
These are the five related causes of the Depression Nineties. America eventually
worked its way out of this economic upheaval. Wheat prices gradually moved upward
due to the declining Russian and French wheat crops of 1897, which allowed little for
export.81 The United States wheat yield in 1897 was 15 percent greater than the average
of the preceding five years; and for the first time, on August 20, 1897, cash wheat went
above one dollar per bushel in major markets regardless of location.82 Corn exports for
the first time in agricultural history amounted to more than 10 percent of the entire crop,
which added an additional $75 million to farm income.83 However, cotton continued to
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be exported principally to the United Kingdom and Germany during much of the early
1900s. They received over 50 percent of the exports total value.84
Grover Cleveland’s attempt to blame the Sherman Silver Purchase Act for the
Depression of 1893−97 was based on delusion. The fact that Cleveland vetoed the
seigniorage bill sponsored by Democratic Congressman Richard P. Bland of Missouri
sectionalized the Democratic Party to the breaking point.85 Bland predicted that if the
Democratic Party followed Cleveland, it would “be trampled into the dust of
condemnation now and in the future.”86 Congressman Bland’s prediction was prophetic.
In the 1894 U. S. Congressional mid-term elections, Republicans gained 117 seats, while
the Democrats lost 114.87 Had President Cleveland merely allowed the amount of silver
bullion held in the vaults of the U.S. Treasury to be coined and circulated into the
depressed economy during March 1894, the Bourbon Democratic Party of the PostReconstruction South in alliance with the West might not have split from the main
faction. This discontented group of Democrats, allied with the free-silver coinage support
of the Populist Movement, merged into the Democratic People’s Party under the
leadership of Nebraskan Congressman William Jennings Bryan during the presidential
elections of 1896 and 1900. The economic depression of the 1890s provided the ideal
stage for William Jennings Bryan’s rise to political prominence; although he was not
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elected. The opinion that the nation’s economic ills were due to rejecting the free coinage
was an argument that suited Bryan’s purposes.88 Bryan felt a certain sense of betrayal of
the Democratic Party principles. In the autobiography The First Battle: A Story of the
Campaign of 1896, Bryan brought forth the principles of Andrew Jackson’s battle with
the Second Bank of the United States in the “Cross of Gold” speech.
The Populists as reformers eventually obtained much of the monetary relief that
they sought during the early twentieth-century Progressive movement. A secondary goal
of this dissertation was to portray Populist leaders as well-educated individuals who were
also economic reformers seeking greater monetary flexibility and less restrictive farm
mortgages through an elimination of key restrictions applied by the National Banking Act
of 1863. Eastern newspapers often characterized the Populists as crackpots, hayseeds, or
inexperienced country bumpkins, while in fact eleven Populist Congressmen of the Fifthfourth Congress (1895−97) had college degrees, and two had law degrees from
recognized universities.89
The Populists obtained some monetary relief from the enactment of the Gold
Standard Act of March 14, 1900, which confirmed the gold dollar as the standard of
value but kept all other forms of money at parity with it.90 This monetary act which
increased the gold redemption reserve fund in the U.S. Treasury from $100 million to
$150 million in gold was the result of the Indianapolis Monetary Commission led by
88
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Professor Laurence Laughlin of the University of Chicago, with the assistance of Carroll
Root and Parker Willis.91 The U.S. Treasury notes of 1890, which allowed a conversion
into gold coin on demand, would be canceled as notes were paid into the U.S. Treasury
rather than re-circulated, but the Gold Standard Act left a number of financial problems
unsolved, especially the various interest rates over the entire United States.92
Many of the monetary problems that Populists raised would not be solved until
the Federal Reserve Act of 1913, which set up Federal Reserve Bank branches
throughout the United States, from which member banks could draw their reserve funds.
Another major reform that the Populists sought that would not occur until much later was
the Federal Farm Loan Act passed on July 17, 1916. It instituted a system of credit
institutions for agriculture, which provided farmers with low interest loans. The Populists
were indeed ahead of their time. As Gene Clanton, asks, “their message was delivered,
but was it received?”93 The answer to that question is “not in the way they would have
had it.”94
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